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V. Business Law
In This Section:
New Case: Moda Health Plan Inc. v. United States; Maine Community Health Options v.
United States; and Land of Lincoln Mutual Health Insurance Co. v. United States.
“U.S. SUPREME COURT TO HEAR MODA HEALTH’S $24 MILLION ACA APPEAL”
Elizabeth Hayes
“SUPREME COURT TO CONSIDER CASES ACCUSING US OF SHORTING HEALTH INSURERS
$12B IN PROMISED PAYMENTS”
Debra Cassens Weiss
“SUPREME COURT TO HEAR INSURERS’ SUIT ON OBAMACARE”
Adam Liptak
“INSURER WINS FIRST CSR PAYMENT DECISION; UPDATES ON BHP AND RISK CORRIDORS
LITIGATION”
Katie Keith
“MODA TAKES A HIT IN COURT OF APPEALS DECISION”
Tom Holt
“INSURERS PREPARE TO APPEAL RISK CORRIDOR CASE TO THE SUPREME COURT”
Evan Sweeney
New Case: Allen v. Cooper
“HIGH COURT TO TACKLE PIRATE SHIP COPYRIGHT FIGHT”
Bill Donahue
“SCOTUS TO DECIDE WHETHER STATES CAN BE SUED FOR COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
IN CASE INVOLVING BACKBEARD’S SHIP”
Krista L. Cox
“SUPREME COURT TO RULE WHETHER CONGRESS APPROPRIATELY ABROGATED STATE
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY FOR COPYRIGHT CLAIMS IN ALLEN V. COOPER”
Steve Brachmann
“YO HO NO: LACK OF EXPRESS LANGUAGE SCUTTLES CLAIM OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
WAIVER”
Rebecca Harker Duttry
“THE STATE CAN PLUNDER YOUR COPYRIGHT: ALLEN V. COOPER”
Brain Esler
New Case: Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc.
“SUPREME COURT WILL HEAR CASE OVER COPYRIGHTS TO LEGAL TEXTS”
Bill Donahue
“THE LAW©?: NO ONE OWNS THE LAW, AND NO ONE SHOULD BE ABLE TO COPYRIGHT IT”
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The New York Times Editorial Board
“ACCUSED OF ‘TERRORISM’ FOR PUTTING LEGAL MATERIALS ONLINE”
Adam Liptak
“ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FINDS NO VALID COPYRIGHT IN OFFICIAL CODE OF GEORGIA
ANNOTATED”
Steve Bachmann
New Case: Aurelius Investment, LLC v. Puerto Rico
“PUERTO RICO BOARD APPOINTMENT DISPUTE GETS SUPREME COURT REVIEW”
Greg Stohr, Michelle Kaske, and Steven Church
“UPDATE 1- U.S. SUPREME COURT TO DECIDE LEGALITY OF PUERTO RICO FINANCIAL
BOARD APPOINTMENTS”
Lawrence Hurley
“PUERTO RICO’S BANKRUPTCY PLAN IS ALMOST DONE, AND IT COULD START A FIGHT”
Mary Williams Walsh
“PUERTO RICO FACES HEDGE FUND LAWSUITS AS U.S. REPRIEVE ENDS”
Michelle Kaske
“FIRST CIRCUIT DECLARES APPOINTMENT OF FOMB MEMBERS VIOLATES APPOINTMENTS
CLAUSE”
Carlos J. Cuevas
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Moda Health Plan Inc. v. United States
Ruling Below: Moda Health Plan Inc. v. United States, 892 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Overview: Congress refused to authorize $12 billion for the expected funding of the Affordable
Care Act stabilization program aimed to encourage sales by health insurance companies.
Department of Justice contend that the Affordable Care Act insurers are not entitled to $12
billion because Congress specifically barred funding for that purpose.
Issue: Whether Congress can evade its unambiguous statutory promise to pay health insurers for
losses already incurred simply by enacting appropriations riders restricting the sources of funds
available to satisfy the government’s obligation.
Note: Moda Health Plan Inc. v. United States is consolidated with Maine Community Health
Options v. United States; and Land of Lincoln Mutual Health Insurance Co. v. United States.
MODA HEALTH PLAN, INC., Plaintiff-Appellee
v.
UNITED STATES, Defendant- Appellant
United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit
Decided on June 14, 2018
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]
PROST, Chief Judge:
A health insurer contends that the
government failed to satisfy the full amount
of its payment obligation under a program
designed to alleviate the risk of offering
coverage to an expanded pool of individuals.
The Court of Federal Claims entered
judgment for the insurer on both statutory and
contract grounds. The government appeals.
We reverse.

No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 18001 et seq.) (“ACA”), and
implemented by regulations promulgated by
the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services (“HHS”). The case also concerns the
bills that appropriated funds to HHS and the
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services
(“CMS”) within HHS for the fiscal years
during which the program in question
operated. We begin with the ACA.

BACKGROUND
I. The ACA
This case concerns a three-year “risk
corridors” program described in the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L.

Among other reforms, the ACA established
“health
benefit
exchanges”—virtual
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marketplaces in each state wherein
individuals and small groups could purchase
health coverage. The new exchanges offered
centralized opportunities for insurers to
compete for new customers. The ACA
required that all plans offered in the
exchanges satisfy certain criteria, including
providing certain “essential” benefits.

participating provider organizations
under part D of title XVIII of the
Social Security Act.
(b) Payment methodology
(1) Payments out
The Secretary shall provide
under the program established
under subsection (a) that if—
(A) a participating plan’s
allowable costs for any plan
year are more than 103
percent but not more than 108
percent of the target amount,
the Secretary shall pay to the
plan an amount equal to 50
percent of the target amount in
excess of 103 percent of the
target amount; and

Because insurers lacked reliable data to
estimate the cost of providing care for the
expanded pool of individuals seeking
coverage via the new exchanges, insurers
faced significant risk if they elected to offer
plans in these exchanges. The ACA
established three programs designed to
mitigate that risk and discourage insurers
from setting higher premiums to offset that
risk: reinsurance, risk adjustment, and risk
corridors. This case concerns the risk
corridors program.

(B) a participating plan’s
allowable costs for any plan
year are more than 108
percent of the target amount,
the Secretary shall pay to the
plan an amount equal to the
sum of 2.5 percent of the
target amount plus 80 percent
of allowable costs in excess of
108 percent of the target
amount.

Section 1342 of the ACA directed the
Secretary of HHS to establish a risk corridors
program for calendar years 2014–2016. The
full text of Section 1342 is reproduced below:

(a) In general
The Secretary shall establish and
administer a program of risk corridors
for calendar years 2014, 2015, and
2016 under which a qualified health
plan offered in the individual or small
group market shall participate in a
payment adjustment system based on
the ratio of the allowable costs of the
plan to the plan’s aggregate
premiums. Such program shall be
based on the program for regional

(2) Payments in
The Secretary shall provide
under the program established
under subsection (a) that if—
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(A) a participating plan’s
allowable costs for any plan
year are less than 97 percent
but not less than 92 percent of
the target amount, the plan
shall pay to the Secretary an
amount equal to 50 percent of
the excess of 97 percent of the
target amount over the
allowable costs; and

(B) Reduction for risk
adjustment and reinsurance
payments

(B) a participating plan’s
allowable costs for any plan
year are less than 92 percent
of the target amount, the plan
shall pay to the Secretary an
amount equal to the sum of
2.5 percent of the target
amount plus 80 percent of the
excess of 92 percent of the
target amount over the
allowable costs.

(2) Target amount

Allowable costs shall [be]
reduced
by
any
risk
adjustment and reinsurance
payments received under
section[s] 18061 and 18063 of
this title.

The target amount of a plan
for any year is an amount
equal to the total premiums
(including any premium
subsidies
under
any
governmental
program),
reduced by the administrative
costs of the plan.
Briefly, section 1342 directed the Secretary
of HHS to establish a program whereby
participating plans whose costs of providing
coverage exceeded the premiums received
(as determined by a statutory formula) would
be paid a share of their excess costs by the
Secretary— “payments out.” Conversely,
participating plans whose premiums
exceeded their costs (according to the same
formula) would pay a share of their profits to
the Secretary—“payments in.” The risk
corridors program “permit[ted] issuers to
lower [premiums] by not adding a risk
premium to account for perceived
uncertainties in the 2014 through 2016
markets.”

(c) Definitions
In this section:
(1) Allowable costs
(A) In general
The amount of allowable
costs of a plan for any year is
an amount equal to the total
costs
(other
than
administrative costs) of the
plan in providing benefits
covered by the plan.
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On March 20, 2010, just three days before
Congress passed the ACA, the Congressional
Budget Office (“CBO”) published an
estimate of the ACA’s cost. The CBO Cost
Estimate made no mention of the risk
corridors program, though it scored the
reinsurance and risk adjustment programs.
Overall, CBO predicted the ACA would
reduce the federal deficit by $143 billion over
the 2010–2019 period it evaluated.

In March 2013, after an informal rulemaking
proceeding, HHS published parameters for
payments under various ACA programs for
the first year of the exchanges, 2014,
including the risk corridors program. The
parameters revised certain definitions and
added others, incorporating a certain level of
profits as part of the allowable administrative
costs. The parameters also provided that an
issuer of a plan in an exchange must submit
all information required for calculating risk
corridors payments by July 31 of the year
following the benefit year. HHS also
indicated that “the risk corridors program is
not required to be budget neutral,” so HHS
would make full payments “as required under
Section 1342 of the Affordable Care Act.”
This constituted the final word from HHS on
the risk corridors program before the
exchanges opened and the program began.

Preambulatory language in the ACA referred
to CBO’s overall scoring, noting that the
“Act will reduce the Federal deficit between
2010 and 2019.”
II. Implementing Regulations
In March 2012, HHS promulgated
regulations establishing the risk corridors
program as directed by section 1342. Those
regulations defined terms such as “allowable
costs,” “administrative costs,” “premiums
earned,” and “target amount,” all of which
would ultimately factor into the calculations
of payments in and payments out required by
the statutory formula.

III. Transitional Policy
The ACA established several reforms for
insurance plans—such as requiring a
minimum level of coverage— scheduled to
take effect on January 1, 2014. Noncompliant plans in effect prior to the passage
of the ACA in 2010, however, received a
statutory
exemption
from
certain
requirements. This meant that insurers
expected the pool of participants in the
exchanges to include both previously
uninsured individuals as well as individuals
whose previous coverage terminated because
their respective plans did not comply with the
ACA and did not qualify for the
grandfathering exemption.

The regulations also provided that insurers
offering qualified health plans in the
exchanges “will receive payment from HHS
in the following amounts, under the
following circumstances” and it recited the
same formula set forth in the statute for
payments out. The regulations similarly
provided that insurers “must remit charges to
HHS” according to the statutory formula for
payments in.
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Individuals and small businesses enrolled in
noncompliant plans not qualifying for the
exemption received notice that their plans
would be terminated. Many expressed
concern that new coverage would be “more
expensive than their current coverage, and
thus they may be dissuaded from
immediately transitioning to such coverage.”
In November 2013, after appellee Moda
Health Plan, Inc. and other insurers had
already set premiums for the exchanges for
2014, HHS announced a one-year transitional
policy that allowed insurers to continue to
offer plans that did not comply with certain
of the ACA’s reforms even for nongrandfathered plans. HHS directed state
agencies to adopt the same policies.

losses that might occur under the transitional
policy as a result of increased claims costs not
accounted for when setting 2014 premiums.”
This included adjustments to HHS’s formula
for calculating the “allowable costs” and
“target amount” involved in the statutory
formula.
HHS projected that these new changes
(together with changes to the reinsurance
program) would “result in net payments that
are budget neutral in 2014” and that it
“intend[ed] to implement this program in a
budget neutral manner” with adjustments
over time with that goal in mind.
In April 2014, CMS, the division of HHS
responsible for administering the risk
corridors program, released guidance
regarding “Risk Corridors and Budget
Neutrality.” It explained a new budget
neutrality policy as follows:

This dampened ACA enrollment in states
implementing the policy, especially by
healthier individuals who elected to maintain
their lower level of coverage, leaving insurers
participating in the exchanges to bear greater
risk than they accounted for in setting
premiums.

We anticipate that risk corridors
collections will be sufficient to pay
for all risk corridors payments.
However, if risk corridors collections
are insufficient to make risk corridors
payments for a year, all risk corridors
payments for that year will be
reduced pro rata to the extent of any
shortfall. Risk corridors collections
received for the next year will first be
used to pay off the payment
reductions issuers experienced in the
previous year in a proportional
manner, up to the point where issuers
are reimbursed in full for the previous
year, and will then be used to fund
current year payments. If, after the

HHS acknowledged that “this transitional
policy was not anticipated by health
insurance issuers when setting rates for
2014” but noted “the risk corridor program
should help ameliorate unanticipated changes
in premium revenue.” HHS later extended
the transitional period to last the duration of
the risk corridor program.
After further informal rulemaking (begun
soon after announcing the transitional
policy), HHS informed insurers that it would
adjust the operation of the risk corridors
program for the 2014 benefit year to “offset
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obligations for the previous year have
been met, the total amount of
collections available in the current
year is insufficient to make payments
in that year, the current year payments
will be reduced pro rata to the extent
of any shortfall. If any risk corridors
funds remain after prior and current
year payment obligations have been
met, they will be held to offset
potential insufficiencies in risk
corridors collections in the next year.

GAO
concluded
that
the
“other
responsibilities” language in the CMS
Program Management appropriation for FY
2014 could encompass payments to health
plans under the risk corridors program, and
so the lump-sum appropriation “would have
been available for making payments pursuant
to section 1342(b)(1).” Further, GAO
concluded that the payments in from the risk
corridors program constituted “user fees,”
and so “any amounts collected in FY 2014
pursuant to section 1342(b)(2) would have
been available . . . for making the payments
pursuant to section 1342(b)(2),” though HHS
had not planned to make any such collections
or payments until FY 2015.

As to any shortfall in the final year of
payment, CMS stated it anticipated payments
in would be sufficient, but that future
guidance or rulemaking would address any
persistent shortfalls.

GAO clarified that appropriations acts “are
considered nonpermanent legislation,” so the
language it analyzed regarding the lump-sum
appropriation and user fees “would need to be
included in the CMS PM appropriation for
FY 2015” in order to be available to make
any risk corridors payments in FY 2015.

IV. Appropriations
In February 2014, after HHS had proposed its
adjustments to account for the transitional
policy (but before HHS had finalized the
adjustments),
Congress
asked
the
Government Accountability Office (“GAO”)
to determine what sources of funds could be
used to make any payments in execution of
the risk corridors program. GAO responded
that it had identified two potential sources of
funding in the appropriations for “Program
Management” for CMS in FY 2014. That
appropriation included a lump sum in excess
of three billion dollars for carrying out certain
responsibilities,
including
“other
responsibilities” of CMS as well as “such
sums as may be collected from authorized
user fees.”

In December 2014, Congress passed its
appropriations to HHS for FY 2015 (during
which the first benefit year covered by the
risk corridors program would conclude). That
legislation reenacted the user fee language
that GAO had analyzed and provided a lump
sum for CMS’s Program Management
account;
however,
the
lump-sum
appropriation included a rider providing:
None of the funds made available by
this Act from the Federal Hospital
Insurance Trust Fund or the Federal
Supplemental Medical Insurance
Trust Fund, or transferred from other
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accounts funded by this Act to the
‘Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services—Program
Management’
account, may be used for payments
under Section 1342(b)(1) of Public
Law 111–148 (relating to risk
corridors).

with any shortfall to be made up by the
payments in received following the 2015
benefit year.
A follow-up letter noted that HHS would
“explore other sources of funding for risk
corridors payments, subject to the availability
of appropriations” in the event of a shortfall
following the final year of the program.

Representative Harold Rogers, thenChairman of the House Committee on
Appropriations, explained his view of the
appropriations rider upon its inclusion in the
appropriations bill for FY 2015:

A report from CMS shows that the total
amount of payments in collected for the
2014–2016 benefit years fell short of the total
amount of payments out calculated according
to the agency’s formula by more than $12
billion.

In 2014, HHS issued a regulation
stating that the risk corridor program
will be budget neutral, meaning that
the federal government will never pay
out more than it collects from issuers
over the three year period risk
corridors are in effect. The agreement
includes new bill language to prevent
CMS
Program
Management
appropriation account from being
used to support risk corridors
payments.

VI. Procedural History
Moda commenced this action in the Court of
Federal Claims under the Tucker Act in July
2016. It seeks the balance between the
prorated payments it received and the full
amount of payments out according to section
1342. The Court of Federal Claims denied the
government’s motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim and
granted Moda’s cross-motion for partial
summary judgment as to liability.

Congress enacted identical riders in FY 2016
and FY 2017.
V. Subsequent Agency Action

Both sides stipulated that the government
owed Moda $209,830,445.79 in accordance
with the ruling on liability. The trial court
entered judgment for Moda accordingly.
Dozens of other insurers filed actions
alleging similar claims, with mixed results
from the Court of Federal Claims. The Court
of Federal Claims had jurisdiction under the
Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1).2 We

In September 2015, CMS announced that the
total amount of payments in fell short of the
total amount requested in payments out.
Specifically, it expected payments in of
approximately $362 million but noted
requests for payments out totaling $2.87
billion. Accordingly, CMS planned to issue
prorated payments at a rate of 12.6 percent,
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have jurisdiction
1295(a)(3).

under

28

U.S.C.

§

Although we agree with Moda that section
1342 obligated the government to pay the full
amount of risk corridors payments according
to the formula it set forth, we hold that the
riders on the relevant appropriations effected
a suspension of that obligation for each of the
relevant years.

DISCUSSION
Moda advances claims based on two theories.
First, Moda contends that section 1342 itself
obligates the government to pay insurers the
full amount indicated by the statutory
formula for payments out, notwithstanding
the amount of payments in collected. Second,
Moda contends that HHS made a contractual
agreement to pay the full amount required by
the statute in exchange for Moda’s
performance (by offering a compliant plan in
an exchange), and the government breached
that agreement by failing to pay the full
amount according to the statutory formula for
payments out.

We begin with the statute.
A. Statutory Interpretation
The government asserts that Congress
designed section 1342 to be budget neutral,
funded solely through payments in and that
the statute carries no obligation to make
payments at the full amount indicated by the
statutory formula if payments in fell short.
Section 1342 is unambiguously mandatory. It
provides that “[t]he Secretary shall establish
and administer” a risk corridors program
pursuant to which “[t]he Secretary shall
provide” under the program that “the
Secretary shall pay” an amount according to
a statutory formula. Nothing in section 1342
indicates that the payment methodology is
somehow limited by payments in. It simply
sets forth a formula for calculating payment
amounts based on a percentage of a “target
amount” of allowable costs.

We review the Court of Federal Claims’ legal
conclusion that the government was liable on
both theories de novo.
I. Statutory Claim
Moda argues that section 1342 obligated the
government to pay the full amount indicated
by the statutory formula for payments out,
not a pro rata sum of the payments in. The
government responds that section 1342 itself
contemplated operating the risk corridors
program in a budget neutral manner (so the
total amount of payments out due to insurers
cannot exceed the amount of payments in). In
the alternative, the government contends that
appropriations riders on the fiscal years in
which payments from the risk corridors
program came due limited the government’s
obligation to the amount of payments in.

The government reasons that we must
nevertheless interpret section 1342 to be
budget neutral, because Congress relied on
the CBO Cost Estimate that the ACA would
decrease the federal deficit between 2010 and
2019, without evaluating the budgetary effect
of the risk corridors program. Thus,
according to the government, the ACA’s
passage rested on an understanding that the
405

risk corridors program would be budget
neutral.

provided no budgetary authority to the
Secretary of HHS and identified no source of
funds for any payment obligations beyond
payments in. But it has long been the law that
the government may incur a debt independent
of an appropriation to satisfy that debt, at
least in certain circumstances.

Nothing in the CBO Cost Estimate indicates
that it viewed the risk corridors program as
budget neutral. Indeed, even if CBO had
accurately predicted the $12.3 billion
shortfall that now exists, CBO’s overall
estimate that the ACA would reduce the
federal deficit would have remained true,
since CBO had estimated a reduction of more
than $100 billion.

In United States v. Langston, Congress
appropriated only five thousand dollars for
the salary of a foreign minister, though a
statute provided that the official’s salary
would be seven thousand five hundred
dollars. The Supreme Court held that the
statute fixing the official’s salary could not be
“abrogated or suspended by the subsequent
enactments which merely appropriated a less
amount” for the services rendered, absent
“words that expressly, or by clear
implication, modified or repealed the
previous law.” That is, the government’s
statutory obligation to pay persisted
independent of the appropriation of funds to
satisfy that obligation.

The government’s amicus suggests it is
“inconceivable” that CBO would have
declined to analyze the budgetary impact of
the risk corridors program, given its
obligation to prepare “an estimate of the costs
which would be incurred in carrying out such
bill.” Not so. It is entirely plausible that CBO
expected payments in would roughly equal
payments out over the three year program,
especially since CBO could not have
predicted the costly impact of HHS’s
transitional policy, which had not been
contemplated at that time. Without more,
CBO’s omission of the risk corridors
program from its report can be viewed as
nothing more than a bare failure to speak.
Moreover, even if CBO interpreted the
statute to require budget neutrality, that
interpretation warrants no deference,
especially in light of HHS’s subsequent
interpretation to the contrary. CBO’s silence
simply cannot displace the plain meaning of
the text of section 1342.

Our predecessor court noted long ago that
“[a]n appropriation per se merely imposes
limitations upon the Government’s own
agents; it is a definite amount of money
intrusted to them for distribution; but its
insufficiency does not pay the Government’s
debts, nor cancel its obligations, nor defeat
the rights of other parties.”
It is also of no moment that, as the
government notes, HHS could not have made
payments out to insurers in an amount
totaling more than the amount of payments in
without running afoul of the Anti-Deficiency
Act. That Act provides that “[a]n officer or

The government also argues that section
1342 created no obligation to make payments
out in excess of payments in because it
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employee of the United States Government .
. . may not . . . make or authorize an
expenditure . . . exceeding an amount
available in an appropriation . . . for the
expenditure.” But the Supreme Court has
rejected the notion that the Anti-Deficiency
Act’s requirements somehow defeat the
obligations of the government. The AntiDeficiency
Act
simply
constrains
government officials.

statutory requirement, Congress
suspended or repealed that obligation.

has

B. The Effect of the Appropriations
Riders
The government next argues the riders in the
appropriations bills for FY 2015 and FY 2016
repealed or suspended its obligation to make
payments out in an aggregate amount
exceeding payments in. We agree.

For the same reason, it is immaterial that
Congress provided that the risk corridors
program established by section 1342 would
be “based on the program” establishing risk
corridors in Medicare Part D yet declined to
provide “budget authority in advance of
appropriations acts,” as in the corresponding
Medicare statute. Budget authority is not
necessary to create an obligation of the
government; it is a means by which an officer
is afforded that authority.

Repeals by implication are generally
disfavored, but “when Congress desires to
suspend or repeal a statute in force, ‘[t]here
can be no doubt that . . . it could accomplish
its purpose by an amendment to an
appropriation bill, or otherwise.’” Whether
an appropriations bill impliedly suspends or
repeals substantive law “depends on the
intention of [C]ongress as expressed in the
statutes.” The central issue on Moda’s
statutory claim, therefore, is whether the
appropriations riders adequately expressed
Congress’s intent to suspend payments on the
risk corridors program beyond the sum of
payments in. We conclude the answer is yes.

Here, the obligation is created by the statute
itself, not by the agency. The government
cites no authority for its contention that a
statutory obligation cannot exist absent
budget authority. Such a rule would be
inconsistent with Langston, where the
obligation existed independent of any budget
authority and independent of a sufficient
appropriation to meet the obligation.

Moda contends, however, this issue is also
controlled by Langston. There, as discussed
above, the Supreme Court held that a bare
failure to appropriate funds to meet a
statutory obligation could not vitiate that
obligation because it carried no implication
of Congress’s intent to amend or suspend the
substantive law at issue.

We conclude that the plain language of
section 1342 created an obligation of the
government to pay participants in the health
benefit exchanges the full amount indicated
by the statutory formula for payments out
under the risk corridors program. We next
consider whether, notwithstanding that

Just three years before Langston, however,
the Supreme Court held that a statute that had
set the salaries of certain interpreters at a
fixed sum “in full of all emoluments
407

whatsoever” had been impliedly amended,
where Congress appropriated funds less than
the fixed sum set by statute, with a separate
sum set aside for additional compensation at
the discretion of the Secretary of the Interior.
The Court held:

by the appropriations bills in question, as in
Mitchell, or if Congress merely appropriated
a less amount for the risk corridors program,
as in Langston.
The Supreme Court has noted Langston
“expresses the limit in that direction.” The
jurisprudence in the century and a half since
Langston has cemented that decision’s place
as an extreme example of a mere failure to
appropriate. Our case falls clearly within the
core of subsequent decisions wherein
appropriations bills carried sufficient
implication of repeal, amendment, or
suspension of substantive law to effect that
purpose, as in Mitchell.

This course of legislation . . .
distinctly reveal[ed] a change in the
policy of [C]ongress on the subject,
namely that instead of establishing a
salary for interpreters at a fixed
amount, and cutting off all other
emoluments
and
allowances,
[C]ongress intended to reduce the
salaries and place a fund at the
disposal of the [S]ecretary of the
[I]nterior, from which, at his
discretion, additional emoluments
and allowances might be given to the
interpreters.

In United States v. Vulte, the Supreme Court
considered a series of enactments concerning
bonuses for Marine Corps officers serving
abroad. A 1902 act established a ten percent
bonus for all such officers and appropriated
funds accordingly. In 1906 and 1907,
appropriations for the payment of that bonus
carried a rider specifying that the funds could
be used to pay officers serving “beyond the
limits of the states comprising the Union of
the territories of the United States contiguous
thereto (except P[ue]rto Rico and Hawaii).”
The appropriations for 1908 contained no
such rider and stated the increase of pay for
officers serving abroad “shall be as now
provided by law.”

Thus, “for the time covered by those”
appropriations bills, the intent of Congress
was “plain on the face of the statute.”
Langston expressly distinguished Mitchell
because the appropriations bills in Mitchell
implied “that [C]ongress intended to repeal
the act” setting a fixed salary, with
“additional pay” to be provided at the
Secretary’s discretion. By contrast, Congress
had “merely appropriated a less amount” for
Langston’s salary.

An officer serving in Puerto Rico in 1908
sought compensation accounting for the ten
percent bonus enacted in 1902. The Supreme
Court rejected the government’s position that
the exception in the appropriations bills of
1906 and 1907 impliedly repealed the 1902

The question before us, then, is whether the
riders on the CMS Program Management
appropriations supplied the clear implication
of Congress’s intent to impose a new
payment methodology for the time covered
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act, noting that the appropriations riders
lacked any “words of prospective extension”
indicating a permanent change in the law.
Nevertheless,
the
Supreme
Court
acknowledged the appropriation riders did
indicate Congress’s intent to “temporarily
suspend as to P[ue]rto Rico and Hawaii” the
ten percent bonus in 1906 and 1907.

passed appropriations acts with riders
limiting the use of funds to pay the increases
for federal judges, among others. The first
such rider provided that “no part of the funds
appropriated in this Act or any other Act shall
be used to pay the salary of an individual in a
position or office referred to in” the act
providing for the pay raises for federal
judges.

In Dickerson, the Supreme Court considered
the effect of various appropriations riders on
a reenlistment bonus authorized by Congress
in 1922. After several years in force, an
appropriations rider expressly suspended the
bonus for the fiscal years ending in 1934–
1937 . The text of the rider changed in the
appropriations bill for the fiscal year ending
in 1938. That bill omitted the express
suspension, noting only that “no part of any
appropriation contained in this or any other
Act for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1938,
shall be available for the payment” of, inter
alia, the reenlistment bonus.

The dispute in Will concerned whether the
effect of the appropriations riders ran afoul of
the Compensation Clause of the Constitution.
Before reaching that issue, however, the
Supreme Court first rejected the judges’
contention that the appropriations bills did
“no more than halt funding for the salary
increases.” Acknowledging the general rule
disfavoring repeals by implication and its
“especial force” when the alleged repeal
occurred in an appropriations bill, the Court
held that in each of the four appropriations
acts in question, “Congress intended to repeal
or postpone previously authorized increases.”
This was true although the riders in years 1,
3, and 4 were “phrased in terms of limiting
funds.”. The Court’s conclusion was
bolstered by floor debates occurring in year 3
of the appropriations riders as well as
language expressly suspending the pay raises
in year 2, but it concluded the rider in year 1
indicated that same clear intent:

The appropriations bill for the fiscal year
ending in 1939 repeated that language. Floor
debates showed that Congress intended the
new language to carry the same restriction
expressed in the earlier appropriations bills..
The Supreme Court held that the
appropriations bill for the fiscal year ending
in 1939 evinced Congress’s intent to suspend
the reenlistment bonus in light of persuasive
evidence to that effect.

These passages indicate[d] clearly
that Congress intended to rescind
these rates entirely, not simply to
consign them to the fiscal limbo of an
account due but not payable. The
clear intent of Congress in each year

Finally, in Will, the Supreme Court
considered the effect of appropriations riders
on a set of statutes establishing annual pay
raises for certain officials, including federal
judges. Over a span of four years, Congress
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was to stop for that year the
application of the Adjustment Act.

funding provided by that appropriations act
“or any other act,” while the riders here omit
that global restriction. But the Supreme Court
never considered the impact of that language
in Dickerson or Will, and it found effective
suspensions-by-appropriations in Mitchell
and Vulte even absent that language.

Congress clearly indicated its intent here. It
asked GAO what funding would be available
to make risk corridors payments, and it cut
off the sole source of funding identified
beyond payments in. It did so in each of the
three years of the program’s existence. And
the explanatory statement regarding the
amendment containing the first rider of
House Appropriations Chairman Rogers
confirms that the appropriations language
was added with the understanding that HHS’s
intent to operate the risk corridors program as
a budget neutral program meant the
government “will never pay out more than it
collects from issuers over the three year
period risk corridors are in effect.” Plainly,
Congress used language similar to the
appropriations riders in Vulte, Dickerson, and
Will (and quite clearer than the language in
Mitchell) to temporarily cap the payments
required by the statute at the amount of
payments in for each of the applicable
years— just as those decisions altered
statutory payment methodologies.

Moda suggests that restricting access to funds
from “any other act” was necessary to
foreclose HHS from using funds that
remained available. It points to the CMS
Program Management appropriation for FY
2014 (before the risk corridors program
began and before any appropriations riders
had been enacted) as well as the Judgment
Fund, a standing appropriation for the
purpose of paying certain judgments against
the government. We address each in turn.
In response to a request of Congress, GAO
concluded that the FY 2014 CMS Program
Management fund “would have been
available for risk-corridors payments.”
According to Moda, this means HHS could
have used funds from the FY 2014
appropriation to make risk corridors
payments for the 2015 benefit year (which
concluded in FY 2015). Not so. GAO’s
opinion only addressed what funds from FY
2014 would have been available for risk
corridors payments had any such payments
been among the “other responsibilities” of
CMS for that fiscal year. That appropriation
expired in FY 2014. GAO specifically noted
that “for funds to be available for this purpose
in FY 2015, the CMS PM appropriation for
FY 2015 must include language similar to the
language included in the CMS PM
appropriation for FY 2015.” Of course,

What else could Congress have intended? It
clearly did not intend to consign risk
corridors payments “to the fiscal limbo of an
account due but not payable.”
Moda contends that notwithstanding the
similarities between our case and the
foregoing authority, Congress simply
intended to limit the use of a single source of
funding while leaving others available. Moda
points out that the appropriations riders in
Dickerson and Will foreclosed the use of
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Congress enacted the rider for FY 2015
instead.

Congress did not intend to suspend payments
in exceeding payments out.

GAO’s opinion was correct. Under section
1342, HHS could not have collected or owed
payments out or payments in during FY 2014
because the statute required calculations
based on allowable costs for a plan year and
the program was to run for calendar years
2014, 2015, and 2016. Thus, HHS could not
have been responsible for payments out until,
at the earliest, the end of calendar year 2014,
which occurred during FY 2015.

As discussed above, Congress’s intent to
temporarily cap payments out at the amount
of payments in was clear from the
appropriations riders and their legislative
history. It did not need to use Moda’s
proposed magic words, “or any other act,” to
foreclose resort to the Judgment Fund. We
simply cannot infer, as Moda’s position
would require, that upon enacting the
appropriations riders, Congress intended to
preserve insurers’ statutory entitlement to full
risk corridors payments but to require
insurers to pursue litigation to collect what
they were entitled to. That theory cannot
displace the plain implication of the language
and legislative history of the appropriations
riders.

Likewise, the CMS Program Management
appropriations in the continuing resolutions
enacted at the end of calendar year 2014
(during FY 2015) expired in December 2014,
when Congress enacted the FY 2015
appropriations act (and the first rider in
question)—still before HHS could have even
calculated the payments in and payments out
under the risk corridors program.

Moda points out that Congress’s intent
regarding the appropriations riders must be
understood with the context of other
legislative efforts surrounding the ACA and
the risk corridors program in particular. For
example, Moda points to Congress’s failed
attempt to enact legislation requiring budget
neutrality for the risk corridors program. But
we need not and do not conclude that
Congress achieved through appropriations
riders what it failed to do with permanent
legislation. Rather, we only hold that
Congress enacted temporary measures
capping risk corridor payments out at the
amount of payments in, and it did so for each
year the program was in effect. (We need not
address, for example, what would have
occurred if Congress had failed to include the
rider in one of the acts appropriating funds for

Moda’s reliance on the Judgment Fund is also
misplaced. The Judgment Fund is a general
appropriation of “[n]ecessary amounts” in
order “to pay final judgments” and other
amounts owed via litigation against the
government, subject to several conditions.
The Judgment Fund “does not create an all
purpose fund for judicial disbursement.”
Rather, access to the Judgment Fund
presupposes liability. Moda’s contention that
the government’s liability persists because it
could pay what it owed under the statutory
scheme from the Judgment Fund reverses the
inquiry. The question is what Congress
intended, not what funds might be used if
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the fiscal years in which payments came due
or if it had affirmatively appropriated funds
through some other source.)

Here, the risk corridors program is an
incentive program, not a quid pro quo
exchange for services rendered like that in
New York Airways. Moreover, it is much
clearer here that Congress understood the
appropriations riders to suspend substantive
law, inasmuch as the appropriations riders
directly responded to GAO’s identification of
only two sources of funding for the program.

It is also irrelevant that the President signed
the bills containing the appropriations riders,
even as he threatened to veto any bill rolling
back the ACA, as Moda points out. Again, we
do not hold that the appropriations riders
effected any permanent amendment.
Moreover, Moda has offered no evidence that
President Obama expressed any specific
views of the implications of these
appropriations riders before or after signing,
much less evidence that could overcome the
clear implication of the text of the riders and
the surrounding legislative history.

In Gibney, a statute provided that certain
employees of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service would be paid
overtime at a particular rate. Two subsequent
statutes extended a more stringent overtime
rate to other federal employees, while
expressly leaving the prior rate for INS in
place. A rider in an appropriations bill
provided that “none of the funds appropriated
for the Immigration and Naturalization
Service shall be used to pay compensation for
overtime services other than as provided in”
the latter two acts. INS agents who received
overtime payments at the more stringent rate
fixed in the latter acts sought payment at the
earlier rate.

Moda also contends that two decisions from
our predecessor court, New York Airways,
and Gibney v. United States, demonstrate that
the appropriations riders here do not carry
such strong implications. In New York
Airways, our predecessor court held that
Congress’s failure to appropriate sufficient
funds to pay for services at a rate set by a
government agency did not defeat the
obligation to pay the full amount. Floor
debates indicated that “Congress was wellaware that the Government would be legally
obligated to pay . . . even if the appropriations
were deficient.” The court noted that
Congress viewed the obligation “as a
contractual obligation enforceable in the
courts which could be avoided only by
changing the substantive law under which the
Board set the rates, rather than by curtailing
appropriations,” and the agency made its
similar view of the obligation clear to
Congress.

That rider, according to the Gibney court,
constituted “a mere limitation on the
expenditure of a particular fund and had no
other effect,” so it could not limit the
overtime rate available to an INS agent. But
the court’s holding ultimately rested on a
different point—that limiting overtime
payments “as provided in” the new acts had
no effect on the rate for INS agents, since the
new acts expressly preserved their special
overtime rate. The appropriations rider did
“not even purport to affect the right of
immigration inspectors to overtime pay as
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provided in the” earlier act. The
interpretation of the appropriations riders in
Gibney cannot be viewed in isolation of its
alternative holding, and there is no safety
valve built into the ACA to preserve the
government’s obligation notwithstanding
Congress’s suspension of it. Accordingly,
Gibney is inapposite.

now after the program has concluded. But the
proposed budget does not place that question
before us.
The intent of Congress remains clear. After
GAO identified only two sources of funding
for the risk corridors program—payments in
and the CMS Program Management fund—
Congress cut off access to the only fund
drawn from taxpayers. A statement
discussing that enactment acknowledged
“that the federal government will never pay
out more than it collects from issuers over the
three year period risk corridors are in effect.”
Congress could have meant nothing else but
to cap the amount of payments out at the
amount of payments in for each of the three
years it enacted appropriations riders to that
effect.

After oral argument in this case had occurred,
Moda filed a citation of supplemental
authority as permitted by Rule 28(j) of the
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure,
indicating that HHS had released a proposed
budget for FY 2019, including a proposal
indicating an $11.5 billion outlay for risk
corridors payments in FY 2018 (reflective of
the effect of sequestration on the total $12.3
billion outstanding) and noting a “legislative
proposal to fully fund the Risk Corridors
Program.”

Moda contends that this result is inconsistent
with the purpose of the risk corridors
program. Perhaps. But it also seems that
Congress expected the program to have
minimal, if any, budget impact (even though
we hold the text of section 1342 allowed for
unbounded budget impact). Congress could
not have predicted the shifting sands of the
transitional policy implemented by HHS,
which Moda blames for the higher costs it
and other insurers bore through their
participation in the exchanges. In response to
that turn of events, Congress made the policy
choice to cap payments out, and it remade
that decision for each year of the program.
We do not sit in judgment of that decision.
We simply hold that the appropriations riders
carried the clear implication of Congress’s
intent to prevent the use of taxpayer funds to
support the risk corridors program.

According to Moda, this refutes the
government’s positions on its statutory
claims. In particular, Moda states, “if the
appropriation riders had substantively
amended the ACA, the government would
have no basis now to be proposing to
appropriate funds to fulfill the entirety of its
[risk corridor] obligations.”
Moda again misunderstands the inquiry. The
question is what intent was communicated by
Congress’s enactments in the appropriations
bills for FY 2015–2017. It is irrelevant that a
subsequent Administration proposed a
budget that set aside funds to make purported
outstanding risk corridors payments. Of
course, Congress could conceivably reinstate
an obligation to make full payments, even
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Thus, Moda’s statutory claim cannot stand.

before the ACA became operational, and the
conduct of the parties, including relating to
the transitional policy.”

II. Contract Claim
Moda also asserts an independent claim for
breach of an implied-in-fact contract that
purportedly promised payments of the full
amount indicated by the statutory formula in
exchange for participation in the exchanges.

The centerpiece of Moda’s contract theory
(and the foundation for the trial court’s
decision in this case) is Radium Mines, Inc. v.
United States. There, the Atomic Energy
Commission issued regulations titled “Ten
Year Guaranteed Minimum Price,” in order
“[t]o stimulate domestic production of
uranium.” The regulations established
guaranteed minimum prices for uranium
delivered to the commission, with specific
conditions required for entitlement to the
minimum price.

The requirements for establishing a contract
with the government are the same for express
and implied contracts. They are (1)
“mutuality of intent to contract,” (2)
“consideration,” (3) “lack of ambiguity in
offer and acceptance,” and (4) “actual
authority” of the government representative
whose conduct is relied upon to bind the
government.

The court observed that the title of the
regulation indicated that the government
would “guarantee” the prices recited and that
the regulation’s “purpose was to induce
persons to find and mine uranium,” when,
due to restrictions on private transactions in
uranium, “no one could have prudently
engaged in its production unless he was
assured of a Government market.” The court
rejected the government’s position that the
regulations constituted a mere invitation to
make an offer, holding instead that the
regulation itself constituted “an offer, which
ripened into a contract when it was accepted
by the plaintiff’s putting itself into a position
to supply the ore or the refined uranium
described in it.”

Absent clear indication to the contrary,
legislation and regulation cannot establish the
government’s intent to bind itself in a
contract. We apply a “presumption that ‘a law
is not intended to create private contractual or
vested rights but merely declares a policy to
be pursued until the legislature shall ordain
otherwise.’” This is because the legislature’s
function is to make laws establishing policy,
not contracts, and policies “are inherently
subject to revision and repeal.”
Moda does not contend that the government
manifested intent via the text of section 1342
alone. Indeed, the statute contains no
promissory language from which we could
find such intent. Instead, Moda alleges a
contract arising “from the combination of
[the statutory] text, HHS’s implementing
regulations, HHS’s preamble statements

Moda contends that here, the statute, its
implementing regulations, and HHS’s
conduct all evinced the government’s intent
to induce insurers to offer plans in the
exchanges without an additional premium
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accounting for the risk of the dearth of data
about the expanded market, in reliance on the
presence of a fairly comprehensive safety net.
But the overall scheme of the risk corridors
program lacks the trappings of a contractual
arrangement that drove the result in Radium
Mines. There, the government made a
“guarantee,” it invited uranium dealers to
make an “offer,” and it promised to “offer a
form of contract” setting forth “terms” of
acceptance. Not so here.

“well-established
presumption”
that
Congress and HHS never intended to form a
contract by enacting the legislation and
regulation at issue here.
Accordingly, Moda cannot state a contract
claim.
***
Because we conclude that the government
does not owe Moda anything in excess of its
pro rata share of payments in, we need not
address whether payments were due annually
or only at the end of the three-year period
covered by the risk corridors program.

The risk corridors program is an incentive
program designed to encourage the provision
of affordable health care to third parties
without a risk premium to account for the
unreliability of data relating to participation
of the exchanges—not the traditional quid
pro quo contemplated in Radium Mines.
Indeed, an insurer that included that risk
premium, but nevertheless suffered losses for
a benefit year as calculated by the statutory
and regulatory formulas would still be
entitled to seek risk corridors payments.

CONCLUSION
Although section 1342 obligated the
government to pay participants in the
exchanges the full amount indicated by the
formula for risk corridor payments, we hold
that Congress suspended the government’s
obligation in each year of the program
through clear intent manifested in
appropriations riders. We also hold that the
circumstances of this legislation and
subsequent regulation did not create a
contract promising the full amount of risk
corridors payments. Accordingly, we hold
that Moda has failed to state a viable claim
for additional payments under the risk
corridors program under either a statutory or
contract theory.

Additionally, the parties in Radium Mines,
one of which was the government, never
disputed that the government intended to
form some contractual relationship at some
time throughout the exchange. The only
question there was whether the regulations
themselves constituted an offer, or merely an
invitation to make offers. Radium Mines is
only precedent for what it decided.
Here, no statement by the government
evinced an intention to form a contract. The
statute, its regulations, and HHS’s conduct all
simply worked towards crafting an incentive
program. These facts cannot overcome the

REVERSED
COSTS
The parties shall bear their own costs.
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NEWMAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

losses. Healthcare insurers throughout the
nation, including Moda Health Plan, accepted
and fulfilled the new healthcare procedures,
in collaboration with administration of the
ACA by the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services (CMS) in the Department
of Health and Human Services (HHS).

The United States and members of the health
insurance industry, in connection with the
program referred to as “Obamacare,” agreed
to a three-year plan that would mitigate the
risk of providing low-cost insurance to
previously uninsured and underinsured
persons of unknown health risk. This riskabatement plan is included in the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (ACA). As
described by the Court of Federal Claims,1
the “risk corridors” provision accommodates
the unpredictable risk of the extended
healthcare programs. By this provision, the
government will “‘share in profits or losses
resulting from inaccurate rate setting from
2014 to 2016.’” The risk corridors program
was enacted as Section 1342 of the
Affordable Care Act, and is codified in
Section 18062 of Title 42. Subsection (a) is
as follows:

Many health insurers soon experienced
losses, attributed at least in part to a
governmental action called the “transitional
policy.” Reassurance was presented, and
Moda (and others) continued to perform their
obligations. Although the government
continued to collect “payments in” from
insurers who more accurately predicted risk,
the government has declined to pay its
required risk corridors amounts, by
restricting the funds available for the
“payments out.”
The Court of Federal Claims held the
government to its statutory and contractual
obligations to Moda. My colleagues do not. I
respectfully dissent.

The Secretary shall establish and
administer a program of risk corridors
for calendar years 2014, 2015, and
2016 under which a qualified health
plan offered in the individual or small
group market shall participate in a
payment adjustment system based on
the ratio of the allowable costs of the
plan to the plan’s aggregate
premiums. Such program shall be
based on the program for regional
participating provider organizations
under part D of [the Medicare Act].

The Court of Federal Claims interpreted
the statute in accordance with its terms
The ACA provides the risk corridors formula,
establishing that the insurer will make
“payments in” to the government for the
insurer’s excess profits as calculated by the
formula, and “payments out” from the
government for the insurer’s excess losses.
The formula was enacted into statute:
The Secretary shall provide under the
program established under subsection
(a) that if—

The statute contains a detailed formula for
this risk corridors sharing of profits and
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(A) a participating plan’s allowable
costs for any plan year are more than
103 percent but not more than 108
percent of the target amount, the
Secretary shall pay to the plan an
amount equal to 50 percent of the
target amount in excess of 103
percent of the target amount; and

Affordable Care Act. Moda states that “many
individuals who had previously passed
medical underwriting, and were considerably
healthier than the uninsured population,
maintained their existing insurance and did
not enroll in QHPs,”, thereby reducing the
amount of premiums collected from healthier
persons. HHS stated, in announcing the
transitional policy, that “the risk corridor
program
should
help
ameliorate
unanticipated changes in premium revenue.”

(B) a participating plan’s allowable
costs for any plan year are more than
108 percent of the target amount, the
Secretary shall pay to the plan an
amount equal to the sum of 2.5
percent of the target amount plus 80
percent of allowable costs in excess
of 108 percent of the target amount.

The transitional policy was initially
announced as applying only until October 1,
2014. However, it was renewed throughout
the period here at issue.
The risk corridors obligations were not
cancelled by the appropriations riders

In March 2012, HHS issued regulations for
the risk corridors program, stating that
Qualified Health Plans (QHPs) “will receive
payment” or “must remit charges” depending
on their gains or losses. In March 2013, HHS
stated:

In April 2014, HHS-CMS issued an
“informal bulletin” stating, “We anticipate
that risk corridors collections will be
sufficient to pay for all risk corridors
payments. However, if risk corridors
collections are insufficient to make risk
corridors payments for a year, all risk
corridors payments for that year will be
reduced pro rata to the extent of any
shortfall.” HHS also stated “that the
Affordable Care Act requires the Secretary to
make full payments to issuers,” and that it
was “recording those amounts that remain
unpaid . . . [as an] obligation of the United
States Government for which full payment is
required.”

The risk corridors program is not
statutorily required to be budget
neutral. Regardless of the balance of
payments and receipts, HHS will
remit payments as required under
section 1342 of the Affordable Care
Act.
Moda cites this reassurance, as Moda
continued to offer and implement healthcare
policies in accordance with the Affordable
Care Act.

The issue on this appeal is focused on the
interpretation and application of the “rider”
that was attached to the omnibus annual

The “transitional policy” resulted in a change
in the risk profile of participants in the
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appropriations bills. This rider prohibits HHS
from using its funds, including its bulk
appropriation, to make risk corridors
payments. My colleagues hold that this rider
avoided or indefinitely postponed the
government’s risk corridors obligations. The
Court of Federal Claims, receiving this
argument from the United States, correctly
discarded it.

available for making the payments pursuant
to section 1342(b)(1).” The GAO also stated
that “payments under the risk corridors
program are properly characterized as user
fees” and could be used to make payments
out. This review also cited the available
recourse to the general CMS assessment.
However, in December 2014, the
appropriations bill for that fiscal year
contained a rider that prohibited HHS from
using various funds, including the CMS PM
funds, for risk corridors payments. The rider
stated:

Meanwhile, the risk corridors statute was not
repealed or the payment regulations
withdrawn, despite attempts in Congress.
Moda continued to perform its obligations in
accordance with its agreement with the
CMS’s administration of the Affordable Care
Act.

None of the funds made available by
this Act from the Federal Hospital
Insurance Trust Fund or the Federal
Supplemental Medical Insurance
Trust Fund, or transferred from other
accounts funded by this Act to the
“Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services-Program
Management”
account, may be used for payments
under section 1342(b)(1) of [the
ACA] (relating to risk corridors).

A statute cannot be repealed or amended
by inference
To change a statute, explicit legislative
statement and action are required. Nor can
governmental obligations be eliminated by
simply restricting the funds that might be
used to meet the obligation. The
appropriation riders that prohibited the use of
general HHS funds to pay the government’s
risk corridors obligations did not erase the
obligations. The Court of Federal Claims
correctly so held.

Similar riders were included in the omnibus
appropriations bills for the ensuing years. As
the Court of Federal Claims recited, by
September 2016, after collecting all
payments in for the 2015 year, it was clear
that all payments in would be needed to cover
2014 losses, and that no payments out would
be made for the 2015 plan year. Moda states:
“The Government owed Moda $89,426,430
for 2014 and $133,951,163 for 2015, but only
paid $14,254,303 for 2014 and nothing for
2015, leaving a $209,123,290 shortfall.”

The mounting problems with the Affordable
Care Act did not go unnoticed. In September
2014, the General Accountability Office
(GAO) responded to an inquiry from Senator
Jeff Sessions and Representative Fred Upton,
and stated that “the CMS PM [Centers for
Medicare Services-Program Management]
appropriation for FY 2014 would have been
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The panel majority ratifies an “indefinite
suspension” of payment, stating that this was
properly achieved by cutting off the funds for
payment. The majority correctly states that
“the government’s statutory obligation to pay
persisted independent of the appropriation of
funds to satisfy that obligation.” However,
the majority then subverts its ruling, and
holds that the government properly
“indefinitely suspended” compliance with
the statute.

modify legislation must be clearly stated, in
“words that expressly or by clear implication
modified or repealed the previous law.” The
Court explained that a statute should not be
deemed abrogated or suspended unless a
subsequent enactment contains words that
“expressly, or by clear implication, modified
or repealed the previous law.”
My colleagues dispose of Langston as an
“extreme example,” stating that subsequent
decisions are more useful since Langston is a
“century and a half” old. Indeed it is, and has
stood the test of a century and a half of logic,
citation, and compliance. Nonetheless
discarding Langston, the panel majority finds
intent to change the government’s obligations
under the risk corridors statute. The majority
concludes that “Congress clearly indicated its
intent” to change the government’s
obligations, reciting two factors:

In United States v. Will, the Court explained
that “when Congress desires to suspend or
repeal a statute in force, ‘[t]here can be no
doubt that . . . it could accomplish its purpose
by an amendment to an appropriation bill, or
otherwise.’” However, this intent to suspend
or repeal the statute must be expressed: “The
whole question depends on the intention of
Congress as expressed in the statutes.”
“The cardinal rule is that repeals by
implication are not favored.” “The doctrine
disfavoring repeals by implication ‘applies
with full vigor when . . . the subsequent
legislation is an appropriations measure,’” as
here. As the Court of Federal Claims
observed:

First, the majority concludes that the
appropriations riders were a response to the
GAO’s guidance that there were two
available sources of funding for the risk
corridors program, and that Congress
intended to remove the GAO-suggested
source of funds from the HHS-CMS program
management funds. My colleagues find that,
by removing access to the HHS-CMS funds,
Congress stated its clear intent to amend the
statute and abrogate the payment obligation
if the payments in were insufficient.
However, they point to no statement in the
legislative history suggesting that the rider
was enacted in response to the GAO’s report.

Repealing an obligation of the United
States is a serious matter, and burying
a repeal in a standard appropriations
bill would provide clever legislators
with an end-run around the
substantive debates that a repeal
might precipitate.
The classic case of United States v. Langston,
speaks clearly, that the intent to repeal or
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Next, my colleagues look to the remarks of
Chairman Harold Rogers to discern intent.
He stated:

Federal Government of carrying out
the program under this section.
The proposal, introduced by Senator Marco
Rubio on April 7, 2014, was an effort to
change the risk corridors program. The
change was proposed, but not enacted,
providing an indication of legislative intent.

In 2014, HHS issued a regulation
stating that the risk corridor program
will be budget neutral, meaning that
the federal government will never pay
out more than it collects from issuers
over the three year period risk
corridors are in effect. The agreement
includes new bill language to prevent
CMS
Program
Management
appropriation account from being
used to support risk corridors
payments.

We have been directed to no statement of
abrogation or amendment of the statute, no
disclaimer by the government of its statutory
and contractual commitments. However, the
government has not complied with these
commitments—leading to this litigation.
The standard is high for intent to cancel or
amend a statute. The standard is not met by
the words of the riders. “[T]he intention of
the legislature to repeal must be clear and
manifest.” “In the absence of some
affirmative showing of an intention to repeal,
the only permissible justification for a repeal
by implication is when the earlier and later
statutes are irreconcilable.” Here, where there
is no irreconcilable statute, repeal by
implication is devoid of any support.

Chairman Rogers is referring to the April
2014 “guidance,” where HHS stated that they
“anticipate that risk corridors collections will
be sufficient to pay for all risk corridors
payments.” In that guidance, HHS was
stating its understanding that “risk corridors
collections [might be] insufficient to make
risk corridors payments for a year.”
In 2014, a bill to require budget neutrality in
the operation of the risk corridors program
was introduced. The proposed legislation
sought to amend Section 1342(d) of the ACA
to ensure budget neutrality of payments in
and payments out. The bill stated:

The panel majority does not suggest that
intent to repeal can be found in the rider itself.
Nor can intent be inferred from any evidence
in the record. It is clear that Congress knew
what intent would have looked like, because
members of Congress tried, and failed, to
achieve budget neutrality in the risk corridors
program.

In implementing this section, the
Secretary shall ensure that payments
out and payments in under paragraphs
(1) and (2) of subsection (b) are
provided for in amounts that the
Secretary determines are necessary to
reduce to zero the cost . . . to the

Instead, my colleagues hold that the statutory
obligation was not repealed, but only
“temporarily suspended.” The unenacted text
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of the proposed “Bailout Act,” reproduced
supra, would have accomplished the result of
budget neutrality that the majority finds was
achieved by the riders. Congress’ decision to
forego this proposed repeal is highly
probative of legislative intent.

Vulte did not retroactively strip the officers of
pay for duties they had performed while
subject to the higher pay. On the question of
whether an annual appropriations rider can
permanently abrogate a statute, the Vulte
Court stated:

Precedent does not deal favorably with repeal
by implication—the other ground on which
my colleagues rely. The panel majority relies
heavily on United States v. Vulte. However,
Vulte supports, rather than negates, the
holding of the Court of Federal Claims. The
facts are relevant: Lt. Vulte’s pay as a
lieutenant in the Marine Corps for service in
Porto Rico was initially based on the Army’s
pay scale, and in 1902 Congress implemented
a ten percent bonus for officers of his pay
grade. In the appropriations acts for foreign
service, for 1906 and 1907, Congress
excluded officers serving in Porto Rico from
receiving the bonus. In the act for 1908, the
appropriations act continued the 10% bonus
but did not mention an exclusion for service
in Porto Rico. Lieutenant Vulte sought the
bonus for 1908. The government argued that
the 1906 and 1907 acts effectively repealed
the 1902 bonus. The Court disagreed, and
held that although the bonus was restricted
for 1906 and 1907, the 1902 act was not
repealed, and he was entitled to the 1908
bonus.

‘Nor ought such an intention on the
part of the legislature to be presumed,
unless it is expressed in the most clear
and positive terms, and where the
language admits of no other
reasonable interpretation.’ This
follows naturally from the nature of
appropriation
bills,
and
the
presumption hence arising is fortified
by the rules of the Senate and House
of Representatives.
The panel majority’s contrary position is not
supported.
The panel majority also relies on United
States v. Mitchell, to support the majority’s
ruling of “temporary suspension.” Again, the
case does not support the position taken by
my colleagues. In Mitchell an appropriations
act initially set the salaries of interpreters at
$400 or $500. A subsequent appropriation,
five years later, set “the appropriation for the
annual pay of interpreters [at] $300 each, and
a large sum was set apart for their additional
compensation, to be distributed by the
secretary of the interior at his discretion.” The
Court stated, “[t]he whole question depends
on the intention of congress as expressed in
the statutes,”, and observed that the statute
clearly stated the number of interpreters to be
hired, the salary for those interpreters, and the

The panel majority concludes that Vulte
established a rule of “effective suspensionsby-appropriations.”. That is not a valid
conclusion. The Court held that, by altering
the bonus for 1906 and 1907, Congress
cannot have intended to effectuate a
permanent repeal of the 1902 statute. And
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appropriation of an additional discretionary
fund to cover additional compensation.

between the old and the new statute
was impossible.

The relevance of Mitchell is obscure, for the
Court found the clear intent to change
interpreters’ pay for the subsequent years.
There is no relation to the case at bar, where
the majority holds that an appropriations
rider can change the statutory obligation to
compensate for past performance under an
ongoing statute. However, Mitchell does
reinforce the rule that repeal or suspension of
a statute must be manifested by clearly stated
intent to repeal or suspend. Also, like Vulte,
the act that in Mitchell was “suspended” by a
subsequent appropriation was itself an
appropriation, not legislation incurring a
statutory obligation. The appropriation rider
in Mitchell simply modified an existing
appropriation. In Moda’s situation, however,
the panel majority holds that the
appropriation rider can suspend the
authorizing legislation. No such intent can be
found in the statute, as Mitchell requires and
as the statute in that case provided.

Similarly, it is not probable that Congress
would abrogate its obligations under the risk
corridors program, undermining a foundation
of the Affordable Care Act, without stating
its intention to do so. The appropriations
riders did not state that the government would
not and need not meet its statutory
commitment.
Precedent supports the decision of the
Court of Federal Claims
In New York Airways, Inc. v. United States,
the Court of Claims held that the “mere
failure of Congress to appropriate funds,
without further words modifying or
repealing, expressly or by clear implication,
the substantive law, does not in and of itself
defeat a Government obligation created by
statute.”. The Civil Aeronautics Board had
provided subsidies to helicopter carriers
according to a statute whose appropriation
provision stated:

The panel majority’s theory is not supported
by Mitchell and Vulte, for the statutes in both
cases contain the clearly stated intent to
modify existing appropriations. Moda’s
situation is more like that in Langston, where
the Court stated:

For payments to air carriers of so
much of the compensation fixed and
determined by the Civil Aeronautics
Board under section 406 of the
Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (49
U.S.C. § 1376), as is payable by the
Board, including not to exceed
$3,358,000 for subsidy for helicopter
operations during the current fiscal
year, $82,500,000, to remain
available until expended.

it is not probable that congress . . .
should, at a subsequent date, make a
permanent reduction of his salary,
without indicating its purpose to do
so, either by express words of repeal,
or by such provisions as would
compel the courts to say that harmony
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However, the appropriation cap was not
sufficient to cover the statutory obligation.
The Court of Claims held that the insufficient
appropriation did not abrogate the
government’s obligations to make payments.
The court stated that “the failure of Congress
or an agency to appropriate or make available
sufficient funds does not repudiate the
obligation; it merely bars the accounting
agents of the Government from disbursing
funds and forces the carrier to a recovery in
the Court of Claims.”

display the clear intent to discontinue the
bonus payment. The Record stated: “We have
not paid [the enlistment bonus] for 5 years,
and the latter part of this amendment now
before the House is a Senate amendment
which discontinues for another year the
payment of the reenlistment allowances.”
The Record and the statutory language left no
doubt of congressional intent to continue the
suspension of reenlistment bonuses. The
panel majority recognizes that the Court in
Dickerson found “persuasive evidence” of
“Congress’s intent to suspend the
reenlistment bonus.”

Precedent also illustrates the circumstances
in which intent to repeal or suspend may
validly be found. In Dickerson, Congress had
in 1922 enacted a reenlistment bonus for
members of the armed forces who reenlisted
within three months. For each year between
1934 and 1937 an appropriations rider stated
that the reenlistment bonus “is hereby
suspended.” For fiscal year 1938, the
appropriations rider did not contain the same
language, but stated that:

In United States v. Will, the Court considered
statutes setting the salary of government
officials including federal judges. In four
consecutive years, appropriations statutes
had held that these officials would not be
entitled to the cost-of-living adjustments
otherwise paid to government employees.
The annual blocking statutes were in various
terms. In one year, the statute stated that the
cost-of-living increase “shall not take effect”
for these officials. For two additional years,
the appropriations statutes barred the use of
funds appropriated “by this Act or any other
Act,” as in Dickerson. The fourth year’s
appropriation contained similar language,
stating that “funds available for payments . .
. shall not be used.” In each year, the
language stated the clear intent that federal
funds not be used for these cost-of-living
adjustments.

no part of any appropriation
contained in this or any other Act for
the fiscal year ending June 30, 1939,
shall be available for the payment’ of
any enlistment allowance for
‘reenlistments made during the fiscal
year ending June 30, 1939 . . . .’
The rider in Dickerson cut off funding from
all sources, stating “no part of any
appropriation contained in this or any other
Act . . . shall be available.” The Court held
that the new language continued to suspend
the bonus statute, for the words, and the
accompanying
Congressional
Record,

The panel majority finds support in Will, and
states that “the Supreme Court never
considered the impact of that language in
Dickerson or Will.” However, in Dickerson
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the Court twice repeated the “any other Act”
language, in concluding that the language
supported the intentional suspension. And in
Will, the Court explicitly stated that the
statutory language was “intended by
Congress to block the increases the
Adjustment Act otherwise would generate.”

The appropriations rider cannot have
retroactive effect on obligations already
incurred and performance already achieved.
Retroactive effect is not available to “impair
rights a party possessed when he acted,
increase a party’s liability for past conduct, or
impose new duties with respect to
transactions already completed. If the statute
would operate retroactively, our traditional
presumption teaches that it does not govern
absent clear congressional intent favoring
such a result.” Such clear intent is here
absent.

The Court found legislative intent clear in
these cases. In contrast, the appropriations
rider for risk corridors payments does not
purport to change the government’s statutory
obligation, even as it withholds a source of
funds for the statutory payment. My
colleagues’ ratification of some sort of
permanent postponement denies the
legislative commitment of the government
and the contractual understanding between
the insurer and HHSCMS.

Removal of Moda’s right to risk corridors
payments would “impair rights a party
possessed when [it] acted,” a “disfavored”
application of statutes, for “a statute shall not
be given retroactive effect unless such
construction is required by explicit language
or by necessary implication.” Such premises
are absent here.

The riders cannot have retroactive effect
after inducing participation
The creation of the risk corridors program as
an inducement to the insurance industry to
participate in the Affordable Care Act, and
their responses and performance, negate any
after-the-fact implication of repudiation of
the government’s obligations.

Moda has recourse in the Judgment Fund

The government argued before the Court of
Federal Claims that its obligations to insurers
did not come due until the conclusion of the
three year risk corridors program, and that
“HHS has until the end of 2017 to pay Moda
the full amount of its owed risk corridors
payments, and Moda’s claims are not yet ripe
because payment is not yet due.” We have
received no advice of payments made at the
end of 2017 or thereafter.

The United States Court of Federal
Claims shall have jurisdiction to
render judgment upon any claim
against the United States founded
either upon the Constitution, or any
Act of Congress or any regulation of
an executive department, or upon any
express or implied contract with the
United States, or for liquidated or

The Government does not argue that the
Judgment Fund would not apply if judgment
is entered against the United States, in
accordance with Section 1491:
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unliquidated damages in cases not
sounding in tort.
The Judgment Fund is established “to pay
final judgments, awards, compromise
settlements, and interest and costs specified
in the judgments or otherwise authorized by
law when . . . payment is not otherwise
provided for . . . .”

do not share my colleagues’ conclusion that
“Moda cannot state a contract claim.”
CONCLUSION
The government’s ability to benefit from
participation of private enterprise depends on
the government’s reputation as a fair partner.
By holding that the government can avoid its
obligations after they have been incurred, by
declining to appropriate funds to pay the bill
and by dismissing the availability of judicial
recourse, this court undermines the reliability
of dealings with the government.

The contract claim is also supported
The Court of Federal Claims also found that
the risk corridors statute is binding
contractually, for the insurers and the
Medicare administrator entered into mutual
commitments with respect to the conditions
of performance of the Affordable Care Act.
The Court of Federal Claims correctly
concluded that an implied-in-fact contract
existed between Moda and the government. I

I respectfully dissent from the panel
majority’s holding that the government need
not meet its statutory and contractual
obligations established in the risk corridors
program.
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“U.S. Supreme Court to hear Moda Health’s $24 Million ACA Appeal”
Portland Business Journal
Elizabeth Hayes
June 24, 2019
Moda Health, which lost its $249 million
appeal against the federal government a year
ago, will get another day in court — the U.S.
Supreme Court.

Moda suffered losses on its plan in 2014 and
2015 but saw little compensation from the
program and nearly went into receivership,
though it has since regained its financial
footing. It is owed $249 million altogether.

The court agreed to to hear three cases filed
by health insurers who claim they are owed
more than $12 billion under the Affordable
Care Act’s risk corridors program.

Risk corridor funds came up $12 billion short
of what was owed nationwide. Meanwhile,
Republicans in Congress blasted the program
as a bailout to the insurance industry and
declined appropriate other funds to cover the
gap. The government paid 12.6 percent of
risk corridor claims for 2014 and nothing for
2015.

Lawsuits from Moda, Maine Community
Health Options and Land of Lincoln Mutual
Health will be consolidated in the appeal.
“We are encouraged that the Supreme Court
has agreed to hear our case,” Moda President
and CEO Robert Gootee said in a statement.
“We remain confident that the court will
ultimately hold the government to its promise
to pay those companies, including Moda,
who answered the government’s call to
provide access to affordable health care for
the neediest of Americans.”

The U.S. Justice Department argued that
since Congress required the program to be
budget-neutral, it only owed to the extent that
profitable insurers paid money in.
Moda and other insurers have argued the
government pulled a bait and switch. The
federal government, Moda has said, should
not be allowed to walk away from its
obligation to partially reimburse the company
for financial losses incurred when it provided
coverage to more than 100,000 Oregonians
under the ACA.

The risk corridors program was created to
encourage insurers to offer plans on the new
health
insurance
marketplaces.
The
government would pay insurers that lost
money during the first three years of the
ACA’s implementation, using funds from
profitable insurers.

Earlier this year, Delta Dental of California
purchased a 49.5 percent stake in Moda for
$152 million.
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“Supreme Court to Consider Cases Accusing US of Shorting Health Insurers $12B
in Promised Payments”

ABA Journal
Debra Cassens Weiss
June 24, 2019
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed Monday to
decide whether Congress must fulfill a
statutory promise to pay insurers who lost
money by participating in the Affordable
Care Act’s insurance marketplaces.

The two other cert petitions also used the
bait-and-switch language.
The Affordable Care Act had authorized the
payments as part of a “risk corridors”
program intended to limit insurers’ gains and
losses when they participated in the insurance
marketplaces, report the Wall Street Journal
the New York Times, Politico and the
Washington Post (

The court accepted and consolidated three
cases brought by insurers who say they
upheld their end of the bargain, and Congress
must honor the statutory commitment to
offset their losses.

Under the program, insurers whose
premiums exceeded expenses in the first
three years of the program would have to pay
some of the profit to the federal government.
Insurers whose claims exceeded premiums
charged would get partial payment for their
losses.

The insurers say Congress promised to pay
the money for three years to encourage
insurers to participate in insurance
marketplaces but later used appropriations
riders to deny funds to pay the insurers. “The
net effect was a bait-and-switch of staggering
dimensions in which the government has paid
insurers $12 billion less than what was
promised,” says a cert petition (filed by two
insurers, Moda Health Plan and Blue Cross
and Blue Shield of North Carolina.

The cases are Maine Community Health
Options v. United States, Moda Health Plan
v. United States and Land of Lincoln Mutual
Health Insurance Co. v. United States.
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“Supreme Court to Hear Insurers’ Suit on Obamacare”
New York Times
Adam Liptak
June 24, 2019
The Supreme Court agreed on Monday to
decide whether the federal government was
entitled to break a promise to shield insurance
companies from some of the risks they took
in participating in the exchanges established
by President Barack Obama’s health care
law, the Affordable Care Act.

The law’s drafters hoped that payments into
the program would offset payments out. As it
turned out, losses substantially outpaced
gains. Under the terms of the law, the
government was required to make up much
of the difference.
But Congress later enacted a series of
appropriation riders that seemed to bar the
promised
payments.
The
insurance
companies sued, but a divided three-judge
panel of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit ruled against them.

In their brief seeking Supreme Court review,
two insurance companies said they had been
the victims of “a bait-and-switch of
staggering dimensions in which the
government has paid insurers $12 billion less
than what was promised.”

Chief Judge Sharon Prost, writing for the
majority, acknowledged that the health care
law “obligated the government to pay the full
amount of risk corridors payments.” But she
added that “the riders on the relevant
appropriations effected a suspension of that
obligation for each of the relevant years.”

The health care law established so-called risk
corridors meant to help insurance companies
cope with the risks they took when they
decided to participate in the law’s
marketplaces without knowing who would
sign up for coverage. Under the program, the
federal government would limit insurance
companies’ gains and losses on insurance
sold in the marketplaces from 2014 through
2016.

In dissent, Judge Pauline Newman said the
majority had undermined basic principles of
fairness.
“The government’s ability to benefit from
participation of private enterprise depends on
the government’s reputation as a fair
partner,” she wrote. “By holding that the
government can avoid its obligations after
they have been incurred, by declining to

If premiums exceeded a company’s medical
expenses, the insurer would be required to
pay some of its profit to the government. But
if premiums fell short of medical expenses,
the insurer would be entitled to payments
from the government.
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appropriate funds to pay the bill and by
dismissing the availability of judicial
recourse, this court undermines the reliability
of dealings with the government.”

provides a road map for the government to
promise boldly, renege obscurely, and avoid
both financial and political accountability for
depriving private parties of billions in
reliance interests.”

In urging the Supreme Court to hear the case,
two insurance companies said the appeals
court’s decision threatened to encourage the
government to walk away from other
inconvenient promises.

The court agreed to hear three cases on the
issue: Maine Community Health Options v.
United States, No. 18-1023; Moda Health
Plan Inc. v. United States, No. 18-1028; and
Land of Lincoln Mutual Health Insurance Co.
v. United States, No. 18-1038. The three
cases will be consolidated for a single hour of
arguments and heard in the court’s next term,
which will begin in October.

“By giving judicial approval to the
government’s egregious disregard for its
unambiguous statutory and contractual
commitments,” the brief said, “the decision
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“Insurer Wins First CSR Payment Decision; Updates on BHP and Risk Corridors
Litigation”
Health Affairs
Katie Keith
September 6, 2018
While all eyes were on this week’s oral
arguments in Texas v. United States, there is
no shortage of litigation over the Affordable
Care Act (ACA) to keep tabs on. This post
discusses what appears to be the first ruling
on whether insurers are entitled to unpaid
cost-sharing reduction (CSR) payments,
following a decision by the Trump
administration to end the payments in
October 2017. The post also discusses the
latest on litigation over unpaid risk corridor
payments and a new payment methodology
for the Basic Health Program (BHP) in
Minnesota and New York.

Here, Judge Kaplan concluded that insurers
are, in fact, entitled to unpaid CSRs even in
the absence of an explicit appropriation. This
lawsuit was brought by the Montana Health
CO-OP but a number of insurers have filed
lawsuits against the Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS) for failing to
reimburse marketplace insurers for 2017 and,
in some cases, beyond. This includes at least
one class
action lawsuit.
Similar
to
arguments made below in risk corridors
litigation,
insurers argued that
the
government’s failure to make CSR payments
violates Section 1402 of the ACA and an
implied-in-fact contract between HHS and
insurers.

First Court To Decide CSR Payment Case
Rules For Insurer.

Judge Kaplan concluded that Section 1402
does indeed obligate the federal government
to make CSR payments and that Congress’s
failure to explicitly appropriate funds for the
payments did not relieve the government of
that obligation. As she put it, “the statutory
language clearly and unambiguously imposes
an obligation on the Secretary of HHS to
make payments to health insurers that have
implemented cost-sharing reductions on their
covered plans as required by the ACA.”

On September 4, 2018, Judge Elaine D.
Kaplan of the Court of Federal Claims issued
what is believed to be the first ruling on
whether insurers are entitled to unpaid costsharing reduction (CSR) payments. The
decision to end those payments was partially
the result of litigation brought by the House
of Representatives in 2014 that was settled
earlier this year. In that lawsuit (House v.
Azar), a district court judge held that the
payment of CSRs without an explicit
appropriation from Congress violated the
appropriations clause of the Constitution.

The judge reached this conclusion in part by
citing Moda Health Plan, a risk corridors
case that was recently decided by a three-
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judge panel of the Federal Circuit (which is
discussed in more detail below). In Moda, the
Federal Circuit concluded that a similar
statute obligated the government to make risk
corridors payments to insurers.

Risk Corridors: Insurers Await Federal
Circuit Decision
In mid-June, a three-judge panel of the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
issued opinions in Moda Health Plan v.
United States and Land of Lincoln Mutual
Health Insurance Co. v. United States. By a
2-1 majority in both cases, the panel
concluded that the government does not have
to pay health insurers that offered qualified
health plans the full amount owed to them in
risk corridors payments. The panel’s decision
overturned a lower court decision (in the
Court of Federal Claims) in favor of Moda
Health Plan.

Judge Kaplan also rejected the idea that silver
loading impacts the analysis of whether
Section 1402 requires the federal government
to make CSR payments. She concluded that
there is no evidence that the ACA itself or
Congress intended the CSR obligation in
Section 1402 to be offset by increased
premium tax credits due to silver loading.
Judge Kaplan granted Montana Health COOP’s request for summary judgment and
denied the Department of Justice’s
(DOJ’s) request to dismiss the case. She
ruled only on the statutory claim (that the
government violated Section 1402 of the
ACA by failing to make CSR payments) and
did not reach the question of whether the
government breached an implied-in-fact
contract with marketplace insurers. The
government will presumably appeal the
decision.

The majority concluded that HHS was
obligated under Section 1342 of the ACA to
make risk corridor payments pursuant to a
statutory formula. This obligation, however,
was later limited by Congress through
appropriations riders. The appropriations
riders rendered the risk corridors program
“budget neutral,” meaning the federal
government could only pay out the amount of
money that it took in, leaving billions in
outstanding risk corridor claims.

In the meantime, other litigation over unpaid
CSRs continues. Some cases had been stayed
temporarily but are now proceeding, with
additional filings expected soon. This
includes lawsuits filed by Blue Cross and
Blue Shield of Vermont, Maine Community
Health
Options, LA
Care
Health
Plan,and Sanford Health Plan, and a class
action lawsuit led by Common Ground
Healthcare Cooperative (where a response
from DOJ is expected in mid-September).

In late July, Moda Health Plan and Land of
Lincoln filed petitions to have their cases
reheard en banc by a full panel of all judges
on the Federal Circuit. En banc review
is discretionary; it is rare and is typically
reserved to maintain precedent or for legal
questions of “exceptional importance.” Both
briefs argue that the Federal Circuit opinion
conflicts with existing Supreme Court
precedent and that the full panel should step
in to decide the question of whether an
appropriations rider can amend the
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government’s financial obligations under a
federal statute.

From here, the Federal Circuit will choose
whether to hear the case en banc or not. If
not, the insurers could appeal to the Supreme
Court. If the Supreme Court declines to hear
the case, the Federal Circuit’s ruling would
stand, meaning insurers would not recover
more than $12 billion in outstanding risk
corridors payments.

At the same time, Blue Cross and Blue Shield
of North Carolina and Maine Community
Health Options—the next two insurers whose
risk corridors cases were pending before the
Federal Circuit—asked the court to rule in
favor of the federal government in their cases.
The court granted these requests,
and both insurers filed their own petitions
for en banc review.

HHS Takes Another Step To Resolve Basic
Health Program Litigation In Minnesota And
New York

On August 31, the Department of Justice
(DOJ) asked the Federal Circuit not to grant
the four insurers’ request for en banc review.
DOJ argues that the three-judge Federal
Circuit panel correctly applied Supreme
Court precedent and there is no need for the
full panel of judges to review the case. (DOJ
also again takes issue with the court’s
conclusion that Section 1342 of the ACA
obligates the government to make risk
corridors payments in the first place, even in
the absence of an explicit appropriation. This
conclusion has implications for CSR
litigation discussed above).

On August 24, HHS posted a new final
administrative order regarding a revised
payment methodology for the BHP for 2018.
The BHP allows states to offer a more
affordable alternative to marketplace
coverage to certain uninsured individuals
with incomes between 133 and 200 percent
of the federal poverty level.
The final administrative order takes yet
another
step
towards
resolving
a lawsuit brought by Minnesota and New
York—the only states that have opted to
establish a BHP—for over $1 billion in
annual funding after HHS stopped making
CSR payments. New York and Minnesota
sued after HHS informed them that their BHP
payments would no longer include the “CSR
component” beginning in 2018. They argued
that this reversal in HHS’s position was both
substantively and procedurally unlawful and
asked that HHS be required to adopt a new
methodology through the notice-andcomment rulemaking process.

A number of other stakeholders filed amicus
briefs throughout August, all urging the
Federal Circuit to rehear the case(s) en banc.
Briefs were filed by America’s Health
Insurance Plans, the Blue Cross Blue Shield
Association, the Association for Community
Affiliated Plans and the Alliance of
Community Health Plans, the National
Association
of
Insurance
Commissioners, state attorneys general
representing 17 states and the District of
Columbia, economists
and
professors,
and other insurers.

The states and federal government have
worked diligently to settle the case,
requesting multiple extensions from the
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court to negotiate. These negotiations
resulted in a stipulation in May that required
HHS to 1) make supplemental BHP
payments of about $151.9 million to New
York and about $17.3 million to Minnesota;
and 2) revise its 2018 BHP payment
methodology while providing states with the
opportunity to comment on the proposed
methodology.

PTC portion of the BHP payment rate for
2018. The premium adjustment factor for
2018 is 18.8 percent and will result in
additional BHP funding of about $422
million to New York and about $46 million
to Minnesota. Put another way, this means
that HHS will assume that premiums in
Minnesota and New York would have been
18.8 percent higher in 2018 due to
nonpayment of CSRs if those states had not
offered the BHP.

Pursuant to the stipulation, HHS issued a
draft administrative order and provided states
with the opportunity to provide comments.
These comments (which are included in the
final order) were submitted in early August.
HHS considered these comments and
finalized its administrative order without
substantive
changes.
Although
the stipulation specified
that
the
administrative order should be published in
the Federal Register, HHS does not appear to
have done so and quietly posted the order on
its website.

HHS arrived at an adjustment of 18.8 percent
after surveying a subset of states and
qualified health plan insurers to understand
how these insurers adapted to CSR
nonpayment. Of the 1,233 qualified health
plans offered in 2018, about 26 percent (318
plans in a total of 26 states) responded. After
excluding 13 plans from New York from the
sample, the nationwide median adjustment
was 20 percent. HHS used this to settle on an
18.8 percent premium adjustment factor for
Minnesota and New York.

Both New York and Minnesota urged HHS
to approve an alternative rate for the premium
tax credit (PTC) component of the BHP
payment that reflects silver loading. This
would reflect what BHP enrollees would
have been paid in PTC subsidies if there had
been silver loading to account for the loss of
CSR subsidies. This would have resulted in
higher PTCs and, thus, a higher PTC
component of BHP payments (to make up for
the lost CSR component).

HHS justified its decision to adopt a premium
adjustment factor and examine the effects of
silver loading in other states by pointing to a
part of Section 1331 of the ACA. Section
1331 directs HHS to “take into consideration
the experience of other states with respect to
participation in an Exchange and such
[PTCs] and [CSRs] provided to residents of
the other states.”
Despite the new methodology for 2018, HHS
makes clear that it has not yet committed to a
methodology for 2019 or beyond.

To address this, the final order adds a
“premium adjustment factor” to calculate the
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“Moda takes a hit in Court of Appeals Decision”
State of Reform
Tom Holt
June 19, 2018
Moda Health’s chances of recovering $214
million in ACA exchange market risk
adjustment funds dropped precipitously last
week. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit reversed a lower court
decision and held that the federal government
did not have to make risk corridor payments
in an adverse decision in Moda Health Plan,
Inc. v. the United States. Despite daunting
legal arguments and political opposition,
Moda is determined to appeal. With such
high-dollar stakes, neither the feds nor Moda
seems likely to surrender.

concerned that the Obama administration
would use general HHS appropriations to
fund risk adjustment payments, found a
populist issue in “insurer bailouts” and
passed riders to forbid the use of general
funds in FY2015 and FY2016 appropriations.
Here are the arguments:
Moda argues that the plain language of the
ACA requires HHS to disburse full payments
by statutory formula. The government does
not dispute that it would owe additional
payments had the pay-ins been su434icient,
but argues that in the absence of such funds,
it owes nothing additional.

Moda is battling a Trump Administration that
refuses to defend the ACA and a conservative
Congressional GOP that could retain a House
or Senate majority. Finally, the Supreme
Court in its landmark ACA decision tossed
core policy questions back to the political
branches, which gives us little reason to
believe it would jeopardize political capital
on questions over risk corridor technicalities.

Moda argues that the cumulative e434ect of
ACA risk corridor provisions, HHS
administrative rules, and the agency’s written
sub-regulatory guidance constitute a
“contract” with carriers who entered the
ACA exchange market to make risk
adjustment payments. The government
contends they do not constitute a contract.

The core legal issues involve the 2014-16
ACA “risk corridors” that were supposed to
smooth financial risk among carriers who
either profited or lost in the exchange market.
Winners were to pay, and losers were to
receive payouts determined by a pro-rated,
market-share formula. However, in practice,
the winnings were paltry and le434 very little
money available for pay outs. Congress,

Moda contends that the restrictive
appropriations riders only precluded payment
from HHS funds but did not limit the use of
the federal government’s legal judgment
funds. The government disagrees.
Though Federal Circuit Appeals Court’s
decision sometimes wandered into the misty
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woods of “legislative intent,” it focused its
reasoning on the text of the ACA and the
appropriations riders signed into law by
President Obama without formal objection.

make its way to the famously active Ninth
Circuit and produce a Supreme Courtinviting split. Similar remaining active cases
all reside in the U.S. Court of Claims, which
is now bound by this Moda precedent.

Moda prevailed on only one of its three
arguments: The court held that the ACA
plainly requires full risk corridor payouts by
formula. However, citing other instances in
which actual programmatic agreements were
in play, the court ruled there was no risk
corridor “contract,” but merely an
“incentive” to sell health insurance on
exchanges. Citing a century of precedent, the
court also ruled that the appropriations riders
suspended the risk corridor payment program
– and that it was within Congress’ power to
do so.

In the meantime, Moda appears to have
inched back from its precarious financial
position through careful strategy and suburb
execution. According to public filings with
the Oregon Division of Financial Regulation,
Moda’s blended fully insured medical loss
ratio dropped to 90% for 2017, down from a
heartbeat-skipping 100% in 2015. The filings
do not take into account other, likely
profitable, lines of business about which
Moda is not required to report specific
results.

Moda intends to appeal; it could do so by
requesting rehearing en banc (a full panel of
the court), or petitioning to the Supreme
Court. A en banc hearing not only is the next
best venue but also could be the last. The
legal issues presented are not high
constitutional principles, but they could meet
the lesser appellate threshold that “the
proceeding involves a question of
exceptional importance.” There is no split of
appellate circuits on the issues at hand, and
the Supreme Court accepts few split- less
cases. One similar case out of Nevada could

Moda quite reasonably will continue to fight
for its full payments from HHS. Its best hope
may be that the case drags on into 2019, past
the Congressional mid-terms and perhaps
long enough to yield a political, rather than a
legal, settlement.
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“Insurers Prepare to Appeal Risk Corridor Case to the Supreme Court”
Fierce Healthcare
Evan Sweeney
November 6, 2018
A federal appeals court has denied a bid from
several insurers to rehear a lawsuit seeking to
recoup risk corridor payments, setting the
stage for a potential battle at the Supreme
Court.

FierceHealthcare. “We continue to believe,
as the trial court did, that the government’s
obligation to us is clearly stated in the law.
We will seek review by the Supreme Court.”
Stephen McBrady, an attorney with Crowell
& Moring who represents Maine Community
Health Options, said the insurer also intends
to appeal.

Over the summer, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit ruled that the
Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS) was not required to make risk corridor
payments to insurers.

“Maine Community Health Options is a nonprofit health plan that went into the
exchanges and performed exactly as the
Affordable Care Act required, providing
healthcare coverage to thousands of
previously uninsured and underinsured
Maine citizens,” he said in an emailed
statement. “The health plan filed its risk
corridors law suit in order to enforce the
government’s obligation to perform as the
government was required under the
ACA. Today’s ruling is disappointing, but
Maine Community Health Options intends to
appeal to the Supreme Court.”

That overturned a 2017 decision by the U.S.
Court of Federal Claims that said HHS failed
to fulfill its promise to make the payments
designed to protect insurers from extreme
gains or losses on the Affordable Care Act
exchanges.
Moda Health Plans, Land of Lincoln, Maine
Community Health Options and Blue Cross
Blue Shield of North Carolina petitioned the
federal circuit court to rehear the case in front
of the entire panel of judges.
On
Tuesday,
9
of
the
11
judges rejected (PDF) that request. Moda
Health Plans, one of the insurers leading the
litigation against HHS, plans to appeal the
decision to the Supreme Court.

Following the Federal Circuit Court’s June
decision, University of Michigan law
professor Nicholas Bagley wrote in the
Incidental Economist that the case is “not an
implausible candidate for review… but the
Court might be gun-shy about wading into
another case about the ACA.”

“Obviously we are disappointed by today’s
decision,” Robert Gootee, President & CEO,
Moda, Inc. said in a statement to
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Notably, two judges on the federal circuit—
Pauline Newman and Evan Wallach—
dissented, calling the case a “question of the
integrity of government” with a financial
impact on insurers across the country.

conflicting interests arise, assurance of fair
dealing is a judicial responsibility.”
As of last year, the government’s unpaid risk
corridor tab had swelled to $12.3 billion.
That brought dozens of lawsuits from
insurers like Moda, Humana and Molina
Healthcare, which claimed they were owed
hundreds of millions in payments.

“Our system of public-private partnership
depends on trust in the government as a fair
partner,” Newman wrote. “And when
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Allen v. Cooper
Ruling Below: Allen v. Cooper, 895 F.3d 337 (4th Cir. 2018).
Overview: A videographer alleged that North Carolina violated his copyright by publishing his
video footage and still photograph of the wreckage. Circuit Court concluded that Congress did not
validly abrogate the State’s Eleventh Amendment immunity with the enactment of the Copyright
Remedy Clarification Act.
Issue: Whether Congress validly abrogated state sovereign immunity via the Copyright Remedy
Clarification Act in providing remedies for authors of original expression whose federal copyrights
are infringed by states.
Frederick ALLEN, Plaintiffs-Appellees
v.
Roy A. COOPER, III, Defendants-Cross-Appellees
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
Decided on July 10, 2018
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]
NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge:
Frederick Allen, a videographer, and
Nautilus Productions, LLC, Allen’s video
production company, commenced this action,
which, at its core, alleges that North Carolina,
its agencies, and its officials (collectively,
"North
Carolina")
violated
Allen’s
copyrights by publishing video footage and a
still photograph that Allen took of the 18th–
century wreck of a pirate ship that sank off
the North Carolina coast. Allen and Nautilus
obtained the rights to create the footage and
photograph through a permit issued by North
Carolina to the ship’s salvors, and Allen
subsequently registered his work with the
U.S. Copyright Office. Allen and Nautilus

also seek to declare unconstitutional a 2015
state law— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 121–
25(b) (providing that photographs and video
recordings of shipwrecks in the custody of
North Carolina are public records)—which
Allen and Nautilus claim was enacted in bad
faith to provide the State with a defense to
their federal copyright infringement action.
North Carolina filed a motion to dismiss
under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), asserting sovereign
immunity under the Eleventh Amendment,
qualified
immunity,
and
legislative
immunity. North Carolina’s claim of
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sovereign immunity prompted Allen and
Nautilus to argue (1) that in a 2013
Settlement Agreement, North Carolina
waived sovereign immunity; (2) that in any
event the federal Copyright Remedy
Clarification Act of 1990 had abrogated the
State’s sovereign immunity; and (3) that as to
their claims for injunctive relief, Ex parte
Young provided an exception to sovereign
immunity for ongoing violations of federal
law.
The district court rejected North Carolina’s
claims of immunity, and North Carolina filed
this interlocutory appeal. Allen and Nautilus
filed a cross-appeal. For the reasons that
follow, we reverse and remand with
instructions to dismiss with prejudice the
claims against the state officials in their
individual capacities and to dismiss without
prejudice the remaining claims.

the wreck of the Revenge , and on September
1, 1998, Intersal, along with Maritime
Research Institute, Inc., an affiliated entity,
entered into a 15–year salvage agreement
with the North Carolina Department of
Natural and Cultural Resources ("the
Department"). Under the agreement, Intersal
and Maritime Research acknowledged North
Carolina’s ownership of the shipwreck and
the ship’s artifacts, and North Carolina
acknowledged Intersal’s and Maritime
Research’s salvage rights, agreeing that
Intersal and Maritime Research could retain
a designated portion of the financial proceeds
arising from the sale of media relating to
the Revenge and replicas of its artifacts.
As relevant to this case, the agreement
provided that:
Except as provided in paragraph 20
and this paragraph, Intersal shall have
the exclusive right to make and
market all commercial narrative
(written, film, CD Rom, and/or video)
accounts of project related activities
undertaken by the Parties.

I
In 1717, the pirate Edward Teach, better
known as Blackbeard, captured a French
merchant vessel and renamed her Queen
Anne’s
Revenge .
Teach
armed
the Revenge with 40 cannons and made her
his flagship. But the following year,
the Revenge ran aground about a mile off the
coast of Beaufort, North Carolina, and Teach
abandoned her. Under state law, the ship and
its artifacts later became the property of
North Carolina and subject to its "exclusive
dominion and control."

The agreement, however, made an exception
for the creation of a "non commercial
educational video and/or film documentary"
and provided that the parties would cooperate
in making such an educational documentary.
And Paragraph 20 provided:
The Department shall have the right
to authorize access to, and publish
accounts
and
other
research
documents relating to, the artifacts,
site area, and project operations for

More than two-and-a-half centuries later, on
November 21, 1996, Intersal, Inc., a private
research and salvage firm operating under a
permit issued by North Carolina, discovered
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non commercial educational or
historical purposes. Nothing in this
document shall infringe to any extent
the public’s right to access public
records in accordance with Chapters
121 and 132 of the General Statutes
of North Carolina.

In 2013, Allen and Nautilus took the position
that the Department’s publication of Allen’s
work on the Internet without his consent
infringed Allen’s copyrights, and this
prompted a dispute leading ultimately to a
settlement agreement dated October 15,
2013, to which the Department, Intersal,
Nautilus, and Allen were parties. In that
agreement, none of the parties admitted to
any wrongdoing but agreed to the
clarification of preexisting arrangements so
that the salvage operation could continue.

The agreement also provided:
[Maritime Research], Intersal and the
Department agree to make available
for duplication by each other, or,
when appropriate, to provide the
Department with, relevant field maps,
notes,
drawings,
photographic
records and other such technical,
scientific
and
historical
documentation created or collected
by [Maritime Research], Intersal or
the Department pursuant to the study
of the site and the recovery of
materials therefrom. These materials
shall become public records curated
by the Department.

The 2013 Settlement Agreement divided
Allen and Nautilus’s video and photographic
documentation, treating some of the footage
as "commercial documentaries" and some as
"non-commercial media," for purposes of
clarifying the parties’ respective rights. With
respect to "commercial documentaries," the
2013 Settlement Agreement provided:
Intersal, through Nautilus, has
documented approximately fifteen
(15) years of underwater and other
activities related to the QAR [Queen
Anne’s Revenge] project. For
purposes of this Commercial
Documentaries section, Intersal
represents to [the Department] that
Nautilus Productions shall remain
Intersal’s designee. Intersal shall have
the exclusive right to produce a
documentary
film
about
the
[Revenge] project for licensing and
sale. Intersal may partner with [the
Department] if it chooses to do so....
If [the Department] and Intersal do
not partner to make a documentary,

Following execution of this salvage
agreement, Intersal retained Nautilus, Allen’s
production company, to document the
salvage of the Revenge, and under that
arrangement, Allen accumulated, as he
alleged in the complain, “a substantial
archive of video and still images showing the
underwater shipwreck and the efforts of
teams of divers and archaeologists to recover
various artifacts from [it].”
Allen registered 13 copyrights in these
materials with the U.S. Copyright Office,
each copyright covering a year’s worth of
footage.
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the Intersal documentary script shall
be reviewed by [the Department] for
historical accuracy prior to final
release by Intersal or its agents.
Intersal agrees to allow [the
Department] to use its completed
documentary, free of charge, in its
museums and exhibits for educational
purposes.

Finally, the 2013 Settlement Agreement
addressed the video footage and still
photographs as public records, providing:
Nothing in this Agreement shall
prevent [the Department] from
making records available to the public
pursuant to North Carolina General
Statutes Chapters 121and 132, or any
other applicable State or federal law
or rule related to the inspection of
public records.

With respect to "non-commercial media," the
Agreement provided in relevant part:
All non-commercial digital media,
regardless of producing entity, shall
bear a time code stamp, and
watermark (or bug) of Nautilus and/or
[the Department], as well as a link to
[the Department], Intersal, and
Nautilus websites, to be clearly and
visibly displayed at the bottom of any
web page on which the digital media
is
being
displayed.

During the recovery phase of the
[Revenge ] project, [the Department]
and Intersal agree to make available
to each other records created or
collected in relation to the [Revenge ]
project. The entity requesting copies
bears the cost of reproduction. Within
one (1) year after the completion of
the recovery phase, Intersal shall
allow [the Department] to accession
duplicate or original records that were
created or collected by Intersal during
the project and that are related to the
site, or the recovery or conservation
of the [Revenge ] materials. Such
records shall include relevant field
maps, notes, drawings, photographic
records, and other technical, scientific
and historical documentation created
or collected by [the Department] or
Intersal pursuant to the study of the
site and the recovery of materials
therefrom. These materials shall
become public records curated by [the
Department]. All digital media
provided by Intersal under the terms

[The Department] agrees to display
non-commercial digital media only
on [the Department’s] website.
As to Nautilus’s archival footage, the
Agreement provided that archival footage
and photographs that did not "bear a time
code stamp and a Nautilus Productions
watermark (or bug)" would be returned to
Nautilus. But it also provided that the
Department could "retain, for research
purposes, archival footage, still photographs,
and other media that contain a time code
stamp and watermark [or bug], and as to such
media [the Department] [would] provide
Nautilus with a current, accurate list."
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of this paragraph shall include a time
code stamp and watermarks (or bugs).

defendants enacted N.C. Gen. Stat. § 121–
25(b) (making shipwreck videos and
photographs in North Carolina’s custody
public records) in bad faith to "create a
defense" to the copyright infringement claim
asserted in Count II. They sought a
declaratory judgment that § 121–25(b) was
unenforceable because it was preempted by
federal copyright law and was otherwise
unconstitutional under the Takings Clause
and Due Process Clause of the Constitution.
In Count II, Allen and Nautilus claimed
copyright infringement under 17 U.S.C. §
501(a) – (b). In Count III, they alleged that
the defendants "acted under color of state law
to enact § 121–25(b) and to threaten
plaintiffs ... with enforcement thereof," in
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Finally, in
Counts IV and V, they alleged state law
claims for unfair trade practices and civil
conspiracy. For relief, Allen and Nautilus
sought, in addition to the declaratory
judgment sought in Count I, an order
enjoining copyright infringement and
enforcement of § 121–25(b), as well as
compensatory, statutory, treble, and punitive
damages. North Carolina filed a motion to
dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), maintaining
that the institutional defendants and
individual defendants in their official
capacities were shielded from suit in federal
court by sovereign immunity under the
Eleventh Amendment and that the officials
sued in their individual capacities were
entitled to qualified and legislative immunity.
Allen and Nautilus responded to the claim of
sovereign immunity, arguing (1) that North
Carolina waived sovereign immunity in the
2013 Settlement Agreement; (2) that North

Following execution of the 2013 Settlement
Agreement, as Allen and Nautilus alleged in
their complaint, the Department "resumed
infringing
[Allen’s]
copyrights"
by
"publish[ing] ... and/or display[ing]" various
"works" on the Internet. The complaint
identified six "infringing works" along with
their Internet addresses. Five of those works
were videos about the Revenge shipwreck
that were posted on the Department’s
YouTube channel, and the remaining
"infringing work" was a newsletter about
North Carolina’s maritime museums, which
contained an article about the Revenge with
one
of
Allen’s
still
photographs.
Accordingly, Allen and Nautilus sent North
Carolina a "Takedown Notice," and North
Carolina maintained that it complied before
the hearing on its motion to dismiss filed in
the district court. It provided the district court
with documentary evidence confirming that
fact, and at oral argument on this appeal,
counsel for Allen and Nautilus also
confirmed that the six alleged infringements
had ceased.
Allen and Nautilus commenced this action in
December 2015, naming as defendants the
State of North Carolina, the Department, the
Governor, and six officials in the
Department, among others. Except for the
Governor, who was sued only in his official
capacity, each of the individual defendants
was sued in both his or her official and
individual capacities. The complaint, as
amended, contained five counts. In Count I,
Allen and Nautilus alleged that in 2015, the
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Carolina’s sovereign immunity was also
abrogated by the federal Copyright Remedy
Clarification Act of 1990, 17 U.S.C. § 511;
(3) and that, in any event, injunctive relief
was available under Ex parte Young , 209
U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908).
They also argued that the individual officials
could not invoke qualified immunity because
reasonable officials under the circumstances
alleged would have known that they were
violating Allen’s rights under federal
copyright law, and that they could not invoke
legislative immunity because none of the
officials had performed any legislative
functions.

Invoking the Eleventh Amendment, North
Carolina and its officials acting in their
official capacities claim that they are immune
from suit in federal court and they contend
that the immunity applies regardless of the
form of relief sought by the plaintiffs.
Allen and Nautilus disagree, arguing that
North Carolina waived sovereign immunity
when it signed the 2013 Settlement
Agreement; that the State’s sovereign
immunity was abrogated by the federal
Copyright Remedy Clarification Act; and
that, in any event, Ex parte Young provides
them with an exception for the injunctive
relief they request as to ongoing violations of
federal law. We address these arguments in
order.

Following a hearing, the district court, by
order dated March 23, 2017, denied North
Carolina’s motion to dismiss as to Counts I
and II, concluding that its Eleventh
Amendment immunity for those counts was
validly abrogated by the Copyright Remedy
Clarification Act; that the state officials sued
in their individual capacities were not entitled
to qualified immunity; and that a
determination of those officials’ legislative
immunity would be "premature" at that time.
It granted the motion as to the remaining
counts on the basis of sovereign immunity.

A
The 2013 Settlement Agreement, on which
Allen and Nautilus rely to argue that North
Carolina waived its sovereign immunity,
provides in relevant part:
In the event [North Carolina],
Intersal, or [Allen and] Nautilus
breaches this Agreement, [North
Carolina], Intersal, or [Allen and]
Nautilus may avail themselves of all
remedies provided by law or equity.

From the district court’s interlocutory order,
North Carolina filed this appeal, challenging
the district court’s denial of immunity in all
forms. Allen and Nautilus cross-appealed,
challenging several of the district court’s
specific conclusions regarding sovereign
immunity.

Allen and Nautilus maintain that by agreeing
to the availability of all remedies, North
Carolina agreed that the remedies being
sought in this action may be obtained from it,
thereby effecting a waiver of sovereign
immunity from suit in federal court.

II

443

We cannot, however, read this provision as a
waiver of North Carolina’s Eleventh
Amendment immunity. First, Eleventh
Amendment immunity protects the States,
their agencies, and officials from suit in
federal court . Yet, the subject provision in
the 2013 Settlement Agreement makes no
reference to federal court, state court or, for
that matter, any court. Moreover, the
provision states only that each party may
pursue available remedies as provided by law
or equity. Consequently, legal or equitable
limitations on those remedies must also
apply. And one of those limitations is that a
State, its agencies, and its officials acting in
their official capacities cannot be sued in
federal court without their consent. We
readily conclude that the provision falls far
short of the clear statement that is required to
effect a waiver of Eleventh Amendment
immunity. As the Supreme Court has made
clear, a State must expressly consent to
suit in federal court to waive its immunity
under the Eleventh Amendment.

under any other doctrine of sovereign
immunity, from suit in Federal court
by any person ... for a violation of any
of the exclusive rights of a copyright
owner provided by [federal copyright
law].
It is well established that any abrogation of a
State’s Eleventh Amendment immunity
requires both a clear statement of
congressional intent—which, to be sure, §
511 provides—and a valid exercise of
congressional power. Thus, the question
presented here reduces to whether Congress
validly exercised its constitutional power
when enacting the Copyright Remedy
Clarification Act.

Allen and Nautilus also contend that
Congress validly abrogated North Carolina’s
Eleventh Amendment immunity with the
enactment of the Copyright Remedy
Clarification Act. That Act provides:

Allen and Nautilus contend first that
Congress validly enacted the Copyright
Remedy Clarification Act because it properly
invoked Article I’s Patent and Copyright
Clause, which authorizes Congress to
"secur[e] for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries." But, as
North Carolina correctly notes, that ground
for enactment of an abrogation is foreclosed
by Seminole Tribe and its progeny, which
make clear that Congress cannot rely on its
Article I powers to abrogate Eleventh
Amendment immunity.

Any State, any instrumentality of a
State, and any officer or employee of
a State or instrumentality of a State
acting in his or her official capacity,
shall not be immune, under the
Eleventh Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States or

Allen and Nautilus argue, however, that those
cases were impliedly overruled by the
Supreme Court’s more recent decision
in Central Virginia Community College v.
Katz , which relied on Article I’s Bankruptcy
Clause to hold that a proceeding initiated by
a bankruptcy trustee to set aside preferential

B
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transfers by a debtor to a state agency was not
barred
by
sovereign
immunity.
The Katz holding, however, was made in a
completely distinguishable context that was
unique to the Bankruptcy Clause, and the
Court limited its holding to that Clause.
Indeed, the Court made clear that its holding
in Katz was
not
intended
to
overrule Seminole Tribe and its progeny,
stating that it was not disturbing the broader
jurisprudence regarding Congress’s power to
abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity. In
short, even after Katz , it remains clear that
Congress cannot rely on the enumerated
power in Article I over copyright to compel a
State to litigate copyright cases in a federal
court.

unconstitutional
Amendment.

by

the

Fourteenth

In construing the scope of § 5 power, the
Supreme Court has been careful to strike a
considered balance between upholding the
dignity of States as sovereign entities, on the
one hand, and safeguarding individual rights
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, on
the other. It has accordingly explained that
Congress has plenary authority to abrogate
sovereign immunity for claims arising from
state conduct that amounts to an actual
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s
substantive guarantees. The Court has also
interpreted § 5 as permitting Congress to
abrogate sovereign immunity for "a
somewhat broader swath of [state] conduct,
including that which is not itself forbidden by
the [Fourteenth] Amendment." Yet again,
however, in light of the competing equities at
stake, it has circumscribed Congress’s
authority to do so in two respects. Congress
must both (1) make clear that it is relying on
§ 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment as the
source of its authority and (2) ensure that any
abrogation of immunity is "congruen[t] and
proportional[ ]" to the Fourteenth
Amendment injury to be prevented or
remedied.

Allen and Nautilus contend that, in any event,
Congress validly enacted the Copyright
Remedy Clarification Act under the authority
granted to it in § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which affords Congress the
"power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation," the Amendment’s substantive
guarantees. As they maintain, it is settled that
Congress can abrogate sovereign immunity
"through a valid exercise of its §5 power,
because the Eleventh Amendment and the
principle of state sovereignty that it embodies
"are necessarily limited by the enforcement
provisions of § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment," North Carolina argues,
however, that Congress did not validly
exercise its § 5 power in enacting the
Copyright Remedy Clarification Act because
(1) it did not, as required, purport to rely on
its § 5 authority, and (2) it did not, as also
required, tailor the Act to an identified,
widespread pattern of conduct made

In this case, we conclude that in enacting the
Copyright Remedy Clarification Act,
Congress satisfied neither requirement.
First, it is readily apparent that in enacting the
Copyright Remedy Clarification Act,
Congress relied on the Copyright Clause in
Article I of the Constitution, rather than § 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment. This
invocation of Article I authority was
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expressly and repeatedly stated in the Act’s
legislative history. Neither the text of the
statute nor its legislative history indicates any
invocation of authority conferred by § 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment. And without
such an invocation, the Act cannot effect a
valid abrogation under § 5.

Here, the legislative history of the Copyright
Remedy Clarification Act shows that
Congress relied on its Article I power over
copyrights and not on § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment,
similarly
"preclud[ing]
consideration" of § 5 as a proper basis for the
Act’s abrogation of States’ Eleventh
Amendment immunity.

This was made clear in Florida Prepaid,
where the Supreme Court addressed the
constitutionality of the Patent Remedy Act,
which abrogated the States’ immunity from
suit in federal court for patent infringement.
After noting that the legislative history
indicated that Congress relied on the
Commerce Clause, the Patent Clause, and § 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court
stated that the Commerce and Patent Clauses
could not sustain the Act in light of Seminole
Tribe. Florida Prepaid. Similarly, the Court
rejected the plaintiff’s alternative argument
that the Act could be justified under the Fifth
Amendment’s Just Compensation Clause:

Allen argues that the Supreme Court’s
decisions in EEOC v. Wyoming, and Kimel
v. Florida Board of Regents, undermine any
need to invoke expressly the Fourteenth
Amendment. In EEOC , the Court noted that
when exercising § 5 power, there is no need
to "recite the words ‘section 5’ or ‘Fourteenth
Amendment.’" But that quotation does not
help Allen and Nautilus because the Court
also explained that, regardless of whether the
terms " § 5" or "Fourteenth Amendment" are
used, it must "be able to discern some
legislative purpose or factual predicate that
supports the exercise of [ § 5 ] power." More
importantly, EEOC was not a case about the
abrogation of Eleventh Amendment
immunity, and the EEOC Court never
addressed whether the legislation before it—
the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act—was a valid exercise of Congress’s
power under § 5.

There is no suggestion in the
language of the statute itself, or in the
House or Senate Reports of the bill
which became the statute, that
Congress had in mind the Just
Compensation
Clause....
Since
Congress was so explicit about
invoking its authority under Article I
and its authority to prevent a State
from depriving a person of property
without due process of law under the
Fourteenth Amendment, we think this
omission precludes consideration of
the Just Compensation Clause as a
basis for the Patent Remedy Act.

Similarly, Kimel provides Allen and Nautilus
with little support. The Kimel Court
concluded that the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act’s abrogation of sovereign
immunity was invalid because it was not a
congruent and proportional response to
unconstitutional age discrimination by the
States. They argue that, because the Court
reached that conclusion despite the absence
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of any congressional invocation of the
Fourteenth Amendment by Congress, no
such invocation should be required here. The
Kimel Court, however, did not even mention
the omission on which Allen and Nautilus
rely. And more to the point, no case
since Florida Prepaid has disavowed the
Supreme Court’s instruction that an
abrogation of sovereign immunity cannot be
sustained by a source of constitutional
authority that Congress never invoked.

would not result merely from a State’s
infringement of a patent. Rather, the
infringement would both have to go
unremedied and have to be done intentionally
or at least recklessly.
Citing at length to the legislative record of the
Patent Remedy Act, the Florida Prepaid
Court then determined that Congress was not
faced with sufficient evidence of
unconstitutional patent infringement to
justify abrogation. It observed that there were
fewer than 10 patent infringement suits
against States in the century preceding the
enactment of the Patent Remedy Act; that
most state infringement was apparently
accidental; and that while state remedies for
governmental infringement were disuniform
and rather tenuous, the evidence before
Congress did not prove such remedies to be
constitutionally inadequate. In the Court’s
view, this evidence "suggest[ed] that the
Patent Remedy Act does not respond to a
history of ‘widespread and persisting
deprivation of constitutional rights’ of the
sort Congress has faced in enacting proper
prophylactic § 5 legislation."

Not only did Congress not invoke its
authority under § 5, it also did not, as
required, limit the scope of the Copyright
Remedy Clarification Act to enforcement of
rights protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. Rather, in abrogating sovereign
immunity, Congress used language that
sweeps so broadly that the Act cannot be
deemed a congruent and proportional
response to the Fourteenth Amendment
injury with which it was confronted.
Our conclusion is required by Florida
Prepaid, where the circumstances were
analogous to those before us. The Supreme
Court there concluded that the Patent
Remedy Act did not appropriately enforce
the Fourteenth Amendment because there
was no "congruence and proportionality
between the [Fourteenth Amendment] injury
to be prevented or remedied and the means
adopted to that end." While the Court
acknowledged that patents are a "species of
property" and that patent infringement by
States could therefore implicate the
Fourteenth Amendment’s prohibition against
deprivations of property without due process,
it explained that a due process violation

The Court then compared that evidence to the
Patent Remedy Act’s sweeping abrogation
provisions, which made the States liable for
patent infringement to the same extent as
private parties, and concluded that the
provisions were " ‘so out of proportion to a
supposed remedial or preventive object that
[they] [could not] be understood as
responsive to, or designed to prevent,
unconstitutional behavior.’" In particular,
the Court observed that Congress had done
"nothing to limit the coverage of the [Patent
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Remedy] Act to cases involving arguable
constitutional violations," such as where a
State authorized infringement as a matter of
official policy or otherwise intentionally
infringed patents without providing any
remedy. Nor had Congress included
durational limits or abrogated immunity only
for States presenting the greatest incidence of
infringement. The absence of such tailoring,
juxtaposed with the limited evidence of
unconstitutional
patent
infringement,
"ma[de] it clear" that the Patent Remedy Act
did not appropriately enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment.
In this case, a similar legislative record and
an equally broad enactment likewise leads to
the conclusion that the Copyright Remedy
Clarification Act’s abrogation of sovereign
immunity cannot be sustained under § 5.
While we may presume that a copyright, like
a patent, is a "species of property" that could
be deprived without due process in violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment, not every
infringement violates the Constitution, as
the Florida Prepaid Court explained. To be
sure, the legislative record of the Copyright
Remedy Clarification Act did include some
evidence of copyright infringement by States
that presumably violated the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The
record of such infringement, however, was
materially similar to that in Florida Prepaid .

comments regarding the issue of state
immunity from copyright claims and
received several dozen responses from
various industry groups, among others,
expressing grave concerns about the prospect
of such immunity. But, the Oman Report
reveals that only five of the commenters
"document[ed] actual problems ... in
attempting to enforce their [copyright] claims
against state government infringers." And
the commenters’ responses described at most
seven incidents in which States invoked
sovereign immunity to avoid liability for
copyright infringement. Only two of those
incidents recounted in the Register’s
Report—where States invoked sovereign
immunity and continued to display
copyrighted films to prison inmates for free
even after the copyright holders notified them
of the infringement—were described with
sufficient detail to show clearly the requisite
willfulness of state officials to amount to a
due process violation. Besides these incidents
in the Oman Report, Congress learned of just
a few other comparable incidents of
unremedied State infringement from hearing
testimony. In total, even assuming that all of
the
incidents
of
unremedied
infringement were intentional, the record
before Congress contained at most a dozen
incidents of copyright infringement by States
that could be said to have violated the
Fourteenth Amendment.

As Allen and Nautilus note, most of the
evidence was compiled in a 1988 report
prepared at Congress’s request by Ralph
Oman, who was then the United States
Register of Copyrights. In preparing the
report, the Copyright Office solicited public

This evidence plainly falls short of
establishing the "widespread and persisting
deprivation of constitutional rights" that is
required to warrant prophylactic legislation
under § 5. Indeed, the evidence here appears
little different in quality or quantity than the
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historical evidence underlying the Patent
Remedy Act, which was found insufficient in
Florida Prepaid . Critically, in each case,
Congress did not identify an extant pattern of
infringement giving rise to violations of the
Fourteenth Amendment across a significant
number of States. At most, the record of the
Copyright Remedy Clarification Act, like
that of the Patent Remedy Act, indicated that
there was a potential for greater
constitutional violations in the future and that
Congress simply "acted to head off this
speculative harm."

the Fourteenth Amendment, and therefore the
abrogation cannot be sustained as an
enactment that "appropriate[ly]" "enforce[s]"
that Amendment.
In concluding otherwise, the district court
sought to distinguish the record in Florida
Prepaid by relying primarily on the "many
examples of copyright infringements by
States" in the Copyright Remedy
Clarification Act’s legislative history. In so
relying, however, the court failed to consider
whether any of those examples involved
intentional and unremedied infringement,
as Florida Prepaid clearly instructs. Also, as
an alternative basis for holding that the
Copyright Remedy Clarification Act had
validly
abrogated
North
Carolina’s
immunity, the district court relied on "the
amount of suits filed against allegedly
infringing states in recent years." That
reliance, however, did not comport with the
Supreme Court’s determination that
Congress must identify a pattern of
unconstitutional conduct before it abrogates
Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Acting against this backdrop of limited
evidence, Congress enacted the Copyright
Remedy Clarification Act to make States
broadly, immediately, and indefinitely
accountable for copyright infringement to the
same extent as private parties, imposing
sweeping liability for all violations of federal
copyright law, whether the violation
implicates the Fourteenth Amendment or
not. Congress thus declined to narrow
whatsoever the Act’s reach, instead
abrogating immunity indiscriminately in a
manner that was wholly incongruous with the
sparse record of unconstitutional conduct
before it. This failure to adopt any limitation
along the lines discussed in Florida
Prepaid cannot be reconciled with the
requirement that legislation enacted under §
5 be "tailor[ed] ... to remedying or preventing
[unconstitutional] conduct."

In concluding that the Copyright Remedy
Clarification Act does not validly abrogate
Eleventh Amendment immunity, we join the
numerous other courts to have considered
this issue since Florida Prepaid, all of which
have held the Act invalid.
C

Accordingly, we conclude that the Copyright
Remedy Clarification Act’s wholesale
abrogation of sovereign immunity for claims
of copyright infringement is grossly
disproportionate to the relevant injury under

Finally, Allen and Nautilus contend that, at
the very least, their claims against the state
officials for injunctive and declaratory relief
may proceed under the exception to Eleventh

449

Amendment immunity recognized in Ex
parte Young. The parties argued the issue
before the district court, but the court, in light
of its ruling on the Copyright Remedy
Clarification Act, did not address it. Because
we reverse the district court on abrogation,
we address the Ex parte Young exception and
conclude that the exception does not apply in
this case.

works" that are "now publicly viewable" at
six locations on the Internet, specifying the
Internet address for each. North Carolina,
however, maintains that shortly before the
November 2016 hearing on its motion to
dismiss, it removed those allegedly
infringing materials from the Internet and
provided exhibits to the district court to
confirm that it had done so. While Allen and
Nautilus acknowledged at oral argument that
the six alleged violations had ceased, they
argue that the complaint nonetheless alleged
generally instances of ongoing Internet
infringement beside those six violations,
referring to a paragraph that alleged, in a
conclusory fashion, that displays of
copyrighted materials were continuing "at
least at th[ose] locations." But such a general
and threadbare catchall, suggesting the
possibility of other infringing displays, does
not plausibly allege the existence of an
ongoing violation of federal law. In the same
vein, Allen and Nautilus argue that because
they alleged a history of infringements both
before and after the 2013 Settlement
Agreement, there is "no reasonable prospect
that infringements will cease unless they are
enjoined." This argument, however, which
relies on the asserted possibility that North
Carolina will resume infringing Allen’s
copyrights,
conflates
the Ex
parte
Young exception with the doctrine of
mootness. Even assuming that North
Carolina has failed to provide reasonable
assurances that it will avoid infringing
Allen’s copyrights in the future, as would
foreclose the voluntary-cessation exception
to mootness, it remains Allen’s burden in the
context of sovereign immunity to establish
an ongoing violation of federal law to qualify

Under Ex parte Young , private citizens may
sue state officials in their official capacities
in federal court to obtain prospective relief
from ongoing violations of federal law. This
exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity
"is designed to preserve the constitutional
structure established by the Supremacy
Clause" and rests on the notion, often referred
to as "a fiction," that a state officer who acts
unconstitutionally is "stripped of his official
or representative character and [thus]
subjected in his person to the consequences
of his individual conduct.” To invoke the
exception, the plaintiff must identify and seek
prospective
equitable
relief
from
an ongoing violation of federal law.
Allen and Nautilus maintain that they have
alleged two ongoing violations from which
they seek prospective relief: (1) North
Carolina’s continuing infringement of
Allen’s copyrights and (2) its continuing
enforcement of an unconstitutional statute,
namely, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 121–25(b), which
designates images of shipwrecks in the
State’s custody as public records.
As to the alleged ongoing copyright
infringement, Allen and Nautilus identified
in their complaint six specific "infringing
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for relief under Ex parte Young. Because the
only ongoing infringement that Allen and
Nautilus plausibly alleged has concededly
ended, they cannot employ the Ex parte
Young exception to address their fear of
future infringements.

several Department officials, alleging at most
that several of the officials supported
enactment of § 121–25(b) and providing no
further explanation regarding any connection
between the officials and the challenged
enactment. Indeed, Allen and Nautilus have
not even shown that § 121–25(b) can be
enforced against a private party. In any event,
in view of the officials’ roles, it is apparent
that none of them would or could have any
role in enforcing the statute, as required.

Allen and Nautilus also identify as an
ongoing violation North Carolina’s purported
continuing "enforcement" of § 121–25(b) to
provide a defense against their claims of
copyright infringement. This allegation,
however, also cannot support application of
the Ex parte Young exception because when
a plaintiff sues "to enjoin the enforcement of
an act alleged to be unconstitutional," the
exception applies "only where a party
defendant in [such] a suit ... has ‘some
connection with the enforcement of the Act.’"
As we explained in Hutto, the "requirement
that there be a relationship between the state
officials sought to be enjoined and the
enforcement of the state statute prevents
parties from circumventing a State’s
Eleventh Amendment immunity." We thus
noted "that a governor cannot be enjoined by
virtue of his general duty to enforce the
laws," nor can an "attorney general ... be
enjoined where he has no specific statutory
authority to enforce the statute at issue." By
contrast, however, we have held that a State’s
circuit court clerk had the requisite
connection to the enforcement of the State’s
marriage laws to be enjoined from enforcing
them because the clerk was charged with the
particular responsibilities for granting and
denying applications for marriage licenses.

Accordingly, we conclude that Ex parte
Young does not provide Allen and Nautilus
with an exception to the Eleventh
Amendment immunity claimed by North
Carolina.
III
The North Carolina officials who were sued
in their individual capacity for monetary
damages contend that the district court erred
in denying them qualified immunity and
legislative immunity from suit. In doing so,
the district court explained that these
defendants were not protected by qualified
immunity because "the law of [copyright]
infringement is clearly established." The
court also denied them legislative immunity
because it was "premature" to resolve that
issue. As we explain, however, we also
reverse on these issues.
Qualified immunity "shields officials from
civil liability so long as their conduct ‘does
not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known.’ The inquiry as to

In this case, Allen and Nautilus sued the
State, the Governor, the Department, and
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whether the law is "clearly established" is a
demanding one:

could "use [the] completed documentary, free
of charge, in museums and exhibits for
educational purposes." And the Agreement
provided, with respect to non-commercial
digital media, that such media should bear "a
time code stamp and watermark" of "Nautilus
and/or [the Department]" and that the
Department would display them only on the
Department’s website. The Agreement also
provided that the Department could retain the
archival footage with a time stamp and
watermark "for research purposes," although
it would return to Nautilus any footage and
photographs that did not bear a time code
stamp and watermark. Moreover, it provided
that "[d]uring the recovery phase of the
[Revenge ] project, [the Department] and
Intersal [would] make available to each other
recordscreated or collected in relation to the
[Revenge ] project," (emphasis added),
defining "records" to include "field maps,
notes, drawings, photographic records, and
other technical, scientific and historical
documentation created or collected by [the
Department] or Intersal pursuant to the study
of the site and the recovery of materials
therefrom." These materials were designated
"public records" to be "curated by [the
Department]." (Emphasis added).

A clearly established right is one that
is sufficiently clear that every
reasonable official would have
understood that what he [or she] is
doing violates that right. In other
words, existing precedent must have
placed the statutory or constitutional
question
beyond
debate.
*

*

*

The Supreme Court has repeatedly
told courts ... not to define clearly
established law at a high level of
generality. Thus, we consider
whether a right is clearly established
in light of the specific context of the
case, not as a broad general
proposition.
In this case, Allen and Nautilus obtained their
rights to take videos and photographs of the
Revenge shipwreck from Intersal, who in turn
obtained the rights from the Department. And
any rights that Allen and Nautilus have to
those videos and photographs are
circumscribed by the provisions of the 2013
Settlement Agreement with the Department.
In that Agreement, Intersal asserted—and the
Department, Allen, and Nautilus agreed—
that Intersal had documented "fifteen (15)
years of underwater and other activities
related to the [Queen Anne’s Revenge]
project" and that it had the right to produce
and retain an interest in a commercial
documentary film about those activities. The
Agreement provided that the Department

Notably, the 2013 Settlement Agreement
stated that "[n]othing in [the] Agreement
shall prevent [the Department] from making
records available to the public pursuant to
North Carolina General Statutes Chapters
121 and 132, or any other applicable State or
federal law or rule related to the inspection of
public records." At that time—i.e. , in 2013,
before § 121–25(b) was enacted— N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 132–1 provided that "all ...
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photographs [and] films ... made or received
pursuant to law ... in connection with the
transaction of public business by any agency
of North Carolina" are "public records," and
that it is "the policy of [the] State that the
people may obtain copies of ... public records
... free or at minimal cost unless otherwise
specifically provided by law."

individual capacities for their alleged
involvement in the enactment of § 121–25(b).
The district court did not expressly resolve
whether the individual officers were entitled
to legislative immunity, concluding instead
that such a ruling would be "premature." But
its deferral in ruling amounted to a denial of
the immunity because the immunity protects
officials "not only from the consequences of
litigation’s results, but also from the burden
of defending themselves" in court. Thus, the
very purpose of the immunity is thwarted
when an official must expend "time and
energy ... to defend against a lawsuit" arising
from his legislative acts. Accordingly, the
North Carolina officials can appropriately
appeal the district court’s deferral in ruling on
legislative immunity.

Based on these provisions of the 2013
Settlement Agreement and the then
applicable public records law, it is far from
clear whether the Department was prohibited
from displaying Allen’s copyrighted
materials in the manner alleged in the
complaint. This is especially so in view of the
Department’s role in the salvage project to
preserve for the public the site and artifacts
and to document their salvage in furtherance
of research and the education of the public.

Legislative immunity entitles public officials
to absolute immunity for their performance
of legislative functions. And it attaches
whenever state officials—including those
outside the legislative branch—engage in any
conduct within the "sphere of legitimate
legislative
activity."
Determining
whether official conduct is shielded by
legislative immunity "turns on the nature of
the act," without regard to the "motive or
intent" of the official performing it.

Of course, we need not resolve whether
North Carolina’s display of the video footage
and the still photograph violated the
Copyright Act to resolve the issue of
qualified immunity. What we do conclude is
that reasonable officials in the position of the
North Carolina officials would not have
understood beyond
debate that
their
publication of the material violated Allen’s
rights under the Copyright Act. The issue is
indeed debatable. Accordingly, we conclude
that Allen and Nautilus’s copyright claims
against the North Carolina officials in their
individual capacities are precluded by
qualified immunity.

In this case, the North Carolina officials were
sued in their individual capacities for
"conspir[ing]
to
convert
[Allen’s]
copyrighted works into public documents"
through the enactment of § 121–25(b). But
the only actual conduct alleged in furtherance
of the conspiracy—that the officers "wrote,
caused to be introduced, lobbied for passage

We also conclude that legislative immunity
shields the North Carolina officials in their
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of, and obtained passage" of § 121–25(b) —
is quintessentially legislative in nature and
falls squarely within the scope of legislative
immunity. Allen and Nautilus’s only
argument to the contrary is that the complaint
alleges that the officers sought enactment of
§ 121–25(b) with impure motives , seeking to
benefit an affiliated nonprofit entity and to
remove the threat of legal liability. As noted,
however, motive is irrelevant to the issue.
*

*

REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH
INSTRUCTIONS

*

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse each of
the district court’s rulings on immunity and
remand with instructions that the district
court dismiss without prejudice Allen and
Nautilus’s claims against North Carolina, the
Department, and the public officials acting in
their official capacities and to dismiss with
prejudice the remaining claims against the
officials in their individual capacities.
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“High Court To Tackle Pirate Ship Copyright Fight”
Law360
Bill Donahue
June 3, 2019
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed Monday to
hear a case over whether a videographer can
sue the state of North Carolina for using his
copyrighted footage of a pirate shipwreck,
giving the justices a chance to revive an
obscure federal law that has repeatedly been
ruled unconstitutional by lower courts.

Justice said the agency "looks forward to
continuing to defend the state in this case."
Allen and his Nautilus Productions sued in
2015 after North Carolina refused to stop
using his footage of the Queen Anne’s
Revenge — the flagship of the famed pirate
Blackbeard that ran aground in North
Carolina.

The justices granted certiorari to Frederick
Allen, who wants the high court to overturn a
ruling from last year last year that declared
unconstitutional the Copyright Remedy
Clarification Act, which allows copyright
owners to sue states for infringement.

Theoretically, the Copyright Remedy
Clarification Act gave him the right to do so.
The Eleventh Amendment gives states and
state officials broad sovereign immunity
from being sued in federal court, but the
CRCA, passed in 1990, aimed to “abrogate”
that immunity to allow infringement cases
against states.

The ruling, which said Congress didn’t have
the authority to revoke the sovereign
immunity granted to states under the
Eleventh Amendment, was the latest by a
federal appeals court to strike down the 1990
amendment to the Copyright Act.

The problem? The CRCA has been struck
down repeatedly by courts that say Congress
lacked the authority to pass a statute trumping
the Eleventh Amendment the way the law
aimed to. The U.S. Department of Justice no
longer defends the statute in court.

Allen, who sued North Carolina for using his
footage of a famed local shipwreck, said
those rulings were “misreadings” of
precedent and an overreach by one branch of
government onto another.

Last summer, the Fourth Circuit rejected
Allen’s arguments that Congress could derive
authority for CRCA in either the
Constitution’s intellectual property clause or
the 14th Amendment, which allows Congress
to protect property rights from states' abuses.

As is customary, the high court did not
explain why it took the case. A spokeswoman
for the North Carolina's Department of
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In January, Allen asked the U.S. Supreme
Court to overturn that decision. He said the
high court, and not a series of lower courts,
should be the final arbiter of the law’s
constitutionality.

North Carolina Gov. Roy Cooper III and
various other defendants named in the
lawsuit are represented by attorneys from the
state’s Department of Justice.

“What should occasion this court’s review is
the federal judiciary’s relatively unexamined
disregard of a law enacted by Congress as a
co-equal branch, and the distension of vital
principles that should properly define and
limit each branch’s respective powers,” Allen
wrote.

The case is Allen v. Cooper, case number 18877, at the Supreme Court of the United
States.

“This court generally grants review where,
as here, a federal court refuses to enforce a
federal statute on constitutional grounds,” he
added.
In a statement on Monday, Allen said that he
and his team were "obviously gratified."
"The Constitution of the United States of
America expressly empowers Congress to
grant copyright holders ‘the exclusive right to
their respective writings and discoveries',"
Allen wrote. "We look forward to making our
case to the Supreme Court as to why it was
within Congress’s constitutional authority to
hold states liable for their acts of copyright
infringement.”
Allen and Nautilus are represented by Derek
L. Shaffer, Christopher Landau, Kathleen
Lanigan, Todd Anten, Lisa M. Geary and
Joanna E. Menillo of Quinn Emanuel
Urquhart & Sullivan LLP; Susan Freya Olive
and David Loar McKenzie of Olive & Olive
PA; and G. Jona Poe Jr. of Poe Law Firm
PLLC.
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“SCOTUS To Decide Whether States Can Be Sued For Copyright Infringement In
Case Involving Backbeard’s Ship”
Above The Law
Krista L. Cox
June 20, 2019
Somehow, within a month, I find myself
writing two different columns involving
copyright… and pirates. Not copyright
“piracy,” but actual pirates. As in, eye
patches, parrots, and swashbuckler pirates.

can just get off scot-free for infringement;
litigation is still expensive and they can be
enjoined from further infringement. States
are not completely immune from litigation.
Additionally, contrary to what some critics of
sovereign immunity claim, states generally
don’t go around infringing intellectual
property. While there may be good-faith,
mistaken beliefs that a particular use is fair
use, states and their subdivisions typically act
in a responsible fashion with every intention
of adhering to the law. It’s a little silly to
suggest
that
a
state
will
start
screening Avengers: Endgame and rely on
state sovereign immunity to avoid liability.

SCOTUS has agreed to hear a case — the
facts of which involve a famous pirate ship
— to determine whether a state can be sued
for damages in a copyright case. Congress
enacted the Copyright Remedy Clarification
Act of 1990 (CRCA), which set out to
abrogate a state’s Eleventh Amendment
sovereign immunity in copyright cases and
allow individuals to sue states for
infringement. While SCOTUS has not ruled
on the constitutionality of CRCA,
developments between 1997 and the present
have led to the widespread belief that states
are indeed immune from copyright
infringement case.

In Allen v. Cooper, the justices will consider
whether Congress validly exercised its power
in abrogating state sovereign immunity in
copyright cases through enactment of the
CRCA. The case involves the discovery of
the infamous pirate Blackbeard’s ship, Queen
Anne’s Revenge, off the coast of North
Carolina. Allen filmed the shipwreck then
claimed that North Carolina violated
copyright by displaying the footage on the
internet without authorization. North
Carolina, in response, asserted that CRCA
was unconstitutional. The Fourth Circuit
agreed that CRCA was not a valid exercise of
Congressional authority.

Before getting into the details of CRCA and
the case SCOTUS will hear next term, let’s
clear up a couple of things about what state
sovereign immunity does — and does not —
do in the intellectual property context. A state
cannot be sued for damages in intellectual
property cases. However, a state (and its
officials
acting
in
their
official
capacity) can be sued for injunctive relief or
declaratory judgments. It’s not like a state
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The Supreme Court’s decision to accept cert
is a bit surprising since it seems to be wellunderstood that CRCA was not a valid
exercise of Congressional authority and that
states retain sovereign immunity in copyright
cases. There are no circuit splits.
Additionally, while SCOTUS has not
determined whether CRCA is constitutional,
it decided two very similar cases involving
trademarks and copyright in 1997. Both
cases, resulting in two separate decisions,
involved the same litigants: Florida Prepaid
Post-Secondary Education Expense Board
and the College Savings Bank. These cases
considered
the
Trademark
Remedy
Clarification Act of 1992 and the Patent and
Plant
Variety
Protection
Remedy
Clarification Act of 1992. In both cases,
SCOTUS ruled in 5-4 decisions that states are
immune from suits in federal courts for
violations of patent and trademark law
(Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter, and
Stevens dissented in the pair of cases). In
order for Congress to validly abrogate
sovereign immunity, SCOTUS ruled,
“Congress would need to identify conduct
transgressing the Fourteenth Amendment’s
substantive provisions, and must tailor its
legislative scheme to remedying or
preventing such conduct.” The Court looked
at the legislative history of the statutes, which
revealed relatively few instances of intention
infringement of patents and trademark.
Because the record did not demonstrate
widespread deprivation of patents and
trademark, Congressional action to abrogate
sovereign immunity was not proportional and
therefore invalid.

in Chavez v. Arte Publico Press that state
universities (here, the University of Houston)
have sovereign immunity under the Eleventh
Amendment and CRCA represents an
improper exercise of Congressional power.
Here, the Fifth Circuit — relying heavily on
the Florida Prepaid cases — found that for
Congress to abrogate state sovereign
immunity under the Fourteenth Amendment,
there
must
be
“congruence
and
proportionality between the injury to be
prevented/remedied and the means adopted
to that end.” The Fifth Circuit determined
that the legislative history did not identify
any pattern of constitutional violations or
infringements by states nor any pattern of
unremedied copyright infringement by states.
Indeed,
the
legislative
history
of
infringement by states is even more scant for
CRCA than it was in the trademark in patent
contexts. Additionally, the court noted that
the legislative history of CRCA included
only two allusions to state remedies,
demonstrating that there was a failure to
include information to state remedies for
unlawful takings of private property by state
governments or other possible remedies —
such as breach of contract — that Congress
did not consider when enacting CRCA.
Additionally, CRCA fails because for
Congress to determine that under the due
process clause deprivation is actionable, it
must be an intentional act; negligent acts
causing unintended injury are an insufficient
nexus. The CRCA failed to confine its reach
to intentional acts.
While some may suggest that SCOTUS has
taken the case to overturn the general
understanding that states retain sovereign
immunity in copyright cases, the Court’s

Following the Florida Prepaid cases in the
copyright context, the Fifth Circuit found
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recent decision in Franchise Tax Board of
California v. Hyatt could provide an
indication that it strongly supports sovereign
immunity. There, in a 5-4 decision, SCOTUS

upheld state sovereign immunity in cases
brought in other state courts.
Ultimately, we will have to wait until next
term to see how sovereign immunity fares.

459

“Supreme Court to Rule Whether Congress Appropriately Abrogated State
Sovereign Immunity for Copyright Claims in Allen v. Cooper”

IP Watchdog
Steve Brachmann
June 18, 2019
As we anxiously await a final decision from
the U.S. Supreme Court in Iancu v. Brunetti,
and decisions on pending petitions
for certiorari in several other IP cases, the
Court agreed to hear Allen v. Cooper on June
3. The case asks whether Congress acted
appropriately in relying upon its powers
under Article I of the U.S. Constitution to
abrogate state sovereign immunity against
federal copyright claims by passing the
Copyright Remedy Clarification Act
(CRCA) or if, as the Fourth Circuit held,
Congress improperly abrogated state
sovereign immunity by passing that law.

salvage project. Allen subsequently obtained
13 federally registered copyrights, each
covering one year of footage from the salvage
project.
After the North Carolina Department of
Natural and Cultural Resources, the state
agency that signed the salvage agreement
with
Intersal,
published
Allen’s
documentation of the salvage work on the
Internet, Allen maintained that this infringed
upon his copyrights in the work. In October
2013, Allen, Nautilus, Intersal and North
Carolina entered into a settlement agreement
that clarified Allen’s respective rights to the
video footage, some of which was
determined
to
be
“commercial
documentaries” and other work that was
“non-commercial media.” Allen contended
that North Carolina continued its
infringement after the settlement agreement
by displaying videos on a YouTube channel
and using a still photograph in a newsletter on
maritime museums.

Queen Anne’s Revenge Salvage Project
Leads to Copyright Claims
The underlying case involves copyrighted
video footage and one photograph created by
videographer Frederick Allen and his
production company Nautilus Productions
during a project to salvage the Queen Anne’s
Revenge, a ship commandeered in 1717 by
the famous pirate Edward Teach, also known
as “Blackbeard,” which was abandoned in
1718 after it ran aground off the coast of
Beaufort, North Carolina. After private
research and salvage firm Intersal entered
into an agreement to salvage the ship in 1998,
Intersal retained Nautilus to document the

Allen Petitions Supreme Court After
Fourth
Circuit
Finds
CRCA
Unconstitutional
In December 2015, Allen and Nautilus filed
an infringement lawsuit in the Eastern
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District of North Carolina against the state’s
cultural resources department as well as the
state’s governor and six department officials.
North Carolina moved to dismiss the claims
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), asserting Eleventh Amendment
sovereign immunity as a defense to the
claims made against the state and individual
defendants. The district court denied North
Carolina’s motions, finding that Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity was validly
abrogated by Congress through the CRCA.

Clarification Act extends liability to states for
all copyright violations, not just violations
that implicate the Fourteenth Amendment, so
the abrogation of state sovereign immunity
under this law was “grossly disproportionate
to the relevant injury under the Fourteenth
Amendment.”
Allen and Nautilus filed their petition to the
Supreme Court this January to challenge the
Fourth Circuit’s holding that the CRCA
didn’t validly abrogate state sovereign
immunity. In the petition, Allen argued that
the Fourth Circuit’s invalidation of federal
statute warranted SCOTUS review. Allen
also argued that the Supreme Court should
weigh in on the constitutional authority held
by Congress to abrogate state sovereign
immunity from copyright suits. Citing
to Florida Prepaid, the petition noted that
Congress’ Article I power to abrogate state
sovereign immunity wasn’t even argued to
the Court in that case. Further, if the Supreme
Court were to render the CRCA “a dead letter
by default” by not reviewing the Fourth
Circuit’s decision, the issue of copyright
infringement by states would continue
unabated. Allen’s petition cites to statistics
identifying 154 infringement suits filed
against states between 2000 and 2017, adding
that actual instances of infringement “are
vastly understated relative to actual
incidence.” The CRCA provides adequate
remedy for copyright holders given that
injunctive relief doesn’t compensate creators
for past infringement and is expensive to
obtain.

North Carolina appealed from the district
court’s denial of the state’s immunity defense
and the case went to the Fourth Circuit. Last
July, a Fourth Circuit panel reversed the
district court’s denial of the sovereign
immunity defense and remanded to the
district court with instructions to dismiss all
claims. On appeal, Allen and Nautilus had
contended that the CRCA, which codified
that states and state officials aren’t immune
from copyright infringement suits in federal
court, was properly invoked by Congress
under the legislative body’s authority granted
by Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
However, the Fourth Circuit found that it was
“readily apparent” that Congress relied upon
the Constitution’s Intellectual Property
Clause in enacting this law and not its
authority under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Citing to the Supreme Court’s 1999 decision
in College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid
Post-Secondary Education Expense Board, a
case involving a similar law abrogating state
sovereign immunity in patent infringement
suits, the Fourth Circuit found that such an
abrogation wasn’t valid absent Congress’
invocation of its Fourteenth Amendment
authority.
The
Copyright
Remedy
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Supreme Court Likely to Undo CRCA and
Uphold State Sovereign Immunity

will decide the state sovereign immunity
issue in this case. In Franchise Tax Board,
the Supreme Court issued a 5-4 decision
(authored by Justice Clarence Thomas)
holding that states retain their sovereign
immunity from private suits brought to courts
in other states. “The Supreme Court majority
in that case said that the Eleventh
Amendment was actually broader than what
its text suggests,” Esler said. He believed
that Franchise Tax Board could be a strong
indicator that the Supreme Court might seek
to extend state sovereign immunity
in Allen consistent with the Court’s decision
in Florida Prepaid.

The CRCA could be open to more challenge
at the Supreme Court because it’s not limited
to injunctive relief, according to Brian Esler,
Partner at Miller Nash Graham & Dunn.
“Giving a private citizen the right to sue a
state for damages is less likely to be held to
be a valid exercise of congressional power,”
he said. “It’s not to say that Congress can’t,
but there’s a higher level of scrutiny then as
opposed to allowing only injunctive relief.”
In a July 2017 blog post on this case, Esler
noted it was interesting that the copyrighted
material at issue was about the Queen Anne’s
Revenge given that the first British copyright
law, from which U.S. copyright law is in part
derived, was the Statute of Anne. This was
the first law providing for the regulation of
copyrights through the government and the
courts rather than private parties. Esler, who
taught British IP law in the early 2000s at the
University of Hertfordshire, said that the
Statute of Anne was very much in the
Framers’ minds when they wrote the
Intellectual Property Clause into Article I of
the U.S. Constitution.

While SCOTUS upheld congressional
abrogation of state sovereign immunity
in Central Virginia Community College v.
Katz (2006), and the bankruptcy provision in
that case also derived from Article I of the
Constitution, Esler noted that the Court held
that the purpose of the Bankruptcy Clause
was to maintain uniformity in U.S.
bankruptcy law. “I don’t think you can say
the same about the Intellectual Property
Clause,” Esler said. “Although it certainly
gave power to Congress to legislate in that
area, it doesn’t demand uniformity.”
Moreover, Justice Thomas authored the
dissent in Central Virginia and now seems to
have a majority for his expansive reading of
state sovereign immunity under the Eleventh
Amendment.

Esler said that the Supreme Court’s recent
decision in Franchise Tax Board of
California v. Hyatt, issued in May, provides
a clue as to how the nation’s highest court
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“Yo Ho No: Lack of Express Language Scuttles Claim of Sovereign Immunity
Waiver”

The National Law Review
Rebecca Harker Duttry
August 29, 2018
The US Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit confirmed, consistent with rulings in
other courts, that the Copyright Remedy
Clarification Act does not validly abrogate
11th Amendment immunity, and that 11th
Amendment immunity may only be waived if
a state expressly consents to suit in federal
court.Allen v. Cooper, Case Nos. 17-1522, 1602 (4th Cir. July 10, 2018) (Niemeyer, J).

wreck, Allen registered these works with the
US Copyright Office.
Subsequently,
the
North
Carolina
Department of Natural and Cultural
Resources published some of Allen’s work
on the internet without his consent, leading to
a copyright infringement dispute that the
parties settled pursuant to a settlement
agreement. After entering into the settlement
agreement, Allen and Nautilus alleged that
the Department resumed publishing and/or
displaying various videos about the
shipwreck on the Department’s YouTube
channel and published one of Allen’s still
photographs in a newsletter, in violation of
the parties’ agreement.

Allen, a videographer, along with Nautilus,
his video production company, obtained the
rights to create footage and photograph
Blackbeard’s pirate ship off the coast of
North Carolina through a permit issued by
North Carolina to the salvors of the ship. The
permit gave the salvors the exclusive right to
make and market all commercial narrative
accounts of project-related activities
undertaken by the salvors, but specifically
provided that the agreement did not infringe
the public’s right to access public records,
including field maps, notes, drawings,
photographic records and other relevant
materials created or collected pursuant to the
study of the site and recovery of materials
therefrom. After capturing substantial video
footage and still images showing the
underwater shipwreck and the efforts of
teams of divers to recover artifacts from the

Allen and Nautilus then brought suit alleging
violation of Allen’s copyrights. North
Carolina filed a motion to dismiss under
Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) asserting
sovereign immunity under the 11th
Amendment. In response, Allen and Nautilus
made three main arguments:
•
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North Carolina waived sovereign
immunity in the settlement
agreement.

•

•

The federal Copyright Remedy
Clarification Act of 1990
abrogated the State’s sovereign
immunity.

the agreement did not constitute a waiver of
11th Amendment immunity.
The Fourth Circuit further found that the
Copyright Remedy Clarification Act does not
abrogate a state’s 11th Amendment
immunity. The Act provides in relevant part:

Ex parte Young provided an
exception to sovereign immunity
for ongoing violations of federal
law.

Any State, any instrumentality of a State, and
any officer or employee of a State or
instrumentality of a State acting in his or her
official capacity, shall not be immune, under
the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution
of the United States or under any other
doctrine of sovereign immunity, from suit in
Federal court by any person . . . for a violation
of any of the exclusive rights of a copyright
owner provided by [federal copyright law].

After the district court rejected North
Carolina’s claims of immunity, North
Carolina filed an interlocutory appeal, and
Allen and Nautilus filed a cross-appeal.
The 11th Amendment immunity protects
states, their agencies and their officials from
suit in federal court. In order to waive
immunity under the 11th Amendment, a state
must expressly consent to suit in federal
court. The Fourth Circuit found that the
settlement
agreement
between
the
Department and Allen fell short of the clear
statement required to effect a waiver of 11th
Amendment immunity. The agreement
provided in relevant part:

The Fourth Circuit reaffirmed that Congress
cannot rely on its enumerated power in
Article I’s Patent and Copyright Clause,
which authorizes Congress to “secur[e] for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries,” to abrogate 11th
Amendment immunity. The Court, relying
on Florida Prepaid v. College Savings
Bank (S.Ct. 1999), found that the language in
the Act sweeps so broadly that it cannot be
deemed a congruent and proportional
response to the 14th Amendment injury with
which it was confronted. Therefore, the Court
concluded that the Copyright Remedy
Clarification Act cannot validly abrogate the
11th Amendment.

In the event [North Carolina], Intersal
[salvors], or [Allen and] Nautilus breaches
this Agreement, [North Carolina], Intersal, or
[Allen and] Nautilus may avail themselves of
all remedies provided by law or equity.
This statement makes no reference to federal
court (or any court) and states only that each
party may pursue available remedies as
provided by law or equity. Thus, the Fourth
Circuit found that legal or equitable
limitations on those remedies—including
11th Amendment immunity—must also
apply under the agreement and, as a result,

Lastly, the Fourth Circuit found that Ex parte
Young, which allows private citizens to sue
state officials in their official capacities in
federal court to obtain prospective relief from
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ongoing violations of federal law, does not
apply in this case because North Carolina
removed the allegedly infringing materials
from the internet and there was no ongoing
copyright infringement. The argument by
Allen and Nautilus that there was
the possibility of other infringing displays
did not plausibly allege the existence of an
ongoing violation of federal law, and thus Ex
parte Young did not provide an exception to

the 11th Amendment immunity claimed by
North Carolina.
The Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded
the matter to the district court with
instructions to dismiss, with prejudice, the
claims against state officials in their
individual capacities, and to dismiss, without
prejudice, the remaining claims.
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“The State Can Plunder Your Copyright: Allen v. Cooper”
IP Law Trends
Brian Esler
July 17, 2018
In 1710, during the reign of Queen Anne,
Great Britain’s Parliament enacted the statute
that gave rise to copyright as we know it—
the Statute of Anne—which was the first
statute to declare that the subject matter of
copyright would be regulated by the
government and the courts, rather than
agreements between private parties. Seven
years later, the English pirate Blackbeard
captured a French merchant vessel, renamed
her the Queen Anne’s Revenge, and soon
after ran her aground off the coast of North
Carolina. As demonstrated by the recent
Fourth Circuit decision in Allen v. Cooper,
Blackbeard’s choice of the ship’s name
proved prophetic.

(although North Carolina did require the
plaintiffs to make their raw footage and
photographs available to North Carolina,
reserved the right to use them for educational
purposes, and warned the plaintiffs that any
materials provided would become public
records). Had the plaintiffs been suing a
private actor, the case for infringement (and
damages or injunctive relief) would have
been straightforward. But as was true in
Queen Anne’s reign, and is still true now, the
sovereign is immune from suit except in
limited circumstances, which sovereign
immunity (at least for states) is enshrined in
the Eleventh Amendment to the United States
Constitution.

In that case, the Fourth Circuit was tasked
with deciding whether the company that
recently discovered and salvaged the wreck
of the Queen Anne’s Revenge off the coast of
North Carolina could sue North Carolina and
various of its state officials for copyright
infringement when North Carolina posted
some YouTube videos and pictures of the
salvage operation that contained what were
admittedly the plaintiff’s copyrighted videos
and images. The plaintiffs even had two
contracts with North Carolina in which North
Carolina had agreed that the plaintiffs would
have the “exclusive right” to produce and
profit from videos about their salvage project

But Article I of the Constitution also gives
Congress the authority to “secur[e] for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries” (i.e., to grant copyrights).
And pursuant to that Constitutional authority,
Congress enacted the Copyright Remedy
Clarification Act in 1990, which provides
that States and state officers “shall not be
immune, under the Eleventh Amendment of
the Constitution of the United States or under
other doctrine of sovereign immunity, from
suit in Federal court by any person . . . for a
violation of any of the exclusive rights of a
copyright owner provided by [federal law].”
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So plaintiffs should have had the wind at their
backs in suing the State and its officers for
copyright infringement.

the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act to be
unconstitutional.
So to review: (1) copyright claims can only
be brought in federal court, (2) states cannot
be sued without their consent in federal court,
so (3) plaintiff’s copyright claims are
dismissed. As we have noted here
before with respect to trade secrets, it can be
dangerous for any rights holder to deal with
the government as it would a private party.
As Mel Brooks sagely noted, “It’s good to be
the King!”

The Fourth Circuit scuttled that notion, and
found that Congress itself was the outlaw in
passing a statute purporting to abrogate the
State’s sovereign immunity because
“Congress cannot rely on the enumerated
power in Article I over copyright to compel a
State to litigate copyright cases in a federal
court.” In doing so, the Fourth Circuit joined
a growing list of federal courts that have held
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Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org Inc.
Ruling Below: Code Revision Comm’n v. Public Resource. Org Inc, 906 F.3d 1229 (11th Cir.
2018)
Overview: The Circuit Court held that the Official Code of Georgia Annotate (OCGA) were
sufficiently law-like to be properly regarded as a sovereign work and therefore were not
copyrightable.
Issue: Whether the government edicts doctrine extends to—and thus renders uncopyrightable—
works that lack the force of law, such as the annotations in the Official Code of Georgia Annotated.
CODE REVISIONS COMMISSION, for the Benefit of and on behalf of General Assembly
of Georgia, State of GEORGIA, Plaintiffs—Appellees
v.
PUBLIC.RESOURCE.ORG, INC., Defendant—Appellant
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit
Decided on October 19, 2018
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]
MARCUS, Circuit Judge:

review of the law, and an examination of the
annotations, we conclude that no valid

Today, we are presented with the question of
whether the annotations contained in the
Official Code of Georgia Annotated
(OCGA), authored by the Georgia General
Assembly and made an inextricable part of
the official codification of Georgia’s laws,
may be copyrighted by the State of Georgia.
Answering this question means confronting
profound and difficult issues about the nature
of law in our society and the rights of citizens
to have unfettered access to the legal edicts
that govern their lives. After a thorough

copyright interest can be asserted in any part
of the OCGA.
From the earliest day of the Republic, under
federal copyright law, copyright interests
have vested in the author of the work.
Authorship, therefore, is central to many
questions that arise under the Copyright Act,
17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. This case is no
exception. In most states the “official” code
is comprised of statutory text alone, and all
agree that a state’s codification cannot be
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copyrighted because the authorship is
ultimately attributable to the People.
Conversely, all agree that annotations created
by a private party generally can be
copyrighted because the annotations are an
original work created by a private publisher.
But the annotations in the OCGA are not
exactly like either of these two types of
works. Rather, they fall somewhere in
between -- their legal effect and ultimate
authorship more indeterminate. To resolve
this question, then, we reason by analogy,
and drill down on the core attributes that
make the OCGA annotations what they are - namely an exercise of sovereign power.

on behalf of the People, who are properly
regarded as the author of the work. The task
we face today is whether we should similarly
treat Georgia’s entire official code, which
expressly merges its statutes and their official
annotations, as the sovereign expression of
the People by their legislature, as public
domain material.
To navigate the ambiguities surrounding how
to characterize this work, we resort to first
principles. Because our ultimate inquiry is
whether a work is authored by the People,
meaning whether it represents an articulation
of the sovereign will, our analysis is guided
by a consideration of those characteristics
that are the hallmarks of law. In particular, we
rely on the identity of the public officials who
created the work, the authoritativeness of the
work, and the process by which the work was
created. These are critical markers. Where all
three point in the direction that a work was
made in the exercise of sovereign power -which is to say where the official who created
the work is entrusted with delegated
sovereign authority, where the work carries
authoritative weight, and where the work was
created through the procedural channels in
which sovereign power ordinarily flows -- it
follows that the work would be attributable to
the constructive authorship of the People, and
therefore uncopyrightable.

The general rule that legislative codifications
are uncopyrightable derives from an
understanding of the nature of law and the
basic idea that the People, as the reservoir of
all sovereignty, are the source of our law. For
purposes of the Copyright Act, this means
that the People are the constructive authors of
those official legal promulgations of
government that represent an exercise of
sovereign authority. And because they are the
authors, the People are the owners of these
works, meaning that the works are
intrinsically public domain material and,
therefore, uncopyrightable.
That the law itself, whether it takes the form
of a legislative enactment or of a judicial
opinion, is subject to the rule is clear and not
contested. This is because these works
represent the quintessential exercise of
sovereign power. When a legislature enacts a
law, or a court writes an opinion rendering an
official interpretation of the law in a case or
controversy, they are undisputedly speaking

The question is a close one -- and important
considerations of public policy are at stake on
either side -- but, at the end of the day, we
conclude that the annotations in the OCGA
are sufficiently law-like so as to be properly
regarded as a sovereign work. Like the
statutory text itself, the annotations are

469

created by the duly constituted legislative
authority of the State of Georgia. Moreover,
the annotations clearly have authoritative
weight in explicating and establishing the
meaning and effect of Georgia’s laws.
Furthermore, the procedures by which the
annotations were incorporated bear the
hallmarks of legislative process, namely
bicameralism and presentment. In short, the
annotations are legislative works created by
Georgia’s legislators in the exercise of their
legislative authority.

To amend… the Official Code of Georgia
Annotated.”
Appearing alongside the statutory text are
various annotations, consisting of history
lines, repeal lines, cross references,
commentaries, case notations, editor’s notes,
excerpts from law review articles, summaries
of opinions of the Attorney General of
Georgia, summaries of advisory opinions of
the State Bar, and other research references.
The Code itself makes clear that these
annotations are a part of the official Code,
stating that the statutory portions of the Code
“shall be merged with annotations… and
[are] published by authority of the state
…and when so published [are to] be known
and may be cited as the ‘Official Code of
Georgia Annotated.’”

As a consequence, we conclude that the
People are the ultimate authors of the
annotations. As a work of the People the
annotations are inherently public domain
material and therefore uncopyrightable.
Because we conclude that no copyright can
be held in the annotations, we have no
occasion to address the parties’ other
arguments regarding originality and fair use.

A.

Despite the fact that they are part of the
official Code, Georgia law says that the
annotations themselves do not have the force
of law in the way that the statutory portions
of the Code do. One provision of the Code
explains that:

The Official Code of Georgia Annotated
(OCGA or the Code) is an annotated
compilation of Georgia statutes that has been
published annually since 1982. The statutory
text contained in the OCGA has been
“enacted and [has] the effect of statutes
enacted by the General Assembly of
Georgia.” As the Code itself explains, the
statutory text in the OCGA is the official
published version of Georgia’s laws, and
when the Georgia General Assembly enacts a
new law, the bill typically reads “An Act…

Unless otherwise provided in this Code, the
descriptive
headings
or
catchlines
immediately preceding or within the text of
the individual Code sections of this Code,
except the Code section numbers included in
the headings or catchlines immediately
preceding the text of the Code sections, and
title and chapter analyses do not constitute
part of the law and shall in no manner limit or
expand the construction of any Code section.
All historical citations, title and chapter
analyses, and notes set out in this Code are

I.
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given for the purpose of convenient reference
and do not constitute part of the law.

Georgia Senate, the Speaker of the Georgia
House of Representatives, four additional
members of the Georgia House of
Representatives, and five members appointed
by the president of the State Bar of Georgia.
Following its successful recodification of
Georgia law and the publication of the
OCGA in 1982, the Commission is now
responsible for updating the OCGA and
supervising Lexis’s editing and publication
of the OCGA.

Laws passed during each session of the
Georgia General Assembly that reenact the
OCGA as the state’s official code similarly
provide that the annotations “contained in the
Official Code of Georgia Annotated are not
enacted as statutes by the provisions of this
Act.”
The annotations were initially prepared by
Mathew Bender & Co., Inc., an operating
division of the LexisNexis Group, (Lexis),
pursuant to an agreement it entered into with
the State of Georgia. Under the terms of the
agreement, Lexis is responsible for the
ongoing publication and maintenance of the
Code, and all editorial, publication, and
distribution costs. In exchange, Lexis was
given the exclusive right of publication by
Georgia. But, notably, Georgia holds the
copyright in the annotations in its own name.
The publication agreement also specifies
what types of annotations should appear
alongside the statutory text, and provides
detailed and specific directions as to how
Lexis is to generate and arrange this content.
The agreement also provides that the Code
Revision Commission (the “Commission”)
supervises the work of Lexis and has final
editorial control over the contents of the
OCGA. The Commission is a body
established by the Georgia General Assembly
in 1977 that was originally tasked with
undertaking the recodification of all of
Georgia’s laws, a project that had not been
done since 1933. The Commission is
comprised of Georgia officials, including the
Lieutenant Governor, four members of the

In addition to providing instructions to Lexis
about how the annotations should be created,
compiled, and arranged, the publication
agreement establishes a number of other
conditions governing the relationship
between Lexis and the State of Georgia. First,
the agreement requires that Lexis create a
free, unannotated, online version of the Code
for use by the general public. Second, the
agreement limits the price that Lexis can
charge for the OCGA. While other
commercial annotations of the Georgia Code
can cost as much as $2,570, the price of the
OCGA is currently $404. Third, it grants
Lexis the exclusive right to produce and sell
print, CD-ROM, and online versions of the
OCGA. Finally, it provides that the
Commission shall receive royalties on the
sale of CD-ROM and online versions of the
OCGA, but shall not receive royalties from
the sale of print volumes.
The publication agreement also provides that
“[a]ll the contents of the Code… shall be
copyrighted in the name of the State of
Georgia… [and] [t]he copyrights shall cover
all copyrightable parts of the Code.” The
Commission asserts a copyright in all
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portions of the OCGA except for the statutory
text, which it recognizes cannot be
copyrighted. Despite the copyright and the
exclusive publishing rights granted to Lexis,
the State of Georgia makes the CD-ROM
version of the OCGA available to the general
public at over 60 state and county-operated
facilities throughout Georgia, such as
libraries and universities. In addition, state
agencies are granted the right to print and
distribute or sell to the public portions of the
OCGA that they are responsible for
administering.

On multiple occasions the Commission sent
letters to PRO demanding that it cease and
desist from publishing the OCGA on the
grounds that publication infringes on the
State of Georgia’s copyright in the work.
PRO refused to comply, arguing that there
was no valid copyright in the OCGA because
the law cannot be copyrighted. The
Commission, acting on behalf of the Georgia
General Assembly and the State of Georgia,
sued PRO on July 21, 2015 in the United
District Court for the Northern District of
Georgia. The complaint sought injunctive
relief against PRO’s “widespread and
unauthorized copying and distribution of the
copyrighted annotations in the Official Code
of Georgia Annotated through the
distribution of thumb drives containing
copies of the O.C.G.A. and the posting of the
O.C.G.A. on various websites.” On
September 14, 2015, PRO filed its answer to
the complaint, acknowledging its widespread
publication of the OCGA, but denying that
the State of Georgia holds an enforceable
copyright in the Code. PRO also asserted the
defense of fair use. Finally, PRO
counterclaimed seeking a declaratory
judgment that “the State of Georgia has no
valid copyright in any portion of the
O.C.G.A. because the O.C.G.A. is in the
public domain.”

B.
Public.Resource.Org (PRO) is a non-profit
organization with a mission of improving
public access to government records and
primary legal materials. Thus for example,
PRO has been responsible for the free, online
publication of all U.S. Supreme Court
opinions and every post-1950 U.S. Court of
Appeals opinion. PRO has also been
responsible for the online publication of
various state statutory codes.
In 2013 PRO purchased all 186 volumes of
the print version of the OCGA and its
supplements, scanned them, and uploaded
them to its website to be freely accessible to
the public. It also placed digital copies of the
OCGA onto USB drives and mailed them to
various Georgia legislators. Additionally,
PRO distributed copies of the OCGA to other
organizations and on other websites in order
to facilitate its further dissemination by other
parties.

Following briefing and argument, the district
court granted the Commission’s motion for
partial summary judgment and denied PRO’s
motion. The court concluded that because the
annotations in the OCGA lack the force of
law, they are not public domain material.
Also, it rejected PRO’s other challenges to
the validity of Georgia’s copyright as well as
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its fair use defense. Soon thereafter, the
district court entered a permanent injunction
against PRO enjoining it “from all
unauthorized use, including through
reproduction, display, distribution, or
creation of derivative works, of the Official
Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.).”
The injunction also ordered PRO to “remove
all versions of the O.C.G.A. from its
website,” and to cease any fundraising
activities connected with PRO’s publication
of the OCGA.

elements from the [work].” A valid copyright
registration “constitute[s] prima facie
evidence of the validity of the copyright.” 17
U.S.C. § 410 (c). Once the plaintiff has
produced a valid copyright registration, the
burden shifts to the defendant to establish that
the copyright is invalid. There is no dispute
that the State of Georgia has a registered
copyright in the OCGA annotations. Nor do
the parties contest that PRO copied the
OCGA in its entirety. Thus, at the heart of
this case is the question whether Georgia’s
copyright in the OCGA is valid; on this issue
PRO carries the burden of proof.

This timely appeal ensued.
II

A.

We review the grant of summary judgment de
novo, applying the same legal standards
which bound the district court. In doing so,
we consider “the evidence and all factual
inferences therefrom in the light most
favorable to the party opposing the motion.”
Summary judgment is proper only where
there is no genuine issue of material fact. A
genuine issue of material fact exists where
the dispute is “over facts that might affect the
outcome of the suit under the governing law”
and where the “evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party.” Id. We also review a
district court’s decision to grant equitable
relief for abuse of discretion, considering
questions of law de novo and findings of fact
for clear error.

The Constitution grants Congress the power
“[t]o promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries.”
Congress has exercised this power by passing
the Copyright Act. 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.
Under the Copyright Act:
Copyright protection subsists… in original
works of authorship fixed in any tangible
medium of expression, now known or later
developed, from which they can be
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated, either directly or with the aid
of a machine or device.
As this provision makes clear, “authorship”
is central to the statutory scheme. Only
“original works of authorship” are eligible
for copyright protection. What’s more,
authorship generally determines who has a
possessory interest in a work. “Copyright in

In order to establish a prima facie case of
copyright infringement, “a plaintiff must
show that (1) it owns a valid copyright in the
[work] and (2) defendants copied protected
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a work… vests initially in the author or
authors of the work.” Indeed, authorship
allows a person to claim copyright protection
regardless of whether the work has been
registered with the United States Copyright
Office. As we have explained, “[c]opyright
inheres in authorship and exists whether or
not it is ever registered.” In consequence, to
ascertain who holds a copyright in a work, we
ordinarily must ascertain the identity of the
author.

this Court; and that the judges thereof cannot
confer on any reporter any such right.” The
Court was interpreting the Copyright Act of
1790, but it did not explain the foundations
for the rule that “the law” was
The Court revisited the question in Banks v.
Manchester, and held that the opinions of
state court judges, just like Supreme Court
opinions, were not copyrightable. In Banks
the Court considered an infringement suit
filed by a publishing firm that had published
official reports containing the decisions of
the Supreme Court of Ohio against a
defendant who had published the same
material in the American Law Journal. An
Ohio statute provided for the appointment of
an official reporter for the Supreme Court of
Ohio, and tasked him with compiling the
decisions and other materials authored by the
judges and securing “for the benefit of the
state” a copyright on the compilations. The
Ohio statute also required the Secretary of
State to contract with a publisher, who would
be given the exclusive right to publish the
reports compiled by the official court reporter
“so far as the state can confer [such right].”
The plaintiff publishing firm in Banks was
the chosen publisher, and, in suing, was
attempting to enforce a copyright interest in
the work of the Ohio judges assigned to it by
the State of Ohio.

The meaning of authorship takes on special
significance in cases like this where we
consider the copyrightability of a government
edict. A long line of authority, stretching
back more than 180 years, establishes that,
with respect to certain governmental works,
the term “author” should be construed to
mean “the People,” so that the general public
is treated as the owner of the work. This
means that a work subject to the rule is
inherently public domain material and thus
not eligible for copyright protection. The
foundations of the case law establishing this
doctrine are far from clear. Few courts have
fully explained the basis for this idea and the
Supreme Court last addressed the question in
1888. Thus, before explaining why we
construe the “author” of the OCGA to mean
“the People,” it’s worth examining the
principal cases in some detail in order to
understand the considerations that guided
them.

The Court found the copyright invalid. It
emphasized that under then-extant copyright
law only “authors” could obtain a copyright
in their work. The Court determined that the
reporter who had created the compilations
did not qualify as the author of the opinions
or the other materials written by the judges

The Supreme Court first addressed whether a
government edict can be copyrighted in
Wheaton v. Peters. The Court unanimously
held that “no reporter has or can have any
copyright in the written opinions delivered by

474

since he had not created the works.
Moreover, the Supreme Court explained that
“[i]n no proper sense can the judge who, in
his judicial capacity, prepares the opinion or
decision, the statement of the case, and the
syllabus, or head-note, be regarded as their
author.” Thus, the Court rested its decision on
a construction of the statutory term “author”
that excluded both the judges and the reporter
from qualifying as authors of the material in
question, which in turn meant that neither the
judges nor the reporter could have conveyed
a valid copyright interest to the publishing
firm bringing suit.

access to the opinions, and that it is against
sound public policy to prevent this, or to
suppress and keep from the earliest
knowledge of the public the statutes, or the
decisions and opinions of the justices.”
The next, and to date last time the Supreme
Court considered the rule that government
edicts cannot be copyrighted came less than a
month after the Court had decided Banks, in
Callaghan v. Myers. There, a publisher of a
set of reports containing the opinions of the
Supreme Court of Illinois, known as the
Illinois Reports, brought suit for copyright
infringement against a rival publisher that
had copied and published the reports. The
original publisher had obtained a proprietary
interest in the reports from a salaried official
of the State of Illinois whose duties, defined
by statute, consisted of compiling the Illinois
Reports; organizing the cases; writing
annotations such as headnotes and syllabi to
appear alongside the opinions in the reports;
and providing a certain number of copies of
the final product to the Secretary of State of
Illinois. Having fulfilled his statutory duties,
the reporter sold whatever proprietary
interest he had in the Illinois Reports to the
publishing firm. When the firm sued for
copyright infringement, the alleged infringer
attempted to defend, claiming that the reports
were public property because they had been
created by a state employed reporter who
could himself have no proprietary interest in
the work since he created the reports as part
of his public duties and therefore was not
their “author.”

The Court offered a number of reasons for
holding that the judges could not be
considered the “authors” of their work. In the
first place judges “receive from the public
treasury a stated annual salary, fixed by law,”
and therefore can “have no pecuniary interest
or proprietorship, as against the public at
large, in the fruits of their judicial labors.”
Furthermore, although the Court said that it
was only construing the statutory meaning of
the term “author,” it also acknowledged that,
fundamentally, “[t]he question is one of
public policy.” In articulating this public
policy interest, the Court explained that
“[t]he whole work done by the judges
constitutes the authentic exposition and
interpretation of the law, which, binding
every citizen, is free for publication to all,
whether it is a declaration of unwritten law,
or an interpretation of a constitution or a
statute.” Banks expressly relied on a ruling of
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in
Nash v. Lathrop, which had similarly
observed that “it needs no argument to show
that justice requires that all should have free

The Court began its analysis by reinforcing
the basic rule announced in Banks that “there
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can be no copyright in the opinions of the
judges, or in the work done by them in their
official capacity as judges.” Nevertheless it
rejected the claim that the copyright in the
Illinois Reports was invalid. It explained that
the underlying rationale of Banks did not
apply, observing that “there is no ground of
public policy on which a reporter who
prepares a volume of law reports, of the
character of those in this case, can… be
debarred from obtaining a copyright for the
volume which will cover the matter which is
the result of his intellectual labor.” The Court
further suggested that, since the court
reporter was a “sworn public officer,
appointed by the authority of the
government… [and] paid a fixed salary for
his labors,” the state government might have
taken any proprietary interest in his work for
itself, but the fact that it had not done so
suggested that there was “a tacit assent by the
government to his exercising such privilege”
on his own. The Court thus reasoned that
federal copyright law as explicated in Banks
did not prevent the reporter from holding a
valid copyright in the work and that the state
had not reserved the copyright to itself. As a
result, the copyright the reporter obtained and
conveyed to the publishing firm was valid.
The compilation of judicial decisions and
other explanatory material like headnotes,
tables, and indices, was different from Banks
in two ways: first, the reporter, who had been
appointed by the Illinois Supreme Court, and
not the judges, had written the material
accompanying the opinion; and, second, the
reporter, and not the State of Illinois, claimed
to hold the copyright.

The Supreme Court has not examined the
doctrine since it decided Callaghan in 1888.
However, since Banks and Callaghan the
lower courts have further explored the nature
and application of the rule. Thus, for
example, the Sixth Circuit, in an opinion
authored by Justice Harlan, applied the rule
to state statutes. The Fifth Circuit has
extended the rule to encompass regulatory
materials. However, other courts have
declined to extend the rule in other, related
contexts.
It is also worth observing that Congress has
partially codified the rule announced in
Banks. Specifically, the 1909 version of the
Copyright Act provided that “no copyright
shall subsist in the original text of any work
which is in the public domain… or in any
publication of the United States Government,
or any reprint, in whole or in part, thereof.”
This prohibition persists under current
copyright law, enacted in 1976, which, in
turn, provides that “[c]opyright protection
under this title is not available for any work
of the United States Government.” This
partial codification of Banks for works
created by the federal government leaves
unmodified the rule as it applies to works
created by the states. As the Copyright
Office’s 1961 Register’s Report stated, even
though Congress enacted a prohibition that
only applies to the federal government, “the
judicially established rule [] still prevent[s]
copyright in the text of state laws, municipal
ordinances, court decisions, and similar
official documents.”
Although case precedent and congressional
enactments have long established the rule
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that government works are not copyrightable,
the foundations of the rule are generally
implicit and unstated. Since the Court in
Banks was not especially clear about the legal
source of the rule it had announced and since
the issue has not been raised before in our
Court, we start with a relatively clean canvas.
What is clear, however, is that the rule
enunciated in Banks was grounded on the
Court’s interpretation of the term “author” in
the Copyright Act of 1790, that works created
by courts in the performance of their official
duties did not belong to the judges, and that
public policy compelled the conclusion that
these works were in the public domain and
uncopyrightable.

The concept of popular sovereignty is deeply
rooted in our politics, our law, and our
history. The seminal statement of America’s
political creed boldly proclaims that
“[g]overnments . . . deriv[e] their just powers
from the consent of the governed.” During
the ratification debates that followed the
Revolution, James Madison similarly began
with the foundational idea that the People
were sovereign, and that under the proposed
form of government “the public voice” was
“pronounced by the representatives of the
people.” Still again, in the midst of the Civil
War, President Lincoln etched an indelible
description of this form of government in the
national memory, describing ours as a
“government of the people, by the people, for
the people.”

Thus, we understand the rule in Banks to
derive from first principles about the nature
of law in our democracy. Under democratic
rule, the People are sovereign, they govern
themselves through their legislative and
judicial representatives, and they are
ultimately the source of our law. Under this
arrangement, lawmakers and judges are
draftsmen of the law, exercising delegated
authority, and acting as servants of the
People, and whatever they produce the
People are the true authors. When the
legislative or judicial chords are plucked it is
in fact the People’s voice that is heard. Not
surprisingly, then, for purposes of copyright
law, this means that the People, as the
constructive authors are also the owners of
the law. And in this way, any work of which
the People are the constructive authors is
intrinsically public domain material and is
freely accessible to all so that no valid
copyright can ever be held in it.

In fact, the United States Reports are filled
with invocations of the sovereignty of the
People. As Chief Justice Marshall expressed
the fundamental idea many years ago: “[t]he
government proceeds directly from the
people; is ‘ordained and established,’ in the
name of the people… [and] is emphatically
and truly, a government of the people. In
form, and in substance, it emanates from
them. Its powers are granted by them, and are
to be exercised directly on them, and for their
benefit.”
While Banks is not explicit in grounding its
holding in this conception of sovereignty,
other federal courts have ruled that
government works are intrinsically public
domain material precisely because the People
are sovereign and are therefore the authors
and owners of the law. Thus, for example, in
Banks & Bros. v. W. Pub. Co., the court
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justified the rule on the grounds that “[e]ach
citizen is a ruler,— a law-maker,— and as
such has the right of access to the laws he
joins in making and to any official
interpretation thereof. If the right of property
enters into the question, he is a part owner,
and as such cannot be deprived of equal
access by his co-owners.”

public are the final ‘authors’ of the law.” The
court discerned that there are strong public
policy interests in giving the public
unfettered access to the law. “[P]ublic
ownership of the law means precisely that
‘the law’ is in the ‘public domain’ for
whatever use the citizens choose to make of
it. Citizens may reproduce copies of the law
for many purposes, not only to guide their
actions but to influence future legislation,
educate their neighborhood association, or
simply to amuse.” Thus, the “metaphorical
concept of citizen authorship together with
the need for citizens to have free access to the
laws are the ultimate holding of Banks.”

In the same vein, and more recently, several
courts have applied the rule announced in
Banks and understood the rule to rest on
foundational principles about the nature of
law in a democratic society. Thus, in Veeck,
the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, confronted
the question of whether a model building
code, once adopted by two municipalities,
lost its copyright protection In concluding
that the work was uncopyrightable, the court
asserted as a basic principle that the law is in
“the public domain and thus not amenable to
copyright,” and that cases like Wheaton and
Banks evince a “broad understanding of what
constitutes ‘the law’” so as to make judicial
opinions in addition to statutes ineligible for
copyright protection. On this basis, the court
held that, “[a]s governing law,” the municipal
building codes also could not be copyrighted.

The First Circuit has also emphasized
popular sovereignty as being foundational to
its understanding of the rule announced in
Banks. In Building. Officials & Code
Administrators v. Code Technology, Inc., the
court considered, on an interlocutory appeal
challenging the issue of a preliminary
injunction, a copyright infringement suit
brought by the private sector author of a
model building code against a publisher of
the Massachusetts building code, which the
Massachusetts legislature had based in large
measure on the model code. The court ruled
that the inclusion of the otherwise
copyrightable model building code in the
official Massachusetts building code likely
rendered those materials, just like the rest of
the materials in the Massachusetts building
code, “freely available for copying by
anyone.”

The court went on to explain that its holding
rested on a deeper principle, a “metaphorical
concept of citizen authorship.” As the court
reasoned, “[l]awmaking bodies in this
country enact rules and regulations only with
the consent of the governed. The very process
of lawmaking demands and incorporates
contributions by ‘the people,’ in an infinite
variety of individual and organizational
capacities… In performing their function, the
lawmakers represent the public will, and the

After reviewing case precedent going as far
back as Wheaton, a panel of the First Circuit
asserted that “[t]he law thus seems clear that
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judicial opinions and statutes are in the public
domain and are not subject to copyright.” The
court reasoned that this principle extends to
regulatory codes as much as it does to statutes
and judicial opinions. While acknowledging
that cases like Banks and Wheaton seemed to
rest in part on the identity of the creators of
the works in question, namely salaried public
officials performing official duties, it
explained that a more fundamental principle
was at work. In particular, “citizens are the
authors of the law, and therefore its owners,
regardless of who actually drafts the
provisions, because the law derives its
authority from the consent of the public,
expressed through the democratic process.”
The reason why judges and legislators cannot
copyright works they create, was not because
they are working for the government rather
than for themselves, but rather because of a
“metaphorical concept of citizen authorship,”
which means that, once it adopts a text as law,
the body politic becomes the author of the
work in question, leaving the original drafter
with no proprietary interest. The court
reasoned that this was true even where the
original creator of the work was a private
sector actor.

This does not mean that statutes, judicial
opinions, and other texts that carry the clear
force of law are the only works that may be
subject to the rule. For one thing, relying, as
the district court did, on a bright line
distinction between edicts that have the force
of law and those that do not to apply the
Banks rule simply does not work in some
cases. This is one of them. It is clear to us that
there exists a zone of indeterminacy at the
frontier between edicts that carry the force of
law and those that do not. In this small band
of cases a government work may not be
characterized as law, and yet still be so
sufficiently law-like as to implicate the core
policy interests undergirding Banks.
Statutory texts are the kinds of works most
obviously subject to the rule announced in
Banks. Because statutes are the prototypical
works to which the rule applies, we rely on
the statutory example as the lodestar for our
inquiry. Whether or not a work is subject to
the rule is dependent on whether the work is
the law, or sufficiently like the law, so as to
be deemed the product of the direct exercise
of sovereign authority, and therefore
attributable to the constructive authorship of
the People. Basing the inquiry on whether a
work is similar enough to the law so as to be
attributable to the People, of course, does
little to diminish the difficulty of applying the
Banks rule in the unique circumstances
presented here. But it does point us toward
the right way of structuring our analysis.

III.
The ultimate inquiry posed by the rule in
Banks is thus whether a work is attributable
to the constructive authorship of the People,
which is to say whether it was created by an
agent of the People in the direct exercise of
sovereign authority. Statutes and judicial
opinions are the most obvious examples of
what falls within the ambit of the rule.

Put simply, there are certain things that make
the law what it is. The law is written by
particular public officials who are entrusted
with the exercise of legislative power; the law
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is, by nature, authoritative; and the law is
created through certain, prescribed processes,
the deviation from which would deprive it of
legal effect. Each of these attributes is a
hallmark of law. These characteristics
distinguish written works that carry the force
of law from all other works. Since we are
concerned here with whether a work is
attributable to the constructive authorship of
the People, these factors guide our inquiry
into whether a work is law or sufficiently
law-like so as to be subject to the rule in
Banks.
An analysis of these factors yields the
conclusion that the annotations in the OCGA,
while not having the force of law, are part and
parcel of the law. They are so enmeshed with
Georgia’s law as to be inextricable. The
annotations are themselves law-like insofar
as we examine who made them, how they
were made, and the role they play in the
legislative and jurisprudential spheres of
Georgia’s public life. In consequence, they
too represent a work, like the statutes
themselves, that is constructively authored by
the
People.
They
are
therefore
uncopyrightable.

are, in a powerful sense, a work created by
the Georgia state legislature.
While it is true that the annotations were
initially prepared by a private party, in this
case Lexis, it is also the case that Lexis drafts
the annotations pursuant to highly detailed
instructions contained in the contract it
entered into with the Code Revision
Commission. In particular, the publication
agreement not only lists the types of materials
that Lexis must include in the OCGA, but
also
provides
punctiliously
specific
instructions on how these materials are to be
prepared. Thus, by way of example, in
addition to instructing Lexis to include
annotations summarizing court decisions that
are relevant to various statutory provisions in
the OCGA, the publication contract tells
Lexis which court decisions to include.
Moreover, the contract specifies the content
of these summaries, instructing Lexis to
include discussion of those portions of
judicial opinions that involve “direct
constructions” of a statute, including
“constructions concerning constitutionality,
purpose, intent, and the meaning of words
and phrases as well as illustrations as to what
a particular provision applies and to what a
particular provision does not apply.” Leaving
even less to Lexis’s independent judgment,
the contract also instructs Lexis what not to
include in the judicial summaries, Lexis’s
editors to “avoid long factual annotations
where they do not bear directly upon the
statute involved.” Further, the agreement tells
Lexis the order in which the various case
annotations are to be arranged.

A.
First, and of critical importance to our
analysis is that the Georgia General
Assembly is the driving force behind their
creation. The Code Revision Commission
exerts authoritative influence over the
creation of the annotations and the
Commission indisputably is an arm of the
General Assembly. Thus, just as the
uncopyrightable works in Banks were created
by the Ohio Supreme Court, the annotations
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The annotations containing summaries of
judicial opinions are not the only ones for
which the publication contract provides
highly specific directions. The agreement
also requires Lexis to include research
references in the annotations, and names the
specific reference sources that must be
included. Similarly, the contract directs Lexis
to include annotations dealing with
legislative history and specifies just how far
back into a statutory provision’s history the
annotations may go.

Lexis’s work. Thus, with respect to the
summaries of judicial opinions, the
agreement provides that “the form of the
annotations shall be subject to the approval of
the Commission.” The agreement contains
similar provisions with respect to the other
annotations. More generally, the agreement
provides that the “ultimate right of editorial
control over all material contained in the
Code shall be in the Commission, and in the
event of any disagreement between the
Commission and the Publisher over the
material to be included, the decision of the
Commission shall control.” A separate
provision of the agreement similarly provides
that in the event of any disagreement “the
Commission shall prevail.” Moreover, the
agreement requires that the Commission have
an opportunity to conduct pre-publication
review of all subsequent supplements,
replacement volumes, and other updates to
the OCGA.

In addition to providing detailed instructions
that guide the creation of the OCGA
annotations, the Commission acts in a
supervisory capacity as well, monitoring
Lexis’s work throughout the process. The
contract says that the annotations are
prepared under the “direct supervision” of the
Commission. The contract spells out in some
detail what this supervision means. In
addition to including the research references
listed in the publication agreement, Lexis is
required to “include any new [references]…
as required by the Commission.” Sections of
the agreement dealing with other annotations
similarly allow the Commission to direct the
inclusion of new material. Indeed, the very
first section of the agreement states that the
OCGA shall include, in addition to the
various, specified annotations, “other
material related to or included in such Code
at the direction of the Commission.”

In short, the Commission exercises direct,
authoritative control over the creation of the
OCGA annotations at every stage of their
preparation. The Commission provides initial
instructions to Lexis, directly supervises
Lexis’s work throughout the preparation
process, and must give its final editorial
assent to the annotations before they can
become part of the OCGA. In this way, the
Commission undeniably controls the creation
of the OCGA annotations.

Finally, the publication agreement describes
in detail how the Commission is to give its
final assent to the annotations. First, as for
each type of annotation, the agreement
affirms the Commission’s role in approving

The Commission’s intimate involvement in
the creation of the annotations is of great
significance. This is because a close
examination of the nature of the Commission
confirms that it is for all intents and purposes
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an arm of the Georgia General Assembly. As
we’ve noted, the Commission is composed of
fifteen members, nine of whom are sitting
members of the Georgia General Assembly,
along with the Lieutenant Governor of the
State. Further, funding for the Commission
comes
directly
from
appropriations
“provided for the legislative branch of state
government.” In addition, Georgia law
provides that “[t]he Office of Legislative
Counsel shall serve as staff for the
commission.” This is notable because, under
Georgia law, the Office of Legislative
Counsel is tasked with providing various
advisory and legal services “for the
legislative branch of government” and is
therefore properly seen as an adjunct to the
General Assembly. Thus, not only is the
Commission funded by legislative branch
appropriations, but its staff is drawn from an
office that is itself an agency of the Georgia
General Assembly.

regarded as one in the same with the
legislators for our purposes. As the Supreme
Court has explained in another context, “it is
literally impossible, in view of the
complexities of the modern legislative
process… for [legislators] to perform their
legislative tasks without the help of aides and
assistants…the day-to-day work of such
aides is so critical to the Members'
performance that they must be treated as the
latter's alter egos.” In consequence, the Court
has held that legislative immunity “applies
not only to a Member but also to his aides
insofar as the conduct of the latter would be a
protected legislative act if performed by the
Member himself.” “The test for applicability
of this derivative legislative immunity is
whether the legislator, counsel or aide was
engaged within a legitimate sphere of
legislative activity.”
The basic intuition underlying cases applying
the Speech and Debate Clause seems to us
equally instructive in identifying which entity
in the Georgia state government is the
creative force behind the OCGA annotations.
While the Commission’s staff and six of its
fifteen members are not Georgia legislators,
the Commission is plainly an adjunct of the
General Assembly. As we have detailed, its
staff, funding, and responsibilities all fall
under the legislative umbrella. The
Commission is therefore, in a real sense, the
“alter ego” of the General Assembly,
meaning that the creative force behind the
annotations are Georgia’s elected legislators.
Acting through the Commission, the
legislators closely supervise and direct the
production of the annotations.

Further confirming the Commission’s deep
connection to the Georgia General Assembly,
the Georgia Supreme Court has held that the
Commission’s work is properly characterized
as “legislative” in nature, and that it is
therefore proper for the Commission to be
largely composed of officials from the
legislative branch. Thus, in light of how it is
funded and staffed, and since its work is
legislative in nature, it is abundantly clear
that the Commission is a creation and an
agent of the Georgia General Assembly.
Indeed, the connection between the
Commission and the elected legislators who
make up the General Assembly is so close
that the Commission may be properly
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Moreover, and of even greater importance to
our analysis, the OCGA annotations, once
completed, are subject to the approval not
only of the Commission, but also to the
approval of the Georgia General Assembly.
The General Assembly actually votes (and
must vote) to make the OCGA the official
codification of Georgia’s laws and, in doing
so, also votes to incorporate the annotations
as part of the OCGA. In other words, the
OCGA annotations are not only authored at
the direction and under the close supervision
of the Georgia General Assembly, but they
also obtain their peculiar status as official
annotations because they are adopted
annually by the General Assembly.

some works made by state employees, that
would be subject to § 105 if made by a federal
employee, are nevertheless copyrightable
under Banks.
The reasoning of Banks points to why the rule
it has announced is applicable to a more
limited class of public officials than those
governed by § 105’s prohibition. The Court
in Banks explained, “[i]n no proper sense can
the judge who, in his judicial capacity,
prepares the opinion or decision, the
statement of the case, and the syllabus, or
head-note, be regarded as their author or their
proprietor…Judges, as is well understood,
receive from the public treasury a stated
annual salary, fixed by law, and can
themselves have no pecuniary interest or
proprietorship, as against the public at large,
in the fruits of their judicial labors… The
whole work done by the judges constitutes
the authentic exposition and interpretation of
the law, which, binding every citizen, is free
for publication to all.” Thus, like § 105, the
Banks decision emphasizes the fact that
judges are producing works in their capacity
as employees, but it also goes further than §
105 and emphasizes that judges are unique
among government employees. In addition to
receiving “from the public treasury a stated
annual salary,” judges are empowered to
create
“authentic
exposition[s]
and
interpretation[s] of the law, which[] bind[]
every citizen.”

That Georgia’s legislators are in a very real
way the creators of the annotations is a
powerful indication that the annotations are
subject to the Banks rule. To begin, it is
apparent that the rule established by Banks
that government edicts cannot be
copyrighted, as applied to the works of state
governments, is more limited than the
statutory prohibition on copyright protection
for works of the federal government. As we
have explained, § 105 states that “[c]opyright
protection… is not available for any work of
the United States Government,” and § 101
defines a “work of the United States
Government” as “a work prepared by an
officer or employee of the United States
Government as part of that person's official
duties.” Thus, under this prohibition, the
work of any federal employee, made in his
capacity as a government employee, is
uncopyrightable. By contrast, the rule in
Banks is more circumscribed, applying to a
limited subclass of government works. Thus,

As a result, the mere fact that a work was
created by a state-paid employee in his
capacity as an employee is not enough to
trigger the rule in Banks. Something more is
needed. Specifically, the government official

483

must be entrusted with unique powers
beyond those possessed by the typical
government employee, such as the power to
pronounce official interpretations of the law.

likely would fall within § 105’s prohibition if
he had been a federal employee. Though paid
by the state, and acting pursuant to his official
duties, the court reporter was tasked with
essentially administrative and clerical
responsibilities, to wit compiling and
summarizing judicial decisions, rather than
the promulgation of binding legal edicts.
There was therefore “no ground of public
policy” standing in the way of his works’
copyrightability.

In short, it is clear that the rule in Banks is not
concerned, as § 105 is, with the works of all
government employees, but rather only with
the works of certain government employees,
which is to say government employees who
are possessed of particular powers, namely
the ability to promulgate official, binding
edicts. This distinction between the rules is
no doubt attributable to the difference in their
underlying rationales. Section 105’s
prohibition is justified on the grounds that the
public paid for the work and is therefore
entitled to access it, and because wide
dissemination of federal government
materials strengthens democratic discourse.

In contrast, the judges in Banks, when
considered in their relationship to the
sovereignty of the People, fulfill a different
function than the court reporter in Callaghan.
Legislators and judges, unlike other
government workers, are peculiarly entrusted
with the exercise of sovereign power to write
or officially interpret the law. Since the
power to make law rests ultimately and
exclusively with the People, the primary,
official duty of lawmakers and judges is
therefore to act as agents of the People. While
government workers like the reporter in
Callaghan might also be said to be engaged
in conducting the People’s business, their
relation to the exercise of sovereign power is
more attenuated. As a result, if a government
work is created by a public official who is so
empowered, it is substantially more likely
that the work is constructively authored by
the people.

On the other hand, the rule in Banks derives
more directly from the concept of popular
sovereignty. As a result, while § 105 is
concerned with any work created by a federal
employee, since all government works are
paid for by the taxpayer and, as a policy
matter, are potentially useful to conscientious
and informed citizens, the rule in Banks is
concerned with works created by a select
group of government employees, because
only certain public officials are empowered
with the direct exercise of the sovereign
power.

In light of these considerations, that the
Georgia General Assembly is the driving
force behind and ultimately adopts the
OCGA annotations is significant. Like the
Ohio Supreme Court in Banks, the Georgia
General Assembly is not simply composed of

This explains why the state-paid court
reporter acting pursuant to his statutory
duties in Callaghan did not run afoul of the
rule in Banks and could hold a valid copyright
in his work even though the work he created
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ordinary government employees but rather of
public officials whose official duties
peculiarly include the direct exercise of
sovereign power. Of the many government
workers employed by the state of Georgia,
the creators of the OCGA annotations are
unique insofar as they are entrusted by the
sovereign with legislative power.

impossible to ignore. The annotations cast an
undeniable, official shadow over how
Georgia laws are interpreted and understood.
Indeed, Georgia’s courts have cited to the
annotations as authoritative sources on
statutory meaning and legislative intent. The
annotations’ authoritativeness makes them
closely analogous to the types of works that
ordinarily represent an exercise of sovereign
authority. The nature of the work, like the
identity of its creator, therefore impels us
further toward the conclusion that these
annotations are attributable to the
constructive authorship of the People.

This is not to say that every work produced
by a legislative body is automatically
uncopyrightable. As we detail below, still
more is necessary to demonstrate that the
OCGA annotations are the kind of work that
is attributable to the constructive authorship
of the People. However, because the OCGA
annotations were created by public officials
entrusted with sovereign, legislative
authority, just like the opinions in Banks were
created by justices on the Ohio Supreme
Court entrusted with sovereign, judicial
authority, this weighs in favor of a
determination that the OCGA annotations
belong in the public domain.

The nature of the OCGA annotations is
spelled out in some detail by Georgia’s
General Assembly. While disclaiming any
legal effect in the annotations, the Georgia
law providing for the creation of the OCGA
also states that the “statutory portion of such
codification shall be merged with
annotations, captions, catchlines, history
lines, editorial notes, cross-references,
indices, title and chapter analyses, and other
materials.” This language is telling. In
various dictionaries, the word “merge” is
defined as meaning to combine or unite, often
in such a way that the constituent elements of
the merger lose their distinct identity or
characteristics and become one. The Random
House Dictionary of the English Language
defines “merge” as “to lose or cause to lose
identity by uniting or blending” and “to
combine or unite into a single unit.”
Similarly, Webster’s Third New International
Dictionary defines “merge” as “to become
combined into one” and to “lose identity by
absorption or intermingling.” And the Oxford
English Dictionary variously defines

B.
We are also persuaded because, while not
carrying the force of law in the way that the
statutory portions of the OCGA do, the
annotations are “law-like” in the sense that
they are “authoritative” sources on the
meaning of Georgia statutes. Having been
merged by the General Assembly with the
statutory text into a single, unified edict,
stamped with the state’s imprimatur, and
created and embraced by the same body that
wrote the text that they explicate, the
annotations have been suffused with
powerful indicia of legal significance that is
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“merge” as “to be absorbed and disappear, to
lose character or identity by absorption into
something else; to join or blend,” and “to
combine to form a single entity.” The use of
the word “merge” thus carries with it strong
connotations of unification or combination of
disparate elements into a single whole in
which the previously distinct attributes of
each element become intermingled and
shared.

does not mean that the annotations, by virtue
of appearing alongside statutory text, are
suddenly possessed of binding legal effect, it
does mean that their combination with the
statutory text imbues them with an official,
legislative quality.
The statutory text, having been merged with
these legislatively authored expositions on
the meaning of Georgia law, must be read in
pari materia with them. The annotations’
combination with the statutes means that any
understanding of the statutory text arrived at
without reference to the annotations is
axiomatically incomplete. Because Georgia
law tells us that the official codification of
Georgia statutes contains not only statutory
text but also annotations that have been
combined and unified with the statutory text
into a single edict, a full understanding of the
laws of Georgia necessarily includes an
understanding of the contents of the
annotations. In this way, the annotations are
clearly laden with legal significance.

The question then becomes, what is the
nature of the new thing created when the
Georgia General Assembly explicitly chose
to merge the annotations with statutory text?
Here too Georgia law supplies an answer. In
particular, Georgia law provides that the
merged text “shall be published by authority
of the state … and when so published shall be
known and may be cited as the ‘Official Code
of Georgia Annotated.’” Thus, the product of
the merger is an official state publication,
labelled and cited as the authoritative
embodiment of the laws of the State of
Georgia.

Their significance is strengthened further by
the legislature’s decision to label the unified
whole “Official.” The OCGA is not simply
one of a number of competing annotated
codifications of Georgia laws. It does not
stand on equal footing with West’s annotated
Georgia code. Rather, it is the official
codification of Georgia laws, stamped with
the imprimatur of the state. This status
necessarily causes the annotations to cast a
long shadow over how the statutory portions
of the OCGA are understood. Because these
are the official comments to the Code, they
are to be read as authoritative in a way that
annotations ordinarily are not.

It of course remains true that portions of the
OCGA clearly carry the force of law while
O.C.G.A. § 1-1-7 disclaims any legal effect
in the annotations. Yet the significance of the
legislature’s decision to “merge” these two
things into a single edict remains. The
Georgia legislature was not required to merge
the annotations with the statutes in order to
create the OCGA, which it then stamped with
the imprimatur of the State. But the bicameral
legislature chose to do so. By combining
these two components into a unified whole,
their attributes have been intermingled and
their distinct character altered. While this
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Indeed, demonstrating the importance of the
state’s decision to stamp the OCGA with its
imprimatur, the very first annotation in the
very first section of the OCGA favorably
cites to a court case that warns that
“[a]ttorneys who cite unofficial publication
of 1981 Code do so at their peril.” Similarly,
the importance the Georgia legislature
attached to its branding of the Code as
“Official” is further demonstrated by its
enactment of a law allowing the publisher of
the “official Code… to use the state emblem
on the cover of the publication,” whereas all
other private parties are prohibited from
using the state emblem in any context. Thus,
while stamping the annotations with the
state’s imprimatur and labelling it official
does not suddenly elevate the annotations to
the status of binding law, it too enhances their
already potent cachet in a way that is
undeniable and also impossible to ignore.

Georgia’s courts. In particular, the state
courts frequently have characterized OCGA
comments as conclusive statements about
statutory meaning and legislative intent.

Moreover, as we have already noted, the
annotations are not simply adopted by the
legislature as an official reference work, but
also, in a very meaningful sense, are written
by the General Assembly -- a fact that further
accentuates their legal significance. The
annotations are not merely expositions on the
meaning of statutes, but rather are official
comments authored by the same body that
also wrote the statutes. Thus, it would be only
natural for the citizens of Georgia to consider
the annotations as containing special insight
into the meaning of the statutory text, and to
therefore confer upon the annotations a
special status.

By way of contrast, a judge might create a
work in his capacity as an employee of the
government that bears little relation to his
role as an official expositor of the law. A
speech delivered by a judge, depending on
the circumstances of the address, may or may
not count as a work created by a government
employee. But such a work assuredly does
not count as a work made in the exercise of
the sovereign power to make or interpret the
law. A judicial speech is assigned no
authoritative weight -- it binds no one and has
no official effect on the law or on how it is
understood. Only those works that derive
from the legitimate exercise of sovereign
power, such as official interpretations of the
law and the law itself, are assigned
authoritative weight.

The nature and authoritativeness of the work,
like the identity of the author, are material in
determining whether the work is attributable
to the constructive authorship of the People.
After all, the decision in Banks not only
emphasized the identity of the creator of the
work but also the nature of the work,
reasoning that the work was uncopyrightable
precisely because it was an “authentic
exposition and interpretation of the law []
binding [on] every citizen.”
Many other courts applying the rule in Banks,
or a rule like it, have emphasized that the law,
as an authoritative work that governs
people’s lives, is uncopyrightable.

Our view is reinforced by an examination of
how the annotations have been treated by
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Put another way, whether or not a work is
assigned the authoritative weight associated
with law is deeply intertwined with the
question of whether the work was made by
the agents of the People in the legitimate
exercise of delegated, sovereign power. As
Hamilton explained during the ratification
debates, “[n]o legislative act [] contrary to the
Constitution, can be valid. To deny this,
would be to affirm, that the deputy is greater
than his principal; that the servant is above
his master; that the representatives of the
people are superior to the people themselves;
that men acting by virtue of powers, may do
not only what their powers do not authorize,
but what they forbid.” As a result, the
authoritativeness of a work is probative on
the question of whether a work is created in
an exercise of sovereign power, and is also
probative on the question of whether a work
falls within the scope of the rule in Banks.
Thus, in addition to whether the work was
prepared by a judicial or legislative body, an
examination of the nature of the work, which
is another way of asking whether it carries
authoritative weight, may indicate whether
the work is uncopyrightable.

The final factor we consider is the process by
which the annotations were created. While
the process by which the annotations were
made into an official edict of the State of
Georgia is not identical to the process by
which the statutory provisions were made
into binding law, they are very closely
related. As a result, like the identity of the
work’s creator and the nature of the work, the
process also weighs in favor of the
conclusion that the work is uncopyrightable.
Both parties acknowledge that the Georgia
General Assembly does not individually
enact each separate annotation as part of the
ordinary legislative process. In this respect
the annotations are different than the
statutory portions of the OCGA. The
statutory portions of the Code are introduced
as bills in the Georgia legislature, generally
pass through the committee process where
legislators can directly influence the text of
the bill, are voted on by both Houses, and are
signed by the Governor.
The enacted laws of a session of the
legislature are then “published in Georgia
Laws as a collection of session laws,
representing all of the acts and resolutions
passed during that particular legislative
session.” Later, the laws are incorporated into
the OCGA. Each year, the Georgia
legislature then votes to “reenact the statutory
portion of [the] Code as amended, in
furtherance of the work of the Code Revision
Commission,” thereby voting on the statutory
text in the form in which it has been
incorporated into the OCGA.

These annotations carry authoritative weight
and therefore make it more likely that the
work is attributable to the constructive
authorship of the People. Quite simply, they
are much closer to resembling the judicially
authored materials found in Banks than other
works produced by state employees, such as
the materials produced by the Court reporter
in Callaghan.
C.
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Further, under Georgia law, it is the
responsibility of the Code Revision
Commission to “prepare and have introduced
at each regular session of the General
Assembly one or more bills to reenact and
make corrections in the Official Code of
Georgia Annotated.” In this way, the
statutory portions of the OCGA are voted on
at least twice, once when they are voted on as
individual bills after having gone through the
regular legislative process, and once as part
of the Georgia legislature’s vote to reenact
the updated OCGA as prepared by the
Commission. By contrast, the annotations are
prepared by the Commission outside of the
normal channels of the legislative process in
the manner we have detailed, and are not
voted on individually in the way that Georgia
session laws are.

those are not the essential steps that endow
the bill with its legal status. Rather, the vote
of both Houses of the legislature, and
presentment to an executive are the defining
moments in an exercise of the sovereign
authority. This is so even when the legislature
adopts as its own a work authored outside the
normal channels of the legislative process.
That the process by which the OCGA
annotations were created is similar to the
ordinary process by which laws are enacted
also is relevant to our inquiry. The
importance of this consideration is apparent
from well settled procedural mechanisms by
which the power to make and interpret the
law is exercised, and from the observation
that deviating from the process may deprive
the edict of its legal effect. As we’ve noted,
bicameral passage of a bill and its
presentment to the executive are the ordinary
means by which a legislative body exercises
the sovereign power entrusted to it. Similarly,
the judicial power to propound the meaning
of the law must be exercised according to
established procedures. In particular, judges
issue official interpretations of the law as part
of deciding a case or controversy, after
considering the arguments made by both
parties to the case. An exposition on the
meaning of a law, even if written by a judge,
would obviously not qualify as an exercise of
the sovereign power to interpret law if it were
written outside the ordinary procedural
channels by which that power is exercised.

However, it is also the case that the Georgia
General Assembly voted to adopt the
annotations as prepared by the Commission
as an integral part of the official Code.
Further, it did so through a legislative act that
necessarily passed both Houses of the
legislature and was signed into law by the
Governor. Moreover, and significant for our
purposes, the General Assembly votes each
year to amend the OCGA and reaffirm its
status as the official codification of Georgia’s
laws.
Under the American system of government,
the essential hallmarks of legislative process
are bicameralism and presentment. While
legislative processes may ordinarily include
the introduction of an individual bill and its
passage through the relevant committee
before it receives a vote of the full House,

In short, as is the case with the identity of the
creator of the work and the nature of the
work, fundamental principles that govern
how sovereign power is exercised under a
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republican form of government suggest that
the process by which an edict is promulgated
is probative as well on the question of
whether a work was created through the
exercise of such power. Just as an action is
not deemed a legitimate exercise of sovereign
power if it is undertaken by the wrong
official, so too it may be invalid if undertaken
outside the proper procedural channels. The
converse follows naturally: if an action is
undertaken through the ordinary procedural
channels by which the sovereign power is
exercised, it is more likely that the action
represents an exercise of sovereign power.

therefore attributable to the constructive
authorship of the People. In making this
determination, we have compared the work in
question to works that represent the
prototypical exercise of sovereign power,
which is to say statutes and official
interpretations of the law. We have been
guided by three factors that may be regarded
as the defining characteristics of law -- the
identity of the public official who created the
work; the nature of the work; and the process
by which the work was produced.
When the wrong public official exercises a
power delegated in the law, when the power
exercised is of a type not contemplated by the
law, or when the power is exercised outside
the procedural channels prescribed by the
law, the act cannot be considered a valid
exercise of the sovereign power. From these
principles, the corollary logically follows:
when the action taken is of the type entrusted
by the People to their agents, when it is
wielded by a public official whose assigned
duties include the exercise of sovereign
power, and when it is exercised pursuant to
constitutionally designated processes, it more
likely represents an exercise of the sovereign
authority. The reasoning found in Banks also
suggests the importance of these factors.

The importance of process was suggested
long ago in Banks when the Supreme Court
emphasized that only those works created by
judges in “the discharge of their judicial
duties” are uncopyrightable. In other words,
a work made by a judge outside the normal
channels by which judicial action is taken
would not be subject to the rule in Banks. It
is therefore fair to say that, just as the Court
in Banks emphasized that the justices of the
Supreme Court of Ohio had authored the
work in question “in the discharge of their
judicial duties,” the Georgia legislature’s use
of bicameralism and presentment to adopt the
annotations as their own and merge them
with statutory text indicates that the work was
created by the legislators in the discharge of
their official duties. This too bolsters our
conclusion

All of them point strongly toward the
conclusion that the OCGA annotations are
not copyrightable. The OCGA annotations
are created by Georgia’s legislative body,
which has been entrusted with exercising
sovereign power on behalf of the people of
Georgia. While the annotations do not carry
the force of law in the way that statutes or
judicial opinions do, they are expressly given

IV.
Our inquiry has focused on whether the
official annotations represent a direct
exercise of sovereign power, and are
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legal significance so that, while not “law,”
the annotations undeniably are authoritative
sources on the meaning of Georgia statutes.
The legislature has stamped them “official”
and has chosen to make them an integral part
of the official codification of Georgia’s laws.
By wrapping the annotations and the
statutory text into a single unified edict, the
Georgia General Assembly has made the
connection between the two inextricable and,
thereby, ensured that obtaining a full
understanding of the laws of Georgia requires
having unfettered access to the annotations.
Finally, the General Assembly’s annual
adoption of the annotations as part of the laws
of Georgia is effected by the legislative
process -- namely bicameralism and
presentment -- that is ordinarily reserved for
the exercise of sovereign power.

for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
REVERSED IN PART, VACATED IN
PART AND REMANDED

Thus, we conclude that the annotations in the
OCGA are attributable to the constructive
authorship of the People. To advance the
interests and effect the will of the People,
their agents in the General Assembly have
chosen to create an official exposition on the
meaning of the laws of Georgia. In creating
the annotations, the legislators have acted as
draftsmen giving voice to the sovereign’s
will. The resulting work is intrinsically public
domain material, belonging to the People,
and, as such, must be free for publication by
all.
As a result, no valid copyright can subsist in
these works. We, therefore, reverse the
judgment of the district court, direct that
judgment be entered for appellant PRO,
vacate the district court’s order granting the
State of Georgia injunctive relief, and remand
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“Supreme Court Will Hear Case Over Copyrights To Legal Texts”
Law360
Bill Donahue
June 24, 2019
The U.S. Supreme Court on Monday agreed
to hear a case about the extent to which state
and local governments can claim copyright
control over legal texts.

States say the arrangement allows for the
cost-efficient creation of more detailed legal
materials; critics say it deprives those who
can’t afford the fees of full access to the law.

The court agreed to tackle a lawsuit filed by
the state of Georgia against an activist group
called Public.Resource, which republished an
annotated version of the state’s code without
permission. In November, the Eleventh
Circuit tossed that case out, saying citizens
should have “unfettered access to the legal
edicts that govern their lives.”

In October, the Eleventh Circuit sided with
Public.Resource, a transparency group that
aims to make legal texts available online. The
court said the annotations were effectively an
extension of state law, making them "a work
of the people" and thus "inherently public
domain material."
"Answering this question means confronting
profound and difficult issues about the nature
of law in our society and the rights of citizens
to have unfettered access to the legal edicts
that govern their lives," the court wrote at the
time.

In appealing to the high court, Georgia
warned the justices that the ruling would
make it harder for states to produce more
robust versions of their state laws.
Surprisingly, Public.Resource also asked for
high court review, saying it wanted final
clarity on the state of the law.

“We conclude that the people are the ultimate
authors of the annotations," the court wrote.
"As a work of the people the annotations are
inherently public domain material and
therefore uncopyrightable."

As is customary, the justices did not explain
why they agreed to hear the case.
Like many states, Georgia makes a simple
text of its code available online but also hires
a private firm to create a more robust
annotated version, which features citations,
analysis and opinions from the state attorney
general. The simple version is free, but users
must pay for the annotated version.

On Monday, an attorney for the state of
Georgia said the court was pleased that the
Supreme Court had taken the case.
"The Eleventh Circuit’s decision ... threatens
to
upend
Georgia’s
longstanding
arrangement for creating and distributing
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annotations useful to guide legal research,
while ensuring that the state’s laws are
widely distributed and easily accessible—
free of charge," said Joshua Johnson of
Vinson & Elkins LLP.

Vinson & Elkins LLP and Anthony B.
Askew, Lisa C. Pavento and Warren Thomas
of Meunier Carlin & Curfman LLC.

An attorney for Public.Resource declined to
comment.

Public.Resource is represented by Elizabeth
H. Rader and Sarah P. Lafantano of Alston &
Bird LLP and Eric F. Citron of Goldstein &
Russell PC.

Georgia and its Code Revision Commission
are represented by John P. Elwood, Joshua
Johnson and Matthew X. Etchemendy of

The case is Georgia et al. v.
Public.Resource.Org Inc., case number 181150, in the U.S. Supreme Court.
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“The Law©?: No one owns the law, and no one should be able to copyright it”
The New York Times
The Editorial Board
June 25, 2019
No one owns the law, because the law
belongs to everyone. It’s a principle that
seems so obvious that most people wouldn’t
give it a second thought. But that’s what is at
issue in Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, a
case about whether the State of Georgia can
assert copyright in its annotated state code.
This week, the Supreme Court agreed to hear
the case in its next term.

uploaded all 186 volumes of the annotated
Georgia state code to its website, the state
sued to take it down. The code was already
available free online through the state’s
partnership with LexisNexis. As part of the
deal, Georgia gave LexisNexis exclusive
rights to official “annotations” that elaborate
on the law but aren’t legally binding.
LexisNexis allowed users to read the law free
and it sold the annotated code for $404
per copy.

Americans deserve free and easy access to
public records of all kinds, including court
documents. But access to the law is the most
important of all: Democracy depends on it.
Keeping the law free of copyright is the first
step.

Public.Resource.Org is no stranger to
litigation. For years, it has been embroiled in
lawsuits over its publication of fire and
electrical safety standards, air duct leakage
standards, nonprofit
tax returns
and
European Union baby pacifier regulations.
The founder of Public.Resource.Org was
once labeled a “rogue archivist.” But if
publishing building safety standards online is
an act of roguery, it is time for the courts to
take a hard look at what copyright is for.

Yet the law is in disarray on the topic. The
last time the Supreme Court ruled on the
issue was in 1888, and it only addressed
opinions written by judges. In the last
century, a number of lower courts issued
lofty proclamations on how the law belongs
to the people and the people alone.
Meanwhile,
copyright
laws
passed
in 1909and 1976 explicitly excluded any
“work of the United States government.” But
that exclusion applies only to the federal
government.

Much
of
the
litigation
against
Public.Resource.Org falls into an everexpanding gray zone of the law, created by
government outsourcing bits and pieces of its
regulatory function to the private sector.
Regulations for everything from student loan
eligibility to food additives can use standards
written by trade groups.

So when the nonprofit organization
Public.Resource.Org purchased, scanned and
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Courts have issued conflicting opinions on
this premium tier of the law. In the Georgia
case, an appeals court ruled that the
annotations were “sufficiently law-like,”
partly because LexisNexis had created the
annotations at the direction of the state. As a
consequence, “the people are the ultimate
authors of the annotations.”
If the law is confused, it is in part thanks to
the Supreme Court, which handed down two
rulings on the subject in 1888. One stated that
the law is in the public domain, and the other
said that compiling the law with a table of
contents, summaries and an index could be
copyrightable. It’s this latter case that the
State of Georgia relies on.
The modern-day outsourcing of regulations
to the private sector makes this issue all the
more important to take up anew. If the law
belongs to anyone, it belongs to the people.
After a hundred or so years of confusion, the
Supreme Court now has the chance to affirm
this principle of self-governance.
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“Accused of ‘Terrorism’ for Putting Legal Materials Online”
The New York Times
Adam Liptak
May 13, 2019
Carl Malamud believes in open access to
government records, and he has spent more
than a decade putting them online. You might
think states would welcome the help.

The state, through a legal publisher, makes
the statutes themselves available online, and
it has said it does not object to Mr. Malamud
doing the same thing. But people who want
to see other materials in the books, the state
says, must pay the publisher.

But when Mr. Malamud’s group posted the
Official Code of Georgia Annotated, the state
sued for copyright infringement. Providing
public access to the state’s laws and related
legal materials, Georgia’s lawyers said, was
part of a “strategy of terrorism.”

This is part of a disturbing trend, according
to a new law review article, “Who Owns the
Law? Why We Must Restore Public
Ownership of Legal Publishing,” by Leslie
Street, a law professor and librarian at Mercer
University in Macon, Ga., and David
Hansen, a librarian at Duke. It will be
published in The Journal of Intellectual
Property Law.

A federal appeals court ruled against the
state, which has asked the Supreme Court to
step in. On Friday, in an unusual move, Mr.
Malamud’s group, Public.Resource.Org, also
urged the court to hear the dispute, saying
that the question of who owns the law is an
urgent one, as about 20 other states have
claimed that parts of similar annotated codes
are copyrighted.

States have struck deals with legal publishers,
the article said, that have effectively
privatized the law. “Publishers now use
powerful legal tools to control who has
access to the text of the law, how much they
must pay and under what terms,” the article
said.

The issue, the group said, is whether citizens
can have access to “the raw materials of our
democracy.”

Mr. Malamud said those arrangements have
complicated his efforts.
“When I started Public Resource,” he said, “I
thought our mission would be a focus on
making the laws easier to use and read, but
because of a buzz saw of opposition we have

The case, Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org,
No. 18-1150, concerns the 54 volumes of
the Official Code of Georgia Annotated,
which contain state statutes and related
materials.
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spent much of our time fighting back
takedown notices and lawsuits.”

“You go to the annotations, which leads you
to the court decisions, where the judges
actually tell you what the words mean.”

There is no question that judicial opinions
cannot be copyrighted. The last time the
Supreme Court addressed the matter, in
1888, it ruled that “the whole work done by
the judges constitutes the authentic
exposition and interpretation of the law,
which, binding every citizen, is free for
publication to all.”

In ruling for Mr. Malamud, the appeals court
made a similar point.
“The annotations clearly have authoritative
weight in explicating and establishing the
meaning and effect of Georgia’s laws,” Judge
Stanley Marcus wrote for a unanimous threejudge panel of the court, the United States
Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit, in
Atlanta. “Georgia’s courts have cited to the
annotations as authoritative sources on
statutory meaning and legislative intent.”

Lower courts have said the same thing about
statutes. But the status of other sorts of legal
materials has not been definitively resolved.
In the Georgia case, the question is whether
annotations commissioned and approved by
the state may be copyrighted.

Still, the annotations are not themselves law,
Judge Marcus wrote, making the case a hard
one. But he concluded that the annotations
were “sufficiently lawlike” that they could
not be copyrighted.

The annotations include descriptions of
judicial decisions interpreting the statutes.
Only a very bad lawyer would fail to consult
them in determining the meaning of a statute.

The annotations were prepared by lawyers
working for LexisNexis as part of a financial
arrangement with the state. Georgia holds the
copyright to the annotations, but the company
has the right to sell them while paying the
state a royalty.

For instance, Georgia has a law on the
books making sodomy a crime. An
annotation tells the reader that the law has
been held unconstitutional “insofar as it
criminalizes the performance of private,
unforced, noncommercial acts of sexual
intimacy between persons legally able to
consent.”

The state says this is a sensible cost-saving
measure, “minimizing burdens on taxpayers”
by sparing them from paying for the
preparation of annotations.

Professor Street said she tells her law
students to be sure to consult the annotations
in Georgia’s official code.

Professor Street said there was no good
reason for the state to outsource the task.
“States are privatizing the functions of
government,” she said. “But the incentives
are different for a private company when it

“When you go to a statute, you see the
language of the statute, but that doesn’t
necessarily tell you the meaning,” she said.
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comes to publishing the law than it is for a
state government.”
I asked Mr. Malamud why he had urged the
Supreme Court to hear his case even though
he had won in the appeals court.
“Repeating the laws of our country should
not be considered a crime,” he said. “I would
like the Supreme Court to tell us which laws
we are allowed to speak.”

498

“Eleventh Circuit Finds No Valid Copyright in Official Code of Georgia
Annotated”
IP Watchdog
Steve Brachmann
October 29, 2018
On Friday, October 19th, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit issued a
decision in Code Revision Commission v.
Public.Resource.Org, Inc., which reversedin-part, vacated-in-part and remanded a
lower court’s ruling in a copyright
infringement case involving an annotated
version of Georgia’s official state code.
Applying U.S. Supreme Court case law from
the 19th Century, the last time the nation’s
highest court decided issues relevant to this
case, the Eleventh Circuit found that no valid
copyright interest can be asserted in any part
of the annotated state code.

agreement between LexisNexis and Georgia
retains the copyright to the annotations in
Georgia’s name. The Northern Georgia court
entered a permanent injunction against PRO,
finding that the annotations are not in the
public domain because they lack the force of
law.
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit found that
the heart of this case rests on the question of
whether Georgia’s copyright in the OCGA is
valid. Although the appellate court notes that
“authorship” is central to the statutory
scheme regarding copyright protection, the
meaning of authorship takes on a special
meaning in cases considering the
copyrightability of a government edict. The
Eleventh Circuit cited three Supreme Court
cases regarding the issue, the last of which
was decided in 1888. In Wheaton v.
Peters (1834), the Supreme Court found that
a reporter cannot hold a copyright in written
opinions produced by the Court. The
Supreme Court revisited the issue twice in
1888, first in Banks v. Manchester, a
copyright infringement case where the Court
found that decisions issued by the Supreme
Court of Ohio are not copyrightable because
a judge’s interpretation of the law is free for
publication to all under public policy. Less
than a month later, the Supreme Court
decided Callaghan v. Myerswhere the Court

In July 2015, the Code Revision
Commission, a body established by the
Georgia General Assembly in 1977 to
recodify Georgia’s state laws, filed suit in the
Northern District of Georgia seeking
injunctive
relief
to
prevent
Public.Resource.Org (PRO), a non-profit
working to improve public access to
government materials, from publishing all
186 volumes of the Official Code of Georgia
Annotated (OCGA) online for free public
access. PRO responded to the lawsuit by
arguing that the state of Georgia didn’t hold
an enforceable copyright to the OCGA.
Although a LexisNexis Group subsidiary
publishes the OCGA and is responsible for its
ongoing maintenance, the publication
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found that a copyright claim asserted by a
publisher of reports containing opinions
issued by the Supreme Court of Illinois were
valid because the publisher had obtained
proprietary interest in the reports from an
Illinois state official, although the rights did
not extent to the decisions themselves.

force of law, are part and parcel of the law.
First, the Eleventh Circuit found that the
Georgia General Assembly was the driving
force behind the annotations in the OCGA.
Although the annotations were prepared by
LexisNexis, those annotations were drafted
based upon highly detailed instructions
contained within its publishing agreement
with the Code Revision Commission, making
Georgia’s legislators the creators of the
annotations.

The Eleventh Circuit also noted that
Congress partially codified the rule
from Banks into the 1909 Copyright Act,
which provided that “no copyright shall
subsist in the original text of any work which
is in the public domain… or in any
publication
of
the
United
States
Government.” A 1961 Register’s Report
released by the Copyright Office stated that
Congress’ prohibition of copyright on federal
government texts also extends to state
government laws, judicial decisions and
similar documents.

Further, the annotations are authoritative
sources on the meaning of Georgia statutes,
heightening their legal significance. This
makes the annotations closely analogous to a
work representing an exercise of sovereign
authority, which under U.S. public policy
makes them a work of the people. The fact
that the OCGA contains the word “Official”
in its title further strengthens the significance
of the document as not being simply one of
many annotated versions of Georgia’s
statutes.

“The ultimate inquiry posed by the rule
in Banks is thus whether a work is
attributable to the constructive authorship of
the People, which is to say whether it was
created by an agent of the People in the direct
exercise of sovereign authority,” the
Eleventh Circuit opinion reads. An analysis
of the OCGA led the appellate court to find
that the annotations, while not having the

Finally, the process used to create the
annotations was closely related to the process
used to create the statutes themselves,
bringing the Eleventh Circuit to the
conclusion that the OCGA is not
copyrightable.
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Aurelius Investment, LLC v. Puerto Rico
Ruling Below: Aurelius Investment, LLC v. Puerto Rico, 915 F.3d 838 (1st Cir. 2019).
Overview: This case is an appeal arising from the restricting of Puerto Rico’s public debt. Aurelius
Investment are Puerto Rico general obligation bondholders, who are filing for injunctive and
declaratory relief claiming that they possess a priority and property interest over other revenues of
the Puerto Rico government. The Financial and Oversight Management Board filed a motion to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim.
Issue: Whether the de facto officer doctrine allows courts to deny meaningful relief to successful
separation-of-powers challengers who are suffering ongoing injury at the hands of
unconstitutionally appointed principle officers
Note: Aurelius Investment, LLC v. Puerto Rico is consolidated with Financial Oversight and
Management Board for Puerto Rico v. Aurelius Investment, LLC; Official Committee of Debtors
v. Aurelius Investment, LLC; United States v. Aurelius Investment, LLC; UTIER v. Financial
Oversight and Management Board of Puerto Rico
AURELIUS INVESTMENT, LLC, ET AL., Plaintiffs-Appellants
v.
Commonwealth of PUERTO RICO, Defendants- Appellees
United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit
Decided on February 15, 2019
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]
TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge:
The matter before us arises from the
restructuring of Puerto Rico's public debt
under the 2016 Puerto Rico Oversight,
Management, and Economic Stability Act
("PROMESA"). This time, however, we are
not tasked with delving into the intricacies of
bankruptcy proceedings. Instead, we are
required to square off with a single question
of constitutional magnitude: whether

members of the Financial Oversight and
Management Board created by PROMESA
("Board Members") are "Officers of the
United States" subject to the U.S.
Constitution's Appointments Clause. Title III
of PROMESA authorizes the Board to
initiate debt adjustment proceedings on
behalf of the Puerto Rico government, and
the Board exercised this authority in May
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2017. Appellants seek to dismiss the Title III
proceedings, claiming the Board lacked
authority to initiate them given that the Board
Members were allegedly appointed in
contravention of the Appointments Clause.

"Appointments Clause," which establishes
that:
[The President] . . . shall nominate, and by
and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, shall appoint . . . all other Officers of
the United States, whose Appointments are
not herein otherwise provided for, and which
shall be established by Law: but the Congress
may by Law vest the Appointment of such
inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the
President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in
the Heads of Departments.

Before we can determine whether the Board
Members are subject to the Appointments
Clause, we must first consider two antecedent
questions that need be answered in sequence,
with the answer to each deciding whether we
proceed to the next item of inquiry. The first
question is whether, as decided by the district
court and claimed by appellees, the
Territorial
Clause
displaces
the
Appointments Clause in an unincorporated
territory such as Puerto Rico. If the answer to
this first question is "no," our second area of
discussion turns to determining whether the
Board Members are "Officers of the United
States," as only officers of the federal
government fall under the purview of the
Appointments Clause. If the answer to this
second question is "yes," we must then
determine whether the Board Members are
"principal" or "inferior" United States
officers, as that classification will dictate how
they must be appointed pursuant to the
Appointments Clause. But before we enter
fully into these matters, it is appropriate that
we take notice of the developments that led
to the present appeal.

The second is Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2,
or the "Territorial Clause," providing
Congress with the "power to dispose of and
make all needful Rules and Regulations
respecting the Territory . . . belonging to the
United States."
A. Puerto Rico's Financial Crisis
The interaction between these two clauses
comes into focus because of events resulting
from the serious economic downfall that has
ailed the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico
since the turn of the 21st Century, and its
Governor's declaration in the summer of
2015 that the Commonwealth was unable to
meet its estimated $72 billion public debt
obligation. This obligation developed, in
substantial part, from the triple tax-exempt
bonds issued and sold to a large variety of
individual and institutional investors, not
only in Puerto Rico but also throughout the
United States. Given the unprecedented
expansiveness of the default in terms of total
debt, the number of creditors affected, and
the creditors' geographic diversity, it became
self-evident that the Commonwealth's

BACKGROUND
The centerpieces of the present appeals are
two provisions of the Constitution of the
United States. The first is Article II, Section
2, Clause 2, commonly referred to as the
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insolvency necessitated a national response
from Congress. Puerto Rico's default was of
particular detriment to the municipal bond
market where Commonwealth bonds are
traded and upon which state and local
governments across the United States rely to
finance many of their capital projects.

Rico's "fiscal emergency" and to help
mitigate the Island's "severe economic
decline." Congress identified the Territorial
Clause as the source of its authority to enact
this law.
To implement PROMESA, Congress created
the Financial Oversight and Management
Board of Puerto Rico (the "Board").
Congress charged the Board with providing
independent supervision and control over
Puerto Rico's financial affairs and helping the
Island "achieve fiscal responsibility and
access to the capital markets." In so
proceeding, Congress stipulated that the
Board was "an entity [created] within the
territorial government" of Puerto Rico, which
"shall not be considered to be a department,
agency, establishment, or instrumentality of
the Federal Government,"), and that it was to
be funded entirely from Commonwealth
resources.

From 1938 until 1984, Puerto Rico was able,
like all other U.S. jurisdictions, to seek the
protection of Chapter 9 of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code when its municipal
instrumentalities
ran
into
financial
difficulties. But without any known or
documented explanation, in 1984, Congress
extirpated from the Bankruptcy Code the 1
availability of this relief for the Island. In an
attempt to seek self-help, and amidst the
Commonwealth's deepening financial crisis,
the Puerto Rico Legislature passed its own
municipal bankruptcy legislation in 2014.
The Commonwealth's self-help journey,
however, was cut short by the Supreme Court
in Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Tr.,
136 S. Ct. 1938 (2016), which invalidated the
Puerto
Rico
bankruptcy
statute.
Coincidentally, the Supreme Court decided
Franklin Cal. on June 13, 2016 -- seven days
before
the
following
congressional
intervention into this sequence of luckless
events.

Although PROMESA places the Board
"within" the Puerto Rico territorial
government, Section 108 of PROMESA,
which is labeled "Autonomy of Oversight
Board,", precludes the Puerto Rico Governor
and Legislature from exercising any power or
authority over the so-called "territorial
entity" that PROMESA 10- creates. Instead,
it subordinates the Puerto Rico territorial
government to the Board, as it
unambiguously pronounces that:
(a) . . . Neither the Governor nor the
Legislature may –

B. Congress Enacts PROMESA
On June 30, 2016, Congress's next incursion
into Puerto Rico's economic fortunes took
place in the form of Public Law 114- 187, the
Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and
Economic Stability Act (PROMESA), which
Congress found necessary to deal with Puerto

(1) exercise any control, supervision,
oversight, or review over the . . . Board or its
activities; or
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(2) enact, implement, or enforce any statute,
resolution, policy, or rule that would impair
or defeat the purposes of this chapter, as
determined by the . . . Board.

territorial
instrumentality
from
requirements of [PROMESA]."

the

PROMESA also requires the Board to have
an office in Puerto Rico and elsewhere as it
deems necessary, and that at any time the
United States may provide the Board with use
of federal facilities and equipment on a
reimbursable or non-reimbursable basis.
Additionally, Section 103(c) waives the
application of Puerto Rico procurement laws
to the Board while Section 104(c) authorizes
the Board to acquire information directly
from both the federal and Puerto Rico
governments without the usual bureaucratic
hurdles. Moreover, the Board's power to
issue and enforce compliance with -12subpoenas is to be carried out in accordance
with Puerto Rico law. Finally, PROMESA
directs the Board to ensure that any laws
prohibiting public employees from striking or
engaging in lockouts be strictly enforced.

PROMESA also provides additional
authority and powers to the Board with
similarly unfettered discretion. For example,
Section 101(d)(1)(A) grants the Board, "in its
sole discretion at such time as the . . . Board
determines to be appropriate," the
designation of "any territorial instrumentality
as a covered territorial instrumentality that is
subject to the requirements of [PROMESA]."
Under Section 101(d)(1)(B), the Board, "in
its sole discretion," may require the Governor
of Puerto Rico to submit "such budgets and
monthly or quarterly reports regarding a
covered territorial instrumentality as the …
Board determines to be necessary…”
Pursuant to Section 101 (d)(1)(C), the Board
is allowed, “in its sole discretion” to require
separate budgets and reports for covered
territorial instrumentalities apart from the
Commonwealth’s budget , and to require the
Governor to develop said separate
documents. Per Section 101(d)(1)(D), the
"Board may require, in its sole discretion,"
that the Governor "include a covered
territorial instrumentality in the applicable
Territory Fiscal Plan." Further, as provided in
Section 101(d)(1)(E), the Board may, "in its
sole discretion," designate "a covered
territorial instrumentality to be the subject of
[a separate] Instrumentality Fiscal Plan.
Finally, Section 101(d)(2)(A) bestows upon
the Board, again "in its sole discretion, at
such time as the . . . Board determines to be
appropriate," the authority to "exclude any

We thus come to PROMESA's Title III, the
central provision of this statute, which creates
a special bankruptcy regime allowing the
territories and their instrumentalities to adjust
their debt. This new bankruptcy safe haven
applies to territories more broadly than
Chapter 9 applies to states because it covers
not just the subordinate instrumentalities of
the territory, but also the territory itself
An important provision of PROMESA's
bankruptcy regime is that the Board serves as
the sole representative of Puerto Rico's
government in Title III debtor-related
proceedings and that the Board is empowered
to "take any action necessary on behalf of the
debtor" -- whether the Commonwealth
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government or any of its instrumentalities -"to prosecute the case of the debtor,".
C.
Appointment
PROMESA's Board

of

Members

Board Members. Of particular importance to
our task at hand is Section 101(e)(2)(A),
which outlines the procedure for the
appointment of the Board Members:

to

(A) The President shall appoint the individual
members of the . . . Board of which –

PROMESA establishes that the "Board shall
consist of seven members appointed by the
President," who must comply with federal
conflict of interest statutes. The Board's
membership is divided into six categories,
labelled A through F, with one member for
Categories A, B, D, E, and F, and two
members for Category C. The Governor of
Puerto Rico, or his designee, also serves on
the Board, but in an ex officio, non-voting
capacity. The Board's duration is for an
indefinite period, at a minimum four years
and likely more, given the certifications that
Section 209 of PROMESA requires.

(i) the Category A member should be selected
from a list of individuals submitted by the
Speaker of the House of Representatives;
(B) the expenditures made by the territorial
government during each fiscal year did not
exceed the revenues of the territorial
government during that year, as determined
in accordance with modified accrual
accounting standards.
(ii) the Category B member should be
selected from a separate, non-overlapping list
of individuals submitted by the Speaker of
the House of Representatives;

Pursuant to Section 101(f) of PROMESA,
individuals are eligible for appointment to the
Board only if they:

(iii) the Category C member should be
selected from a list submitted by the Majority
Leader of the Senate;

(1) ha[ve] knowledge and expertise in
finance,
municipal
bond
markets,
management, law, or the organization or
operation of business or government; and

(iv) the Category D member should be
selected from a list submitted by the Minority
Leader of the House of Representatives;

(2) prior to appointment, [they are] not an
officer, elected official, or employee of the
territorial government, a candidate for
elected office of the territorial government, or
a former elected official of the territorial
government.

(v) the Category E member should be
selected from a list submitted by the Minority
leader of the Senate; and
(vi) the category F member may be selected
in the President's sole discretion.
In synthesis, pursuant to this scheme, six of
the seven Board Members shall be selected

In addition, there are certain primary
residency or primary business place
requirements that must be met by some of the
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by the President from the lists provided by
House and Senate leadership, with
PROMESA allowing the President to select
the seventh member at his or her sole
discretion. Senatorial advice and consent is
not required if the President makes the
appointment from one of the aforementioned
lists. In theory, the statute allows the
President to appoint a member to the Board
who is not on the lists, in which case, "such
an appointment shall be by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate." Consent
by the Senate had to be obtained by
September 1, 2016 so as to allow an off-list
appointment, else the President was required
to appoint directly -16- from the lists. And
because the Senate was in recess for all but
eight business days between enactment of the
statute and September 1, one might conclude
that, in practical effect, the statute forced the
selection of persons on the list.

the District of Puerto Rico. This was
followed by the filing of several other Title
III proceedings on behalf of various
Commonwealth
government
instrumentalities. Thereafter, some entities -now the appellants before us -- arose in
opposition to the Board's initiation of debt
adjustment proceedings on behalf of the
Commonwealth.
Among the challengers are Aurelius
Investment, LLC, et al. and Assured
Guaranty Corporation, et al. ("Aurelius").
Before the district court, Aurelius argued that
the Board lacked authority to initiate the Title
III proceeding because its members were
appointed in violation of the Appointments
Clause and the principle of separation of
powers. The Board rejected this argument,
positing that its members were not "Officers
of the United States" within the meaning of
the Appointments Clause, and that the
Board's powers were purely local in nature,
not federal as would be needed to qualify for
Appointments Clause coverage. The Board
further argued that, in any event, the
Appointments Clause did not apply even if
the individual members were federal officers,
because they exercised authority in Puerto
Rico, an unincorporated territory where the
Territorial Clause endows Congress with
plenary powers. This, according to the Board,
exempted Congress from complying with the
Appointments Clause when legislating in
relation to Puerto Rico. In the alternative, the
Board argued that the Board Members'
appointment did not require Senate advice
and consent because they were "inferior
officers." The United States intervened on
behalf of the Board, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

As was arguably inevitable, on August 31,
2016, the President chose all Category A
through E members from the lists submitted
by congressional leadership and appointed
the Category F member at his sole discretion.
It is undisputed that the President did not
submit any of the Board member
appointments to the Senate for its advice and
consent prior to the Board Members
assuming the duties of their office, or, for that
matter, at any other time.
D. Litigation Before the District Court
In May 2017, the Board initiated Title III debt
adjustment proceedings on behalf of the
Commonwealth in the U.S. District Court for
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2403(a), to defend the constitutionality of
PROMESA and the validity of the
appointments and was generally in agreement
with the Board's contentions.

The district court based its ruling on the
premise that "the Supreme Court has long
held that Congress's power under [the
Territorial Clause] is both 'general and
plenary.'" Such a plenary authority is what,
according to the district court, allows
Congress to "establish governmental
institutions for territories that are not only
distinct from federal government entities but
include features that would not comport with
the requirements of the Constitution if they
pertained to the governance of the United
States." The district court further pronounced
that Congress "has exercised [its plenary]
power with respect to Puerto Rico over the
course of nearly 120 years, including the
delegation to the people -21- of Puerto Rico
elements of its . . . Article IV authority by
authorizing a significant degree of local selfgovernance."

The other challenger to the Board's
appointments process, and an appellant here,
is the Unión de Trabajadores de la Industria
Eléctrica y Riego ("UTIER"), a Puerto Rican
labor organization that represents employees
of the government-owned electric power
company, the Puerto Rico Electric Power
Authority ("PREPA"). The Board had also
filed a Title III petition on behalf of PREPA,
which led the UTIER to file an adversary
proceeding as a party of interest before the
District Court in which it raised substantially
the same arguments as Aurelius regarding the
Board Members' defective appointment
E. The District Court's Opinion

The district court also relied on judicial
precedents holding that Congress may create
territorial courts that do not "incorporate the
structural
assurances
of
judicial
independence" provided for in Article III of
the Constitution -- namely, life tenure and
protection against reduction in pay -- as
decisive authority. From the perdurance of
these non-Article III courts across the
territories (excepting, of course, Puerto Rico
which although still an unincorporated
territory has had, since 1966, an Article III
court), the district court reasoned that
"Congress can thus create territorial entities
that are distinct in structure, jurisdiction, and
powers from the federal government."

The district court, in separate decisions, ruled
against Aurelius and UTIER and rejected
their motions to dismiss the Board's Title III
petitions. In brief, the district court
determined that the Board is an
instrumentality of the Commonwealth
government
established
pursuant
to
Congress's plenary powers under the
Territorial Clause, that Board Members are
not "Officers of the United States," and that
therefore there was no constitutional defect in
the method of their appointment. The court
arrived at this conclusion after considering
the jurisprudence and practice surrounding
the relationship between Congress and the
territories, including Puerto Rico, along with
Congress's intent with regards to PROMESA.

Turning to the relationship between Congress
and Puerto Rico, the district court noted that
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"Congress has long exercised its Article IV
plenary power to structure and define
governmental entities for the island," in
reference to the litany of congressional acts
that have shaped Puerto Rico's local
government since 1898, including the Treaty
of Paris of 1898, the Foraker Act of 1900, the
Jones-Shafroth Act of 1917, and Public Law
600 of 1950.

[t]he fact that the . . . Board's members hold
office by virtue of a federally enacted
statutory regime and are appointed by the
President[,] [because this] does not vitiate
Congress's express provisions for creation of
the . . . Board as a territorial government
entity that "shall not be considered to be a
department, agency, establishment, or
instrumentality of the Federal Government."

Furthermore, with regards to PROMESA and
its Board, the district court afforded
"substantial deference" to "Congress's
determination that it was acting pursuant to
its Article IV territorial powers in creating the
. . . Board as an entity of the government of
Puerto Rico." The district court then
proceeded to consider whether Congress can
create an entity that is not inherently federal.
It concluded in the affirmative, because
finding otherwise would "ignore[] both the
plenary nature of congressional power under
Article IV and the well-rooted jurisprudence
. . . establish[ing] that any powers of selfgovernance
exercised
by
territorial
governments are exercised by virtue of
congressional delegation rather than inherent
local sovereignty." Accordingly, the district
court found that the "creation of an entity
such as the . . . Board through popular
election would not change the . . . Board's
ultimate source of authority from a
constitutional perspective." The court
deemed this so because "neither the case law
nor the historical practice . . . compels a
finding that federal appointment necessarily
renders an appointee a federal officer." The
district court therefore concluded that the
Board is a territorial entity notwithstanding

After ruling that the Board is a "territorial
entity and its members are territorial
officers," the district court finally determined
that "Congress had broad discretion to
determine the manner of selection for
members of the . . . Board," which Congress
"exercised . . . in empowering the President
with the ability to both appoint and remove
members from the . . . Board." On this final
point, the district court observed that
"[a]lthough historical practice . . . indicates
that Congress has required Senate
confirmation for certain territorial offices,
nothing in the Constitution precludes the use
of that mechanism for positions created under
Article IV, and its use does not establish that
Congress was obligated to invoke it."
The district court was certainly correct that
Article IV conveys to Congress greater
power to rule and regulate within a territory
than it can bring to bear within the fifty states.
In brief, within a territory, Congress has not
only its customary power, but also the power
to make rules and regulations such as a state
government may make within its state. As we
will explain, however, we do not view these
expanded Article IV powers as enabling
Congress to ignore the structural limitations
on the manner in which the federal
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government chooses federal officers, and we
deem the Board Members -- save its ex
officio member -- to be federal officers.

The Territorial Clause is one of general
application authorizing Congress to engage
in rulemaking for the temporary governance
of territories. But such a general
empowerment does not extend to areas where
the Constitution explicitly contemplates a
particular subject, such as the appointment of
federal officers. Nowhere does the Territorial
Clause reference the subject matter of federal
appointments or the process to effectuate
them. On the other hand, federal officer
appointment is, of course, the raison d'etre of
the Appointments Clause. It cannot be clearer
or more unequivocal that the Appointments
Clause mandates that it be applied to "all . . .
Officers of the United States." Thus, we find
in answering the first question before us a
prime candidate for application of the
specialibus canon and for the strict
enforcement of the constitutional mandate
contained in the Appointments Clause.

DISCUSSION
A. The Territorial Clause Does Not Trump
the Appointments Clause
However much Article IV may broaden the
reach of Congress's powers over a territory as
compared to its power within a state, this case
presents no claim that the substance of
PROMESA's numerous rules and regulations
exceed that reach.
Instead, appellants challenge the way the
federal government has chosen the
individuals who will implement those rules
and regulations. This challenge trains our
focus on the power of Congress vis-à-vis the
other branches of the federal government.
Specifically, the Board claims that Article IV
effectively allows Congress to assume what
is otherwise a power of the President, and to
share within the two bodies of Congress a
power only assigned to the Senate.

Consider next the Presentment Clause of
Article I, Section 7. Under that clause, a bill
passed by both chambers of Congress cannot
become law until it is presented to, and
signed by, the President (or the President's
veto is overridden). Surely no one argues that
Article IV should be construed so as to have
allowed Congress to enact PROMESA
without presentment, or to have overridden a
veto without the requisite super-majority vote
in both houses. Nor does anyone seriously
argue that Congress could have relied on its
powers under Article IV to alter the
constitutional roles of its two respective
houses in enacting PROMESA.

We reject this notion that Article IV enhances
Congress's capabilities in the intramural
competitions established by our divided
system of government. First, the Board seems
to forget -- and the district court failed to
recognize and honor -- the ancient canon of
interpretation that we believe is a helpful
guide to disentangle the interface between the
Appointments Clause and the Territorial
Clause: generalia specialibus non derogant
(the "specific governs the general").

Like the Presentment Clause, the
Appointments
Clause
constitutionally
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regulates how Congress brings its power to
bear, whatever the reach of that power might
be. The Appointments Clause serves as one
of the Constitution's important structural
pillars, one that was intended to prevent the
"manipulation of official appointments" -- an
"insidious . . . weapon of eighteenth century
despotism." The Appointments Clause was
designed "to prevent[] congressional
encroachment"
on
the
President's
appointment power, while "curb[ing]
Executive abuses" by requiring Senate
confirmation of all principal officers. It is
thus universally considered "among the
significant structural safeguards of the
constitutional scheme."

context, "[a] municipal corporation . . . is but
a department of the State.
The legislature may give it all powers such a
being is capable of receiving, making it a
miniature State within its locality." The
Supreme Court has also made clear that, in
delegating power to the territories, Congress
can only act insofar as "other provisions of
the Constitution are not infringed."
The territorial variations on the traditional
restrictions of the nondelegation doctrine
pose no challenge by Congress to the power
of the other branches. Any delegation must
take the form of a duly enacted statute subject
to the President's veto. Furthermore, the
territorial exception to the nondelegation
doctrine strikes us as strongly implicit in the
notion of a territory as envisioned by the
drafters of the Constitution. The expectation
was that territories would become states.
Hence, Congress had a duty -- at least a moral
duty -- to manage a transition from federal to
home rule. While the final delegation takes
place in the act of formally creating a state, it
makes evident sense that partial delegations
of home-rule powers would incrementally
precede full statehood. Accordingly, from the
very beginning, Congress created territorial
legislatures to which it delegated rule-making
authority.

It is true that another restriction that is
arguably a structural limitation on Congress's
exercise of its powers -- the nondelegation
doctrine -- does bend to the peculiar demands
of providing for governance within the
territories. In normal application, the doctrine
requires that "when Congress confers
decision-making authority upon agencies," it
must "lay down by legislative act an
intelligible principle to which the person or
body authorized to [act] is directed to
conform." Otherwise, Congress has violated
Article I, Section 1 of the Constitution, which
vests "[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted
. . . in a Congress of the United States.". In
connection with the territories, though,
Congress can delegate to territorial
governments the power to enact rules and
regulations governing territorial affairs. The
Supreme Court has analogized the powers of
Congress over the District of Columbia and
the territories to that of states over their
municipalities. In the state-municipality

None of these justifications for limiting the
nondelegation doctrine to accommodate one
of Congress's most salient purposes in
exercising its powers under Article IV
applies to the Appointments Clause. Nor does
the teaching of founding era history. To the
contrary, the evidence suggests strongly that
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Congress in 1789 viewed the process of
presidential appointment and Senate
confirmation as applicable to the
appointment by the federal government of
federal officers within the territories. That
first Congress passed several amendments to
the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 "so as to
adopt the same to the present Constitution of
the United States." One such conforming
amendment eliminated the pre-constitutional
procedure for congressional appointment of
officers within the territory and replaced it
with
presidential
nomination
and
appointment "by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate.".

For the foregoing reasons, we find in the
nondelegation doctrine no apt example to
justify an exception to the application of the
Appointments Clause within the territories.
An exception from the Appointments Clause
would alter the balance of power within the
federal government itself and would serve no
necessary purpose in the transitioning of
territories to states.
Further, the Board points us to Palmore v.
United States. That case arose out of
Congress's exercise of its plenary powers
over the District of Columbia under Article I,
Section 8, Clause 17, powers which are fairly
analogous to those under Article IV. The
Court held that Congress could create local
courts -- like state courts -- that did not satisfy
the requirements of Article III. The Board
would have us read Palmore as an instance of
Congress's plenary powers over a territory
trumping the requirements of another
structural pillar of the Constitution. We
disagree. The Court explained at length how
Article III itself did not require that all courts
created by Congress satisfy the selection and
tenure requirements of Article III. ("It is
apparent that neither this Court nor Congress
has read the Constitution as requiring every
federal question arising under the federal law,
or even every criminal prosecution for
violating an Act of Congress, to be tried in an
Art. III court before a judge enjoying lifetime
tenure and protection against salary
reduction."). Rather, the requirements of
Article III are applicable to courts "devoted
to matters of national concern,", and that
local courts "primarily. . . concern[ed] . . .
with local law and to serve as a local court

More difficult to explain is United States v.
Heinszen. The actual holding in Heinszen
sustained tariffs on goods to the Philippines
where the tariffs were imposed first by the
President and then thereafter expressly
ratified by Congress. In sustaining those
tariffs, the Court stated that Congress could
have delegated the power to impose the
tariffs to the President beforehand, citing
United States v. Dorr, a case that simply held
that Congress could provide for criminal
tribunals in the territories without also
providing for trial by jury. Heinszen cannot
be explained as an instance of Congress
enabling home rule in a territory. Rather, it
seems to allow Congress to delegate
legislative power to the President, citing the
territorial context as a justification. Heinszen,
though, has no progeny that might shed light
on how reliable it might serve as an apt
analogy in the case before us. Moreover,
Heinszen concerned a grant of power by
Congress, not a grab for power at the expense
of the executive.
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system" created by Congress pursuant to its
plenary powers are simply another example
of those courts that did not fit the Article III
template (like state courts empowered to hear
federal cases, military tribunals, the Court of
Private Land Claims, and consular courts). In
short, Article III was not trumped by
Congress's creation of local courts pursuant
to its Article I power. Rather, Article III itself
accommodates exceptions, and the local D.C.
court system fits within the range of those
exceptions. That there are courts in other
territories of the same ilk does not alter this
analysis. Palmore therefore offers no firm
ground upon which to erect a general Article
IV exception to separation-of-powers
stalwarts such as the Appointments Clause.

a lack of enthusiasm for the perdurance of
these cases, which have been regarded as a
"relic from a different era,", and which
Justice Frankfurter described as "historically
and juridically, an episode of the dead past
about as unrelated to the world of today as the
one-hoss shay is to the latest jet airplane,", we
cannot be induced to engage in an ultra vires
act merely by siren songs. Not only do we
lack the authority to meet UTIER's request,
but even if we were writing on a clean slate,
we would be required to stay our hand when
dealing with constitutional litigation if other
avenues of decision were available, and we
believe there are in this case.
In this respect, we are aided again by the
Supreme Court's decision in Reid, which
although refusing to reverse the "Insular
Cases" outright, provides in its plurality
opinion instructive language that outlines the
appropriate course we ought to pursue in the
instant appeal:

Finally, nothing about the "Insular Cases"
casts doubt over our foregoing analysis. This
discredited lineage of cases, which ushered
the unincorporated territories doctrine,
hovers like a dark cloud over this case. To our
knowledge there is no case even intimating
that if Congress acts pursuant to its authority
under the Territorial Clause it is excused
from conforming with the Appointments
Clause, whether this be by virtue of the
"Insular Cases" or otherwise. Nor could there
be, for it would amount to the emasculation
from the Constitution of one of its most
important structural pillars. We thus have no
trouble in concluding that the Constitution's
structural provisions are not limited by
geography and follow the United States into
its unincorporated territories.

The "Insular Cases" can be distinguished
from the present cases in that they involved
the power of Congress to provide rules and
regulations to govern temporarily territories
with wholly dissimilar traditions and
institutions whereas here the basis for
governmental power is American citizenship.
. . . [I]t is our judgment that neither the cases
nor their reasoning should be given any
further expansion.
The only course, therefore, which we are
allowed in light of Reid is to not further
expand the reach of the "Insular Cases."
Accordingly, we conclude that the Territorial
Clause and the "Insular Cases" do not impede

Notwithstanding this doctrine, appellant
UTIER asks us to go one step further and
reverse the "Insular Cases." Although there is
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the application of the Appointments Clause
in an unincorporated territory, assuming all
other requirements of that provision are duly
met.

well extend beyond three years, as
PROMESA stipulates that the Board will
continue in operation until it certifies that the
Commonwealth government has met various
fiscal objectives "for at least 4 consecutive
fiscal years."

B. Board Members Are "Officers of the
United
States"
Subject
to
the
Appointments Clause

Second, the Board Members plainly exercise
"significant authority." For example,
PROMESA empowers the Board Members to
initiate and prosecute the largest bankruptcy
in the history of the United States municipal
bond market with the bankruptcy power
being a quintessential federal subject matter.
The Supreme Court recently reminded the
Commonwealth
government
of
the
bankruptcy power's exclusive federal nature
in Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust.

We must now determine whether the Board
Members qualify within the rubric of
"Officers of the United States," the
Appointments Clause's job description that
marks the entry point for its coverage. The
district court determined that the Board
Members do not fall under such a rubric. We
disagree. We begin our analysis by turning to
a triad of Supreme Court decisions: Lucia v.
SEC; Freytag; and Buckley v. Valeo. From
these cases, we gather that the following
"test" must be met for an appointee to qualify
as an "Officer of the United States" subject to
the Appointments Clause: (1) the appointee
occupies a "continuing" position established
by federal law; (2) the appointee "exercis[es]
significant authority"; and (3) the significant
authority is exercised "pursuant to the laws of
the United States.". In our view, the Board
Members readily meet these requirements.

The Board Members' federal authority
includes the power to veto, rescind, or revise
Commonwealth laws and regulations that it
deems inconsistent with the provisions of
PROMESA or the fiscal plans developed
pursuant to it. Likewise, the Board showcases
what can be construed as nothing but its
significant authority when it rejects the
budget of the Commonwealth or one of its
instrumentalities; when it rules on the
validity of a fiscal plan proposed by the
Commonwealth; when it issues its own fiscal
plan if it rejects the Commonwealth's
proposed plan; and when it exercises its sole
discretion to file a plan of adjustment for
Commonwealth debt. The Board can only
employ these significant powers because a
federal law so provides.

First, Board Members occupy "continuing
positions" under a federal law since
PROMESA provides for their appointment to
an initial term of three years and they can
thereafter be reappointed and serve until a
successor takes office The continuity of the
Board Members' position is fortified by the
provision that only the President can remove
them from office and then only for cause. In
fact, the Board Members' term in office could

Moreover, Board Members' investigatory
and enforcement powers, as carried out
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collectively by way of the Board, exceed or
are at least equal to those of the judicial
officers the Supreme Court found to be
"Officers of the United States" in Lucia.
There, the Supreme Court held that
administrative law judges are "Officers of the
United States," in part, because they can
receive evidence at hearings and administer
oaths. PROMESA grants the Board Members
the same right and more. In short, the Board
Members enjoy "significant discretion" as
they carry out "important functions”, under a
federal law -- qualities that the Supreme
Court has considered for decades as the
birthmark of federal officers who are subject
to the Appointments Clause.

precedent suggests the inapplicability of the
Appointments Clause to the territories.
Second, the United States contends that if we
find for appellants, such a ruling will
invalidate the present-day democratically
elected local governments of Puerto Rico and
the other unincorporated territories because
the officers of such governments took office
without the Senate's advice and consent. We
reject each argument in turn.
The relevant historical precedents of which
we are aware lead us to a different conclusion
than that claimed by the United States.
Excepting the short period during which
Puerto
Rico
was
under
military
administration following the SpanishAmerican War, the major federal
appointments to Puerto Rico's civil
government throughout the first half of the
20th century all complied with the
Appointments Clause.

Third, the Board Members' authority is
exercised "pursuant to the laws of the United
States." The Board Members trace their
authority directly and exclusively to a federal
law, PROMESA. That federal law provides
both their authority and their duties.
Essentially everything they do is pursuant to
federal law under which the adequacy of their
performance is judged by their federal
master. And this federal master serves in the
seat of federal power, not San Juan. The
Board Members are, in short, more like
Roman proconsuls picked in Rome to enforce
Roman law and oversee territorial leaders
than they are like the locally selected leaders
that Rome allowed to continue exercising
some authority.

Beginning in 1900 with the Foraker Act, the
Governor of Puerto Rico was to be nominated
by the President and confirmed by the Senate
to a term of four years "unless sooner
removed by the President." An Act
temporarily to provide revenues and a civil
government for Porto Rico, ch. 191, 31 Stat.
77, 81 (1900). The Foraker Act also
mandated presidential nomination and Senate
confirmation of the members of Puerto Rico's
"Executive Council" (which assumed the
dual role of executive cabinet and upper
chamber of the territorial legislature). The
Executive Council consisted of a secretary,
an attorney general, a treasurer, an auditor, a
commissioner of the interior, a commissioner
of education, and five other persons "of good

The United States makes two arguments in
support of the district court's opinion and
PROMESA's current appointments protocol
that warrant our direct response at this point.
First, the United States argues that historical
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repute." In addition, the Foraker Act also
subjected the justices of the Puerto Rico
Supreme Court, along with the marshal and
judge of the territorial U.S. District Court for
the District of "Porto" Rico, to the strictures
of the Appointments Clause. Even the three
members of a commission established to
compile and revise the laws of "Porto" Rico
were made subject to the Appointments
Clause.

posture runs head against the sound principle
of legislative interpretation bordering on
dogma that "'[l]ong settled and established
practice is a consideration of great weight in
proper interpretation of constitutional
provisions' regulating the relationship
between Congress and the President."
Furthermore, the United States fails to
support its assertion with legislative history
or other evidence establishing that Congress's
largely
consistent
adherence
to
Appointments Clause procedures in
appointing territorial officials was gratuitous.
Lacking such an explanation, we believe it is
more probable that Congress was simply
complying with what the Constitution
requires. Furthermore, that largely consistent
compliance with Appointment Clause
procedures in hundreds if not thousands of
instances over two centuries belies any claim
that adherence to those procedures impedes
Congress's exercise of its plenary powers
within the territories.

The Foraker Act regime lasted until 1917,
when Congress passed the Jones-Shafroth
Act. Here again, Congress provided for all
key appointments by Washington to Puerto
Rico's territorial government to meet the
Appointments Clause: the governor, attorney
general, commissioner of education, supreme
court justices, district attorney, U.S. marshal,
and U.S. territorial district judge were to be
appointed by the President with the advice
and consent of the Senate. In sum, between
1900 and 1947 -- the last time the Island had
a federally-selected Governor -- each of the
presidentially appointed Governors of Puerto
Rico acquired their office after receiving the
Senate's blessing.

The United States, as well as the Board, also
point to the manner in which Congress has for
centuries allowed territories to elect
territorial officials, including for example the
governor of Puerto Rico since 1947.
Congress created many of these territorial
positions and they were filled not through
presidential
nomination
and
Senate
confirmation, but rather by elections within
the territory. The Board's basic point (and the
United States' basic point as well) is this: If
we find that the Board Members must be
selected by presidential nomination and
Senate confirmation, then that would mean
that, for example, all elected territorial

As the United States would have it,
Congress's
requirement
of
Senate
confirmation for presidential nominees in all
of the aforementioned contexts was mere
voluntary legislative surplusage. This
position, however, directly contravenes the
published opinions of the United States' own
Office of Legal Counsel issued as recently as
2007. The original public meaning of 'officer'
in Article II includes all federal officials with
responsibility for an ongoing statutory
duty."). At a minimum, the United States'
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governors and legislators have been selected
in an unconstitutional manner.

President alone, the courts, or a department
head. And the Board argues (but we do not
decide) that the President appointed the
Board Members notwithstanding the
restricted choice from congressional lists.

We disagree. The elected officials to which
the Board and the United States point -- even
at the highest levels -- are not federal officers.
They do not "exercise significant authority
pursuant to the laws of the United States."
Rather, they exercise authority pursuant to
the laws of the territory. Thus, in Puerto Rico
for example, the Governor is elected by the
citizens of Puerto Rico, his position and
power are products of the Commonwealth's
Constitution, see Puerto Rico Const. art. IV,
and he takes an oath similar to that taken by
the governor of a state.

In Morrison v. Olson, the Supreme Court
held that an independent counsel was an
"inferior" officer because she was subject to
removal by the attorney general and because
she had limited duties, jurisdiction, and
tenure, among other factors. More than a
decade later, the Court held that an "inferior"
officer was one "whose work is directed and
supervised at some level by others who were
appointed by Presidential nomination with
the advice and consent of the Senate." Our
circuit later squared the two cases by holding
that Edmond's supervision test was sufficient,
but not necessary. Therefore, inferior officers
are those who are directed and supervised by
a presidential appointee; otherwise, they
"might still be considered inferior officers if
the nature of their work suggests sufficient
limitations of responsibility and authority."

It is true that the Commonwealth laws are
themselves the product of authority Congress
has delegated by statute. So the elected
Governor's power ultimately depends on the
continuation of a federal grant. But that fact
alone does not make the laws of Puerto Rico
the laws of the United States, else every claim
brought under Puerto Rico's laws would pose
a federal question.

The Board Members clearly satisfy the
Edmond test. They are answerable to and
removable only by the President and are not
directed or supervised by others who were
appointed by the President with Senate
confirmation. Considering the additional
Morrison factors does not change the
calculus. Though the Board Members' tenure
"is 'temporary' in the sense that [they are]
appointed essentially to accomplish a single
task, and when that task is over the [Board] is
terminated,", the Board's vast duties and
jurisdiction are insufficiently limited.
Significantly, while the independent counsel

C. The Board Members are Principal
Officers of the United States
Having concluded that the Board Members
are indeed United States officers, we now
turn to the specific means by which they must
be appointed pursuant to the Appointments
Clause. If the officer is a "principal" officer,
the only constitutional method of
appointment is by the President, by and with
the advice and consent of the Senate. But
when an officer is "inferior," Congress may
choose to vest the appointment in the
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in Morrison was unable to "formulate policy
for the Government or the Executive
Branch," PROMESA explicitly grants such
authority. And whereas the jurisdiction of the
independent counsel was limited, Morrison,
the Board's authority spans across the
economy of Puerto Rico -- a territory with a
population of nearly 3.5 million -overpowering that of the Commonwealth's
own elected officials. Under Edmond and
Morrison, the Board Members are "principal"
United States officers. They therefore should
have been appointed by the President, by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate.

solution is available. In choosing among
potential options, we ought to reduce the
disruption that our decision may cause. But
we are readily aided by several factors in this
respect.
First, PROMESA itself contains an express
severability clause, stating as follows:
Except as provided in subsection (b)
[regarding uniformity of similarly situated
territories], if any provision of this chapter or
the application thereof to any person or
circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of
this chapter, or the application of that
provision to persons or circumstances other
than those as to which it is held invalid, is not
affected thereby, provided that subchapter III
is not severable from subchapters I and II,
and subchapters I and II are not severable
from subchapter III.

THE REMEDY
Having concluded that the process
PROMESA provides for the appointment of
Board Members is unconstitutional, we are
left to determine the relief to which
appellants are entitled. Both Aurelius and the
UTIER ask that we order dismissal of the
Title III petitions that the Board filed to
commence
the
restructuring
of
Commonwealth debt. In doing so, appellants
suggest that we ought to deem invalid all of
the Board's actions until today and that this
case does not warrant application of the de
facto officer doctrine. It would then be on a
constitutionally reconstituted Board, they
say, to ratify or not ratify the unconstitutional
Board's actions. Appellants also request that
we sever from 48 U.S.C. § 2121(e) the
language that authorizes the Board Members'
appointment without Senate confirmation.

Such a clause "creates a presumption that
Congress did not intend the validity of the
statute in question to depend on the validity
of [a] constitutionally offensive provision."
Severability in this instance is especially
appropriate because Congress, within
PROMESA, has already provided an
alternative appointments mechanism, at least
as to six of the Board Members. PROMESA
directs that if the mechanism we found
unconstitutional is not employed, "[w]ith
respect to the appointment of a Board
member . . . such an appointment shall be by
and with the advice and consent of the
Senate, unless the President appoints an
individual from a list, . . . in which case no
Senate confirmation is required."

There is no question but that in fashioning a
remedy to correct the constitutional violation
we have found it is unlikely that a perfect
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Accordingly, we hold that the present
provisions allowing the appointment of
Board Members in a manner other than by
presidential nomination followed by the
Senate's confirmation are invalid and
severable. We do not hold invalid the
remainder of the Board membership
provisions, including those providing the
qualifications for office and for appointment
by the President with the advice and consent
of the Senate.

Title III petitions on the Commonwealth's
behalf, a power squarely within their lawful
toolkit. And there is no indication but that the
Board Members acted in good faith in
moving to initiate such proceedings.
Moreover, the Board Members' titles to office
were never in question until our resolution of
this appeal.
Other considerations further counsel for our
application of the de facto officer doctrine.
We fear that awarding to appellants the full
extent of their requested relief will have
negative consequences for the many, if not
thousands, of innocent third parties who have
relied on the Board's actions until now. In
addition, a summary invalidation of
everything the Board has done since 2016
will likely introduce further delay into a
historic debt restructuring process that was
already turned upside down once before by
the ravage of the hurricanes that affected
Puerto Rico in September 2017. At a
minimum, dismissing the Title III petitions
and nullifying the Board's years of work will
cancel out any progress made towards
PROMESA's aim of helping Puerto Rico
"achieve fiscal responsibility and access to
the capital markets."

Second, we reject appellants' invitation to
dismiss the Title III petitions and cast a
specter of invalidity over all of the Board's
actions until the present day. To the contrary,
we find that application of the de facto officer
doctrine is especially appropriate in this case.
An ancient tool of equity, the de facto officer
doctrine "confers validity upon acts
performed by a person acting under the color
of official title even though it is later
discovered that the legality of that person's
appointment . . . to office is deficient." A de
facto officer is "one whose title is not good in
law, but who is in fact in the unobstructed
possession of an office and discharging its
duties in full view of the public, in such
manner and under such circumstances as not
to present the appearance of being an intruder
or usurper." Our sister court for the D.C.
Circuit has described the doctrine as
"protect[ing] citizens' reliance on past
government actions and the government's
ability to take effective and final action."

We therefore decline to order dismissal of the
Board's Title III petitions. Our ruling, as
such, does not eliminate any otherwise valid
actions of the Board prior to the issuance of
our mandate in this case. In so doing, we
follow the Supreme Court's exact approach in
Buckley, which involved an Appointments
Clause challenge to the then recently formed
Federal Election Commission. Although the
Court held that the Commission was in fact

Here, the Board Members were acting with
the color of authority -- namely, PROMESA
-- when, as an entity, they decided to file the
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constituted in violation of the Appointments
Clause, it nonetheless found that such a
constitutional infirmity did "not affect the
validity of the Commission's . . . past acts,".
We conclude the same here and find that
severance is the appropriate relief to which
appellants are entitled after they successfully
and "timely challenge[d] . . . the
constitutional validity of" the Board
Members' appointment.

CONCLUSION
In sum, we hold that the Board Members
(other than the ex officio Member) must be,
and were not, appointed in compliance with
the Appointments Clause. Accordingly, the
district court's conclusion to the contrary is
reversed. We direct the district court to enter
a declaratory judgment to the effect that
PROMESA's -55- protocol for the
appointment of Board Members is
unconstitutional and must be severed. We
affirm, however, the district court's denial of
appellants' motions to dismiss the Title III
proceedings. Each party shall bear its own
costs.

Finally, our mandate in these appeals shall
not issue for 90 days, so as to allow the
President and the Senate to validate the
currently
defective
appointments or
reconstitute the Board in accordance with the
Appointments Clause. During the 90-day
stay period, the Board may continue to
operate as until now.

So ordered.
Reversed in part and Affirmed in part.
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“Puerto Rico Board Appointment Dispute Gets Supreme Court Review”
Bloomberg
Greg Stohr, Michelle Kaske, and Steven Church
June 20, 2019
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear a case
that could upend the work of the oversight
board tasked with pulling Puerto Rico out of
its record bankruptcy.

Along with certifying fiscal plans of the
commonwealth and its agencies, the board
restructured $4 billion of debt of the island’s
former Government Development Bank in
November and $17.6 billion of sales-tax debt
in February.

The justices will review a federal appeals
court ruling that said the Financial Oversight
and Management Board’s members were
appointed in violation of the Constitution. At
the same time, the appellate panel said the
board’s past decisions could stay in force,
and both sides in the dispute asked the
Supreme Court to intervene.

On June 16, the board and creditors holding
$3 billion of commonwealth bonds
announced a tentative restructuring deal that
would reduce nearly $18 billion of Puerto
Rico debt. The board in 2017 filed
bankruptcy for Puerto Rico, the island’s
government-owned electric utility and other
agencies.

Bondholders led by Aurelius Investment
LLC are challenging the board’s composition
and aiming to unravel much of its work. A
win for Aurelius could threaten two tentative
debt-restructuring deals: an accord with
creditors of the island’s only electric utility,
known as Prepa, and a recent agreement with
a group of commonwealth bondholders.

Senate Confirmation
Congress created the board in 2016 as part of
federal legislation aimed at solving Puerto
Rico’s debt crisis. President Barack
Obama picked three Democrats and four
Republicans to serve as board members from
a list provided by congressional leaders of
both parties.

Underscoring the urgency of the case, the
high court indicated it will hear it on a fasterthan-usual basis, with arguments in October.
Both sides had urged expedited review.

The appeals court said the board members
should have been subject to Senate
confirmation, as required under the
Constitution’s appointments clause. The
three-judge panel rejected contentions that a
different part of the Constitution governing

“The cloud of uncertainty that now hangs
over the board’s actions is intolerable,” the
board argued in its appeal.
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U.S. territories overrides the appointments
clause when it comes to Puerto Rico.

Highways and Transportation Authority debt,
as of March 6, according to court documents.

But the appeals court also refused to
categorically invalidate all the board’s work.
The panel pointed to a legal principle known
as the “de facto officer doctrine,” under
which courts won’t nullify actions taken in
good faith by someone whose appointment is
later declared invalid.

Retroactive Ratification
A Supreme Court decision favoring Aurelius
wouldn’t necessarily invalidate past board
actions, but it would almost certainly spawn
a new round of litigation. One possibility is
that a newly appointed board, once confirmed
by the Senate, could try to retroactively ratify
the prior work.

“We fear that awarding to appellants the full
extent of their requested relief will have
negative consequences for the many, if not
thousands, of innocent third parties who have
relied on the board’s actions until now,”
Judge Juan Torruella wrote for the court.

The Trump administration joined the board in
urging the Supreme Court to overturn the
appointments-clause part of the ruling. The
administration said the lower court’s
reasoning is so broad it “necessarily implies
that the government of Puerto Rico has been
unconstitutional since its inception.”

In its appeal, Aurelius and its allies said it
received “no meaningful remedy.” The
appeals court “granted Congress free license
to pass laws that violate the appointments
clause,” the bondholders argued.

The terms of the court’s current members
expire Aug. 30. Earlier this month, President
Donald Trump nominated the current
members to complete their terms, a step
aimed at minimizing the impact of the
appeals court decision going forward.

Aurelius has a history of litigating debt
restructurings. It was part of a group of
holdout investors that rejected deals to
resolve Argentina’s debt crisis in a dispute
that lasted 15 years. The firm held $360
million of Puerto Rico general obligation
bonds and $18.8 million of the island’s

The lead case is Financial Oversight Board v.
Aurelius, 18-1334.
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“Update 1- U.S. Supreme Court to Decide Legality of Puerto Rico Financial Board
Appointments”
CNBC
Lawrence Hurley
June 20, 2019
The U.S. Supreme Court on Thursday agreed
to decide whether members of Puerto Rico’s
federally created financial oversight board
were lawfully appointed in a dispute that
could disrupt the panel’s restructuring of
about $120 billion of the bankrupt U.S.
commonwealth’s debt.

Rico
creditors
including
Aurelius
Investment, LLC, a hedge fund that holds
Puerto Rico bonds, and Unión de
Trabajadores de la Industria Eléctrica y
Riego, Inc, a labor group that represents
workers at Puerto Rico’s government-owned
electricity utility.

The justices will hear an appeal by the board
after a lower court ruled in February that the
2016 appointments of its seven members
violated the U.S. Constitution because they
were not confirmed by the Senate.

Bondholders face losses as a result of debt
restructuring while the labor group has said
that the board’s proposed restructuring of the
utility’s debt would violate the terms of a
collective bargaining agreement and lead to
its members having worse working
conditions.

Creditors challenging the appointments filed
appeals separately, asking the Supreme Court
to find that the decisions made by the board
are invalid because its members were
unlawfully installed. The justices also agreed
to hear that part of the dispute.

In an effort to resolve the dispute, the White
House on June 18 officially sent nominations
for the board’s current members to the
Senate. The Trump administration also filed
its own appeal to the Supreme Court
defending the original appointments.

The court scheduled oral arguments for
October in a bid to resolve the issue quickly.
The board is overseeing the restructuring of
debt and pension obligations through a form
of bankruptcy.

In the meantime, the oversight board has
asked an appeals court to extend a July 15
deadline it set for the board’s seven members
to be reappointed or replaced.

The legal challenge to the board’s
composition was brought in 2017 by Puerto
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“Puerto Rico’s Bankruptcy Plan is Almost Done, and It Could Start a Fight”
New York Times
Mary Williams Walsh
July 14, 2019
After three years of negotiations, Puerto
Rico’s federal overseers are at last finishing
up a plan to complete the restructuring of the
island’s roughly $124 billion in debt. To
resolve the biggest government financial
collapse in United States history, they have
had to untangle the island’s thorny finances,
negotiate with creditors and figure out how to
do it without endangering the livelihoods of
retirees who rely solely on their pensions.

municipal bankruptcy lawyer who is not
involved in Puerto Rico’s legal proceedings.
“But it’s best to have them wrapped up in a
settlement that everybody agrees to.”
The plan is expected to be presented to Judge
Laura Taylor Swain in Federal District Court
in San Juan, P.R., in the next few weeks. But
the approach the board has taken could invite
titanic legal battles and appeals, Mr. Spiotto
said.

That may have been the easy part.

“You want resolution, not litigation,” he said.
“I think there’s a significant risk to what’s
being done.

Some of the island’s creditors — including
the
hedge
fund
Aurelius
Capital
Management, which held up Argentina’s
debt settlement for years for a better deal —
will almost certainly challenge the plan on
the ground that it violates the territory’s 1952
Constitution.

In many ways, Puerto Rico’s collapse has
been uncharted legal territory. It took an act
of Congress in 2016 to create the bankruptcylike law, known as Promesa, that is being
used to deal with the crisis.

At the center of it all are two intertwined
issues. The oversight board wants to cut back
the amount paid to some of those who hold
the territory’s debt while also giving an
unexpectedly good deal to more than 300,000
workers and retirees, some of whom do not
even have Social Security. The good deal for
the pension holders means a worse one for the
holders of Puerto Rico’s debt.

That has turned Puerto Rico into something
of a test case. Although cities and
municipalities — most notably Detroit in
2013 — have declared bankruptcy, states are
not eligible to do so. But a number of them
are dealing with serious financial problems
because of pension costs.
A combination of inadequate funding over
the decades, a wave of retiring baby boomers
and the lingering effects of the 2008 financial
crisis has forced states to reduce benefits,

“You can make social and political
decisions,” said James E. Spiotto, a longtime
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increase funding or both. But a few states —
including Illinois, New Jersey, Kentucky,
Connecticut and Colorado — are still far
behind, and more drastic measures may be
tempting if Puerto Rico can provide a road
map to recovery.

obligation bondholders whose investments
financed the island over the years.
Under the current proposals, 61 percent of the
retirees would keep receiving their full
pensions, said Natalie Jaresko, the oversight
board’s executive director. Other pensions
would be cut on a sliding scale, but even
those owed the most would get 91.5 percent
of their payments. Current employees would
be shifted into individual retirement
accounts.

“If this works — if Promesa works and the
restructuring works — it may make
bankruptcy for states seem like something
that lawmakers should be considering a little
more seriously,” said David A. Skeel Jr., a
University of Pennsylvania law professor
who is on the oversight board and has written
on the possibility of states using bankruptcy.
“But if it doesn’t work, it would have the
opposite effect.”

That’s a better deal than is being offered to
the general-obligation bondholders, who
would get 64 cents on the dollar, at best. And
retirees are being offered a far more generous
deal than expected, given that the island’s
pension system has been stripped bare.

Whether Puerto Rico is able to blaze new
ground in the world of government debt
restructuring will not be decided until after
the courts resolve any challenges to the novel
steps the oversight board has taken: its
treatment of retirees and an attempt to
have $9 billion of its debt declared
unconstitutional.

Normally, the money in a pension fund
secures the benefits. If an employer goes
bankrupt, the participants are still guaranteed
benefits based on what has been set aside: A
fully funded pension system will pay full
benefits, and a partly funded pension system
will pay partial benefits.

Promesa contains a legal requirement that
Puerto Rico “provide adequate funding for
public pension systems” — carefully chosen
language that has given the island legal cover
to keep paying retirees their pensions, even as
it defaulted on bonds that would normally
have been paid first.

But there is no money set aside in Puerto
Rico. The participants in such a case would
normally be considered unsecured creditors
— the kind who typically get a fraction of
what they’re owed. One group of unsecured
creditors, trade vendors to the Puerto Rican
government, is being offered just 9 cents on
the dollar, on average.

The board has essentially switched the usual
order of priority used in bankruptcy: It put
workers and retirees, with their roughly $55
billion in pension obligations, near the front
of the line, and pushed back the general-

The retirees’ terms rival those achieved by
Detroit’s after their city went bankrupt.
(Unlike states, cities are eligible for
bankruptcy unless prohibited by state law.)
Detroit’s retired police officers and
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firefighters are still receiving 100 percent of
their original pensions, with smaller annual
cost-of-living increases, while other retirees
are getting 95.5 percent.

being offered less as part of a hardball
negotiating tactic by the oversight board.
The board said this year that it would
challenge the validity of several billion
dollars’ worth of bonds, including generalobligation bonds that were brought to market
in 2012 and 2014. It says that those bonds
were issued in violation of Puerto Rico’s
constitutional debt ceiling, and that the
people of Puerto Rico should not have to
repay them.

But Detroit’s pension funds were said to be
about two-thirds funded, and a threat to sell
off treasures owned by the Detroit Institute of
Arts raised hundreds of millions of
dollars more from philanthropic and
governmental bodies that were horrified at
the idea of pieces by van Gogh, Matisse and
others going to private collectors.

As a result, only the general-obligation bonds
issued before 2012 would pay the proposed
64 cents on the dollar. Investors who hold the
bonds issued in 2012 are being offered 45
cents, and those holding the 2014 vintage are
being offered 35 cents.

At least one company that stands to lose
money under the proposed Puerto Rico deal
says it is preparing a challenge.
Assured Guaranty, a bond insurer with
exposure to some of Puerto Rico’s debt, said
it was ready to go to court because the deal
threatened to “significantly erode the
municipal bond market’s confidence” and
make it harder for governments to take on big
projects.

Many holders of the older bonds are expected
to take their 64 cents and be done with it. But
holders of the 2012 and 2014 bonds —
including Aurelius — are likely to sue.
Aurelius declined to comment on its plans.
But it has already sued Puerto Rico,
contending that the island must respect its
constitutional pledge of using “all available
resources” to ensure repayment. That suit has
been stayed while the oversight board works
on its plan, but any challenge could use the
same argument.

The proposed deal, the insurer said, is based
on “a number of terms that violate Puerto
Rico law, its Constitution and Promesa.”
Under the island’s Constitution, generalobligation bondholders are said to have “first
claim” on “all available resources” of the
government to ensure the repayment of their
roughly $17 billion of bonds.

Aurelius could also use the legal
argument that got results in the Argentine
case: that the restructuring plan illegally
discriminates against the holders of similar
bonds.

But they’re being offered less than the
pension holders, who are being offered more
than 90 percent of what they’re owed. Some
general-obligation bondholders are being
offered 64 cents on the dollar, but others are

Such lawsuits would be an all-or-nothing
gamble. If the bondholders won, they would
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get the same 64 percent repayment rate as the
holders of the older bonds. If the board won,
the bonds would be voided and the
bondholders would get nothing.

individual retirement accounts under the deal
— voted against it in an early ballot, even
though the American Federation of Teachers
had urged a yes vote.

That group of bondholders has some
company in opposing the deal. Puerto Rican
teachers — who would be moved into

Retired teachers will not cast ballots until
after the restructuring plan is introduced in
court.
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“Puerto Rico Faces Hedge Fund Lawsuits as U.S. Reprieve Ends”
Bloomberg
Michelle Kaske
May 2, 2017
Puerto Rico is facing a fresh round of creditor
lawsuits after a temporary reprieve on
litigation was lifted, exposing the distressed
Caribbean island to the consequences of the
defaults on much of its $70 billion of debt.

government so far unable to reach an
agreement with bondholders, such lawsuits
threaten to expose Puerto Rico to adverse
legal rulings and could lead the island and its
federal overseers to use bankruptcy-like
procedures to cut its debts in court.

Hedge funds holding $1.4 billion of generalobligation
bonds
sold
in
2014,
including Aurelius
Capital
Management and Monarch
Alternative
Capital, sued the commonwealth in New
York state court in Manhattan, seeking
payment on overdue principal and interest.
Insurer Ambac Financial Group Inc. and
funds that own sales-tax backed bonds sued
in the U.S. District Court of San Juan in an
effort to block the government from spending
that money before bondholders are paid.

That process was created under U.S.
legislation enacted last year to help Puerto
Rico arrest its fiscal crisis, given the
difficulty of restructuring debt sold by more
than a dozen agencies and backed by varying
legal pledges. Analysts have speculated that
Puerto Rico would need to utilize such a
court-supervised proceeding to force
creditors to accept losses.
The lawsuits, similar to others that were filed
months ago, came after a stay imposed by the
federal rescue law lapsed on Monday night.

“They’re breaking every agreement and
security feature they set up to borrow the
money,” said Daniel Solender, head of
municipals at Lord Abbett & Co., which
manages $19 billion of state and local debt,
including commonwealth securities. “The
creditors have to challenge that because the
rules have been broken.”

In one of the new cases, funds holding about
$1.9 billion of senior sales-tax bonds know as
Cofinas -- including those run by Whitebox
Advisors, Merced Partners and Tilden Park
Capital Management -- sued Governor
Ricardo Rossello and his administration to
stop a fiscal plan that diverts the revenue to
the commonwealth’s general fund, which
they said violates the U.S. and Puerto Rico
constitutions. Such shifts raise the risk that
the island will default on the bonds, and the

The cases filed Tuesday are the first of what’s
expected to be a wave of new legal challenges
from investors seeking to force the U.S.
territory to pay what it owes. With the
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fiscal plan doesn’t specify which creditors
have the highest legal claim to the small share
of money allocated to bondholders.

declare the fiscal plan unconstitutional and
illegal because it requires using sales-tax
revenue for general-fund expenses.

Puerto Rico has already defaulted on its
general-obligation bonds, the securities
behind the lawsuit filed in New York state
court.

Jose Luis Cedeno, a spokesman for the
federal oversight board, didn’t have an
immediate comment.
While negotiations between Puerto Rico and
its creditors have so far failed to produce a
restructuring deal, the commonwealth is still
engaged in “meaningful conversations” with
certain bondholders and creditor groups,
Gerardo Portela Franco, executive director of
the island’s Fiscal Agency and Financial
Advisory Authority, said in a statement
Monday.

Senior Cofinas with a 6.05 percent coupon
and maturing in 2036, the most-actively
traded sales-tax bonds in the past three
months, changed hands Tuesday at an
average 61.3 cents on the dollar, up from an
average 60.4 cents the day before, data
compiled by Bloomberg show. General
obligations due in 2041, the most active
Tuesday, traded for an average of 59.5 cents
on the dollar, up from 59.1 cents Monday.

The cases are Aristeia Horizons LP v.
Rossello, 17-01566; and Ambac Assurance
Corp. v. Commonwealth, 17-01567, both in
U.S. District Court, District of Puerto Rico
(San Juan). Aurelius Investment LLC v.
Commonwealth
of
Puerto
Rico,
652357/2017, New York State Supreme
Court, New York County (Manhattan.)

Yennifer Alvarez, a spokeswoman for the
governor, didn’t immediately respond to a
phone message and email.
Ambac, which insures about $1.3 billion of
senior Cofinas, filed a similar suit against
Rossello and the members of Puerto Rico’s
federal oversight board, asking the court to
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“First Circuit Declares Appointment of FOMB Members Violates Appointments
Clause”

Law.com
Carlos J. Cuevas
March 1, 2019
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes
omitted]

because the Board Members of the FOMB
had acted under color of law and it would be
counter-productive to negate the actions of
the FOMB because thousands of people have
relied upon the acts of the FOMB. The court
stayed enforcement of its decision for ninety
days to allow the FOMB to function and to
permit the Board Members of the FOMB to
go through the Senate confirmation process.

The Puerto Rico Oversight, Management,
and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA) is
the federal legislation that was enacted to
provide a special bankruptcy framework for
Puerto Rico. 48 U.S.C. §§2101 et seq. An
important component of PROMESA is the
establishment of a Financial Oversight Board
(FOMB) with oversight powers over the
financial affairs of the Puerto Rican
government and sole authority over the
Puerto Rico bankruptcy cases. 48 U.S.C.
§§2121(b), 2121(d), and 2124(j)(1). The
members of the FOMB are appointed by the
President. 48 U.S.C. §2101(e)(2).

Discussion
The Territorial Clause of the U.S.
Constitution Does Not Supersede the
Appointments Clause of the U.S.
Constitution. The first issue that the court
addressed was whether the Territorial Clause
of the U.S. Constitution superseded the
Appointments Clause of the U.S.
Constitution. The Territorial Clause provides
Congress with the following authority over
the territories of the United States:

In Aurelius Investment v. Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico, 2019 WL 642328 (1st Cir.
2019) the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit held that the appointment of the
members of the FOMB (the Board Members)
violated the Appointments Clause of the U.S.
Constitution. The Board Members are
officers of the United States, and therefore
they are subject to Senate confirmation.
However, the court refused to dismiss the
Puerto Rico bankruptcy case. The First
Circuit ruled that under the de facto officer
doctrine the acts of the FOMB were lawful

power to dispose of and make all
needful Rules and Regulations
respecting the Territory … belonging
to the United States.
The Appointments Clause states:
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[The President] … shall nominate,
and by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, shall
appoint … all other Officers of the
United States, whose Appointments
are not herein otherwise provided for,
and which shall be established by
Law: but the Congress may by Law
vest the Appointment of such inferior
Officers, as they think proper, in the
President alone, in the Courts of Law,
or in the Heads of Departments.

The court also rejected the argument that the
Insular Cases negated the operation of the
Appointments Clause in Puerto Rico:
Finally, nothing about the “Insular
Cases” casts doubt over our foregoing
analysis. This discredited lineage of
cases,
which
ushered
the
unincorporated territories doctrine,
hovers like a dark cloud over this
case. To our knowledge there is no
case even intimating that if Congress
acts pursuant to its authority under the
Territorial Clause it is excused from
conforming with the Appointments
Clause, whether this be by virtue of
the “Insular Cases” or otherwise. Nor
could there be, for it would amount to
the
emasculation
from
the
Constitution of one of its most
important structural pillars. We thus
have no trouble in concluding that the
Constitution’s structural provisions
are not limited by geography and
follow the United States into its
unincorporated territories. (Footnotes
omitted).

The court thought that the resolution of this
issue was a straightforward issue of
Constitutional interpretation. The Territorial
Clause was a general clause in the U.S.
Constitution. The Appointments Clause was
a specific clause. An important principle of
Constitutional interpretation is that the
specific governs over the general. The First
Circuit stated:
Nowhere does the Territorial Clause
reference the subject matter of federal
appointments or the process to
effectuate them. On the other hand,
federal officer appointment is, of
course, the raison d’etre of the
Appointments Clause. It cannot be
clearer or more unequivocal that the
Appointments Clause mandates that it
be applied to “all … Officers of the
United States.” U.S. Const. art II, §2,
cl. 2 (emphasis added). Thus, we find
in answering the first question before
us a prime candidate for application
of the specialibus canon and for the
strict
enforcement
of
the
constitutional mandate contained in
the Appointments Clause.

The Members of the FOMB Are Principal
Officers of the United States. The next issue
that the First Circuit addressed was whether
the Board Members are officers of the United
States. The court applied a three-part test to
determine whether Board Members are
“Officers of the United States” and therefore
subject to the Appointments Clause. The
three-part test was derived from Supreme
Court case law:
(1) the appointee occupies a
“continuing” position established by
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federal law; (2) the appointee
“exercis[es] significant authority”;
and (3) the significant authority is
exercised “pursuant to the laws of the
United States.”

removable by the President and are not
directed or supervised by others who were
nominated by the President and confirmed by
the Senate.
The Remedy and the Application of the De
Facto Officers Doctrine. The First Circuit
was averse to dismissing the Puerto Rico
bankruptcy case. The court stated:

A Board Member has a “continuing position”
under a federal law because PROMESA
provides for his or her appointment to an
initial term of three years and he or she can
thereafter be reappointed and serve until a
successor takes office. A Board Member
exercises significant authority because the
FOMB has sole authority over the Puerto
Rico bankruptcy case. The FOMB has the
authority to countermand Puerto Rico laws or
regulations that are inconsistent with
PROMESA. Board Members, moreover,
exercised significant authority pursuant to
federal law:

Second, we reject appellants’
invitation to dismiss the Title III
petitions and cast a specter of
invalidity over all of the Board’s
actions until the present day. To the
contrary, we find that application of
the de facto officer doctrine is
especially appropriate in this case.
The court applied the de facto officer
doctrine:

Third, the Board Members’ authority
is exercised “pursuant to the laws of
the United States.” The Board
Members trace their authority directly
and exclusively to a federal law,
PROMESA. That federal law
provides both their authority and their
duties.

An ancient tool of equity, the de
facto officer
doctrine
“confers
validity upon acts performed by a
person acting under the color of
official title even though it is later
discovered that the legality of that
person’s appointment … to office is
deficient.”

The court also held that the Board Members
are “principal” officers, and thus, must be
nominated by the President and confirmed by
the Senate. An “inferior” officer is not subject
to the Appointments Clause. An “inferior”
officer was a government official whose
work is directed and supervised at some level
by others who were appointed by Presidential
nomination with the advice and consent of
the Senate. On the other hand, Board
Members are only answerable to and only

The facts warranted the application of the de
facto officer doctrine. The Board Members
were acting under color of authority. The
Board Members acted in good faith. Until the
resolution of this appeal there was never any
question of the Board Members’ authority
under PROMESA.
The First Circuit applied the de facto officer
doctrine
because
of
prudential
considerations:
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We fear that awarding to appellants
the full extent of their requested relief
will have negative consequences for
the many, if not thousands, of
innocent third parties who have relied
on the Board’s actions until now. In
addition, a summary invalidation of
everything the Board has done since
2016 will likely introduce further
delay into a historic debt restructuring
process that was already turned
upside down once before by the
ravage of the hurricanes that affected
Puerto Rico in September 2017.

Conclusion
The First Circuit reached a legally correct
decision that is equitable and pragmatic. The
court was cognizant of the potential
irreparable damage that its decision could do
to Puerto Rico. In essence, the court applied
what was the equivalent of the equitable
mootness doctrine because after almost two
years it declined to unravel the Puerto Rico
bankruptcy case. The dismissal of the Puerto
Rico bankruptcy case would have resulted in
the dissolution of the automatic stay, and
unmanageable litigation that could have
destroyed Puerto Rico. If the Puerto Rico
bankruptcy case had been dismissed, then
millions of dollars in professional fees
incurred by Puerto Rico could have been
wasted. Therefore, the First Circuit reached
the correct equitable and legal conclusion.

The First Circuit did not invalidate any of the
FOMB’s actions. The court stayed the
enforcement of its Decision and Order for 90
days to enable the Board Members to be
confirmed by the Senate.
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